Abstract: We tested for social learning and imitation in common marmosets using an artificial foraging task and trained conspecific demonstrators. We trained a demonstrator marmoset to open an artificial fruit, providing a full demonstration of the task to be learned. Another marmoset provided a partial demonstration, controlling for stimulus enhancement effects, by eating food from the outside of the apparatus. We thus compared three observer groups, each consisting of four animals: those that received the full demonstration, those that received the partial demonstration, and a control group that saw no demonstration prior to testing. Although none of the observer marmosets succeeded in opening the artificial fruit during the test periods, there were clear effects of demonstration type. Those that saw the full demonstration manipulated the apparatus more overall, whereas those from the control group manipulated it the least of the three groups. Those from the full-demonstration group also contacted the particular parts of the artificial fruit that they had seen touched (localised stimulus enhancement) to a greater extent than the other two groups. There was also an interaction between the number of hand and mouth touches made to the artificial fruit for the full- and partial-demonstration groups. Whether or not these data represent evidence for imitation is discussed. We also propose that the clear differences between the groups suggest that social learning mechanisms provide real benefits to these animals in terms of developing novel food-processing skills analogous to the one presented here.

Abstract: The ability to act on information flexibly is one of the cornerstones of intelligent behavior. As particularly informative example, tool-oriented behavior has been investigated to determine to which extent nonhuman animals understand means-end relations, object affordances, and have specific motor skills. Even planning with foresight, goal-directed problem solving and immediate causal inference have been a focus of research. However, these cognitive abilities may not be restricted to tool-using animals but may be found also in animals that show high levels of curiosity, object exploration and manipulation, and extractive foraging behavior. The kea, a New Zealand parrot, is a particularly good example. We here review findings from laboratory experiments and field observations of keas revealing surprising cognitive capacities in the physical domain. In an experiment with captive keas, the success rate of individuals that were allowed to observe a trained conspecific was significantly higher than that of naive control subjects due to their acquisition of some functional understanding of the task through observation. In a further experiment using the string-pulling task, a well-probed test for means-end comprehension, we found the keas finding an immediate solution that could not be improved upon in nine further trials. We interpreted their performance as insightful in the sense of being sensitive of the relevant functional properties of the task and thereby producing a new adaptive response without trial-and-error learning. Together, these findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the distribution of higher cognitive skills in the animal kingdom by showing high levels of sensorimotor intelligence in animals that do not use tools. In conclusion, we suggest that the 'Technical intelligence hypothesis' (Byrne, Machiavellian intelligence II: extensions and evaluations, pp 289-211, 1997), which has been proposed to explain the origin of the ape/monkey grade-shift in intelligence by a selection pressure upon an increased efficiency in foraging behavior, should be extended, that is, applied to some birds as well.

Abstract: Five dyads of chimpanzees were tested in a competitive situation, as a pilot study to examine chimpanzees' understanding of conspecifics' knowledge. A human experimenter baited one of five containers in an outdoor enclosure. Chimpanzee A (witness) could see where the food was hidden, while chimpanzee B (witness-of-witness) could not see the baited place but could observe the chimpanzee A watching the food being hidden. Then the two were released into the enclosure. This procedure was repeated for a certain number of days along with a control condition in which neither could see the baited location. The witness-of-witness developed tactics to forestall the witness in two pairs. The witness misled the witness-of-witness by taking a route to an empty container in several cases. These episodes might represent examples of deception. Tactics and counter-tactics thus developed through the interaction between the witness and the witness-of-witness, illustrating the high social intelligence of chimpanzees. An examination of the changes in tactics suggests a possibility that the witness-of-witness understands the witness's knowledge of the location of hidden food.

Abstract: Rhesus monkeys received concurrent within-session training on eight, two-choice object pairs and then underwent successive reversals of these problems. Initially, reversals required about six times more training than acquisition with no improvement over seven successive reversals. Surprisingly, performance on these eight problems was unimpaired if they were embedded in different eight-problem tasks, thereby indicating a release from proactive interference. When the original eight problems again underwent successive reversal, no improvement was seen over seven reversals, although there was significantly less error-per-reversal than in the initial test. Subsequently, monkeys appeared to be developing a learning set for successive reversal because performance on successive reversal of eight novel problems was not different from that seen with the old familiar task. Set acquisition was confirmed when proficient reversal was eventually achieved on both old and new concurrent tasks. Thus, “concurrent reversal set” did develop, but it required arduous training to overcome proactive interference effects on memory. The ubiquitous influence of measurement context on organization of monkey memory was noted.

Abstract: Planning is an important component of cognition that contributes, for example, to efficient movement through space. In the current study we presented novel two-dimensional alley mazes to four chimpanzees and three capuchin monkeys to identify the nature and efficiency of planning in relation to varying task parameters. All the subjects solved more mazes without error than expected by chance, providing compelling evidence that both species planned their choices in some manner. The probability of making a correct choice on mazes designed to be more demanding and presented later in the testing series was higher than on earlier, simpler mazes (chimpanzees), or unchanged (capuchin monkeys), suggesting microdevelopment of strategic choice. Structural properties of the mazes affected both species' choices. Capuchin monkeys were less likely than chimpanzees to take a correct path that initially led away from the goal but that eventually led to the goal. Chimpanzees were more likely to make an error by passing a correct path than by turning onto a wrong path. Chimpanzees and one capuchin made more errors on choices farther in sequence from the goal. Each species corrected errors before running into the end of an alley in approximately 40% of cases. Together, these findings suggest nascent planning abilities in each species, and the prospect for significant development of strategic planning capabilities on tasks presenting multiple simultaneous or sequential spatial relations. The computerized maze paradigm appears well suited to investigate movement planning and spatial perception in human and nonhuman primates alike.