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Tommasi, L., & Vallortigara, G. (2000). Searching for the center: spatial cognition in the domestic chick (Gallus gallus). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 26(4), 477–486.
Abstract: Chicks learned to find food hidden under sawdust by ground-scratching in the central position of the floor of a closed arena. When tested inan arena of identical shape but a larger area, chicks searched at 2 different locations, one corresponding to the correct distance (i.e., center) in the smaller (training) arena and the other to the actual center of the test arena. When tested in an arena of the same shape but a smaller area, chicks searched in the center of it. These results suggest that chicks are able to encode information on the absolute and relative distance of the food from the walls of the arena. After training in the presence of a landmark located at the center of the arena, animals searched at the center even after the removal of the landmark. Marked changes in the height of the walls of the arena produced some displacement in searching behavior, suggesting that chicks used the angular size of the walls to estimate distances.
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Pennisi, E. (1997). Schizophrenia clues from monkeys (Vol. 277).
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Scordato, E. S., & Drea, C. M. (2007). Scents and sensibility: information content of olfactory signals in the ringtailed lemur, Lemur catta. Anim. Behav., 73(2), 301–314.
Abstract: The function of olfactory signalling in social species is less well understood than in asocial species. Consequently, we examined olfactory communication in the ringtailed lemur, a socially complex primate that retains a functional vomeronasal organ, has well-developed scent glands and shows a suite of scent-marking behaviour. To assess the information content of different types of scent gland secretions, we decoupled olfactory cues from the visual and behavioural modalities with which scent marking is normally associated. We presented male and female subjects (signal receivers) with a series of choice tests between odours derived from conspecific donors (signal senders) varying by sex, age, social status and reproductive condition. We additionally examined the influence of the receivers' reproductive state and familiarity with the signaller. The reproductive condition, social status and familiarity of senders and receivers affected signal transmission; specifically, male receivers attended most to the odours of conspecifics in breeding condition and to the odours of familiar, dominant animals. By contrast, females varied their responses according to both their own reproductive state and that of the sender. Based on male and female patterns of countermarking, we suggest that scent marking serves a function in intergroup spacing and intrasexual competition for both sexes, as might be expected in a female-dominant species. By contrast, minimal female interest in male odours counters a female mate choice function for scent marking in this species. Nevertheless, scent marks are critical to male-male competition and, therefore, may be subject to sexual selection.
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Katz, J. S., & Wright, A. A. (2006). Same/different abstract-concept learning by pigeons. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(1), 80–86.
Abstract: Eight pigeons were trained and tested in a simultaneous same/different task. After pecking an upper picture, they pecked a lower picture to indicate same or a white rectangle to indicate different. Increases in the training set size from 8 to 1,024 items produced improved transfer from 51.3% to 84.6%. This is the first evidence that pigeons can perform a two-item same/different task as accurately with novel items as training items and both above 80% correct. Fixed-set control groups ruled out training time or transfer testing as producing the high level of abstract-concept learning. Comparisons with similar experiments with rhesus and capuchin monkeys showed that the ability to learn the same/different abstract concept was similar but that pigeons require more training exemplars.
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Uller, C., Jaeger, R., Guidry, G., & Martin, C. (2003). Salamanders ( Plethodon cinereus) go for more: rudiments of number in an amphibian. Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 105–112.
Abstract: Techniques traditionally used in developmental research with infants have been widely used with nonhuman primates in the investigation of comparative cognitive abilities. Recently, researchers have shown that human infants and monkeys select the larger of two numerosities in a spontaneous forced-choice discrimination task. Here we adopt the same method to assess in a series of experiments spontaneous choice of the larger of two numerosities in a species of amphibian, red-backed salamanders ( Plethodon cinereus). The findings indicate that salamanders “go for more,” just like human babies and monkeys. This rudimentary capacity is a type of numerical discrimination that is spontaneously present in this amphibian.
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Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(9), 5359–5362.
Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.
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Beran, M. J. (2007). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) succeed on a computerized test designed to assess conservation of discrete quantity. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 37–45.
Abstract: Conservation of quantity occurs through recognition that changes in the physical arrangement of a set of items do not change the quantity of items in that set. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were presented with a computerized quantity judgment task. Monkeys were rewarded for selecting the greater quantity of items in one of two horizontal arrays of items on the screen. On some trials, after a correct selection, no reward was given but one of the arrays was manipulated. In some cases, this manipulation involved moving items closer together or farther apart to change the physical arrangement of the array without changing the quantity of items in the array. In other cases, additional items were added to the initially smaller array so that it became quantitatively larger. Monkeys then made another selection from the two rows of items. Monkeys were sensitive to these manipulations, changing their selections when the number of items in the rows changed but not when the arrangement only was changed. Therefore, monkeys responded on the basis of the quantity of items, and they were not distracted by non-quantitative manipulations of the sets.
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Washburn, D. A., Smith, J. D., & Shields, W. E. (2006). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) immediately generalize the uncertain response. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 185–189.
Abstract: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.
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Beran, M. J., Smith, J. D., Redford, J. S., & Washburn, D. A. (2006). Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) monitor uncertainty during numerosity judgments. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 111–119.
Abstract: Two rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) judged arrays of dots on a computer screen as having more or fewer dots than a center value that was never presented in trials. After learning a center value, monkeys were given an uncertainty response that let them decline to make the numerosity judgment on that trial. Across center values (3-7), errors occurred most often for sets adjacent in numerosity to the center value. The monkeys also used the uncertainty response most frequently on these difficult trials. A 2nd experiment showed that monkeys' responses reflected numerical magnitude and not the surface-area illumination of the displays. This research shows that monkeys' uncertainty-monitoring capacity extends to the domain of numerical cognition. It also shows monkeys' use of the purest uncertainty response possible, uncontaminated by any secondary motivator.
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Amant, R. S., & Horton, T. E. (2008). Revisiting the definition of animal tool use. Anim. Behav., 75(4), 1199–1208.
Abstract: Benjamin Beck's definition of tool use has served the field of animal cognition well for over 25 years (Beck 1980, Animal Tool Behavior: the Use and Manufacture of Tools, New York, Garland STPM). This article proposes a new, more explanatory definition that accounts for tool use in terms of two complementary subcategories of behaviours: behaviours aimed at altering a target object by mechanical means and behaviours that mediate the flow of information between the tool user and the environment or other organisms in the environment. The conceptual foundation and implications of the new definition are contrasted with those of existing definitions, particularly Beck's. The new definition is informally evaluated with respect to a set of scenarios that highlights differences from Beck's definition as well as those of others in the literature.
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