Abstract: Despite the long divergent evolutionary history of birds and mammals, early avian and primate cognitive development have many convergent features. Some of these features were investigated with a series of tasks designed to assess human infant development. The tasks were presented to young parakeets to assess their means-end problem solving abilities. Examples of these early skills are: attaining and playing with objects, retrieving rewards through use of a stick or rake, or by pulling in rewards on supports or on the ends of strings. Twelve such tasks were presented to 11 young yellow-crowned parakeets ( Cyanoramphus auriceps) to investigate their natural abilities; there was no attempt to train them to do those tasks that they did not spontaneously perform. Six of the birds were parent-raised and five were hand-raised. The birds completed 9 of the 12 tasks, demonstrating all the Piagetian sensorimotor circular reactions, but they failed to hand-watch (“claw-watch”), to stack objects, or to fill a container. Their ordinality on the tasks differed from that of human infants in that locomotion to obtain objects occurred earlier in the avian sequence of development and the mid-level tasks were performed by the two groups of avian subjects in a mixed order perhaps indicating that these abilities may not emerge in any particular order for these birds as they supposedly do for human infants. The hand-raised group needed fewer sessions to complete these means-end tasks.

Abstract: It has been suggested that the system behind implicit memory in humans is evolutionarily old and that animals should readily show priming. In Experiment 1, a picture fragment completion test was used to test priming in pigeons. After pecking a warning stimulus, pigeons were shown 2 partially obscured pictures from different categories and were always reinforced for choosing a picture from one of the categories. On control trials, the warning stimulus was a picture of some object (not from the S+ or S- category), on study trials the warning stimulus was a picture to be categorized on the next trial, and on test trials the warning stimulus was a randomly chosen picture and the S+ picture was the warning stimulus seen on the previous trial. Categorization was better on study and test trials than on control trials. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that the priming effect was caused by the pigeons' responding to familiarity by using warning stimuli from both S+ and S- categories. Experiment 3 investigated the time course of the priming effect.

Abstract: The diversified leadership hypothesis proposes that different individuals within a school of fish act as leaders in different circumstances. This `circumstantial leadership' results from inter-individual behavioral variability and a `cohesion-dispersion' tendency modulated by `failure-success' contingencies. The hypothesis predicts that when offered different pathways to escape the restriction of their swimming space, individuals within a group of fish will show 1. (a) consistent passage orders in each pathway, but2. (b) different passage orders in different pathways. Using an avoidance paddle and three different groups of fish (Aphyocharax erithrurus) the results confirmed prediction 1. (a) while prediction2. (b) was verified only in one group.

Abstract: Primate species differ in their imitative performance, perhaps reflecting differences in imitative capacity. The developmentally earliest form of imitation in humans, neonatal imitation, occurs in early interactions with social partners, and may be a more accurate index of innate capacity than imitation of actions on objects, which requires more cognitive ability. This study assessed imitative capacity in five neonatal chimpanzees, within a narrow age range (7-15 days of age), by testing responses to facial and vocal actions with two different test paradigms (structured and communicative). Imitation of mouth opening was found in both paradigms. In the communicative paradigm, significant agreement was found between infant actions and demonstrations. Additionally, chimpanzees matched the sequence of three actions of the TC model, but only on the second demonstration. Newborn chimpanzees matched more modeled actions in the communicative test than in the structured paradigm. These performances of chimpanzees, at birth, are in agreement with the literature, supporting a conclusion that imitative capacity is not unique to the human species. Developmental histories must be more fully considered in the cross-species study of imitation, as there is a greater degree of innate imitative capacity than previously known. Socialization practices interact with innate and developing competencies to determine the outcome of imitation tests later in life.

Abstract: The ability to rehearse possible future courses of action in the mind is an important feature of advanced social cognition in humans, and the “social brain” hypothesis implies that it might also be a feature of primate social cognition. We tested two chimpanzees, six orangutans and 63 children aged 3-7 years on a set of four puzzle boxes, half of which were presented with an opportunity to observe the box before being allowed to open it (“prior view”), the others being given without an opportunity to examine the boxes before handling them (“no prior view”). When learning effects are partialled out, puzzle boxes in the “prior view” condition were opened significantly faster than boxes given in the “no prior view” condition by the children, but not by either of the great apes. The three species differ significantly in the speed with which they opened boxes in the “no prior view” condition. The three species' performance on this task was a function of relative frontal lobe volume, suggesting that it may be possible to identify quantitative neuropsychological differences between species.