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Milgram, N. W. (2003). Cognitive Experience and Its Effect on Age-Dependent Cognitive Decline in Beagle Dogs. Neurochemical Research, 28(11), 1677–1682.
Abstract: Test-sophisticated beagle dogs show marked age sensitivity in a size discrimination learning task, with old and senior dogs performing significantly more poorly than young dogs. By contrast, age differences in learning were not seen in dogs naive with respect to neuropsychological test experience. These results indicate that old animals benefit less from prior cognitive experience than young animals, which is an example of an age-dependent loss in plasticity. This finding also suggests that behaviorally experienced animals are a more useful model of human cognitive aging than behaviorally naive animals. We also looked at the effect of a program of behavioral enrichment in aged dogs. One year of enrichment did not lead to significant differences, but after 2 years the behaviorally enriched group performed significantly better than the control group. The effect after 2 years indicates that a prolonged program of cognitive enrichment can serve as an effective intervention in aged dogs. These findings demonstrate that cognitive abilities in aged animals can be modified by providing behavioral experience, indicating that cognitive abilities remain moderately plastic, even in very old animals.
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Hayashi, M., & Matsuzawa, T. (2003). Cognitive development in object manipulation by infant chimpanzees. Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 225–233.
Abstract: This study focuses on the development of spontaneous object manipulation in three infant chimpanzees during their first 2 years of life. The three infants were raised by their biological mothers who lived among a group of chimpanzees. A human tester conducted a series of cognitive tests in a triadic situation where mothers collaborated with the researcher during the testing of the infants. Four tasks were presented, taken from normative studies of cognitive development of Japanese infants: inserting objects into corresponding holes in a box, seriating nesting cups, inserting variously shaped objects into corresponding holes in a template, and stacking up wooden blocks. The mothers had already acquired skills to perform these manipulation tasks. The infants were free to observe the mothers' manipulative behavior from immediately after birth. We focused on object-object combinations that were made spontaneously by the infant chimpanzees, without providing food reinforcement for any specific behavior that the infants performed. The three main findings can be summarized as follows. First, there was precocious appearance of object-object combination in infant chimpanzees: the age of onset (8-11 months) was comparable to that in humans (around 10 months old). Second, object-object combinations in chimpanzees remained at a low frequency between 11 and 16 months, then increased dramatically at the age of approximately 1.5 years. At the same time, the accuracy of these object-object combinations also increased. Third, chimpanzee infants showed inserting behavior frequently and from an early age but they did not exhibit stacking behavior during their first 2 years of life, in clear contrast to human data.
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Cooper, J. J., Ashton, C., Bishop, S., West, R., Mills, D. S., & Young, R. J. (2003). Clever hounds: social cognition in the domestic dog (Canis familiaris). Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 81(3), 229–244.
Abstract: This paper reviews the reasons why domestic dogs make good models to investigate cognitive processes related to social living and describes experimental approaches that can be adopted to investigate such processes in dogs. Domestic dogs are suitable models for investigating social cognition skills for three broad reasons. First, dogs originated from wolves, social animals that engage in a number of co-operative behaviours, such as hunting and that may have evolved cognitive abilities that help them predict and interpret the actions of other animals. Second, during domestication dogs are likely to have been selected for mental adaptations for their roles in human society such as herding or companionship. Third, domestic dogs live in a human world and “enculturation” may facilitate the development of relevant mental skills in dogs. Studies of social cognition in animals commonly use experimental paradigms originally developed for pre-verbal human infants. Preferential gaze, for example, can be used as a measure of attention or “surprise” in studies using expectancy violation. This approach has been used to demonstrate simple numerical competence in dogs. Dogs also readily use both conspecific and human social signals (e.g. looking or pointing) as information sources to locate hidden rewards such as food or favourite toys. Such abilities make dogs particularly good models for investigating perspective-taking tasks, where animals are required to discriminate between apparently knowledgeable and apparently ignorant informants.
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Cohen, J., Pardy, S., Solway, H., & Graham, H. (2003). Chunking versus foraging search patterns by rats in the hierarchically baited radial maze. Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 93–104.
Abstract: Rats were exposed to a radial maze containing six black smooth arms and six wire-grid-covered arms and a striped 'exit arm' in experiment 1. The probability of a black or grid arm being baited (5/6 vs 1/6) with sunflower seeds was associated with its proximal cue for some rats (the Relevant Arm Cue group) but not for others (the Irrelevant Arm Cue group). All rats could terminate a trial and receive a highly preferred morsel of apple by entering the exit arm only after having sampled all six seed-baited arms. Relevant Arm Cue rats usually chose some arms from the more densely baited set before choosing an arm from the less densely baited set and made fewer reentries than Irrelevant Arm Cue rats. Although such clustered, higher choice accuracy in the Relevant Arm Cue group corresponds to human clustered, better recall of verbal items from lists hierarchically organized by categories, these rats did not similarly exhaustively retrieve items (arm locations). That is, when required to terminate a trial by entering the 'exit' arm for an apple morsel after having sampled all seed-baited arms, both groups were equally unable to withhold making nonrewarded premature exits. This nonexhaustive foraging search pattern was maintained in the next two experiments in which the radial maze was reduced to three black and three grid arms along with the striped 'exit' arm and in which black and grid arm cues were paired with number of seeds (eight or one) in an arm for Relevant Arm Cue rats. Although Relevant Arm Cue rats displayed perfect clustering by entering all eight-seeded arms before a one-seeded arm, they made more premature exits and reentries into eight-seeded arms in experiment 2 or when forced to enter all eight-seeded arms in experiment 3 than did Irrelevant Arm Cue rats. These foraging tendencies prevent accurate estimations of the amount of information (i.e., arm locations) rats can 'chunk'.
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Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2003). Choice based on exclusion in pigeons. Psychon Bull Rev, 10(4), 959–964.
Abstract: When humans acquire a conditional discrimination and are given a novel-sample-comparison choice, they often reject a comparison known to be associated with a different sample and choose the alternative comparison by default (or by exclusion). In Experiment 1, we found that if, following matching training, we replaced both of the samples, acquisition took five times longer than if we replaced only one of the samples. Apparently, the opportunity to reject one of the comparisons facilitated the association of the other sample with the remaining comparison. In Experiment 2, we first trained pigeons to treat two samples differently (to associate Sample A with Comparison 1 and Sample B with Comparison 2) and then trained them to associate one of those samples with a new comparison (e.g., Sample A with Comparison 3) and to associate a novel sample (Sample C) with a different, new comparison (Comparison 4). When Sample B then replaced Sample C, the pigeons showed a significant tendency to choose Comparison 4 over Comparison 3. Thus, when given the opportunity, pigeons will choose by exclusion.
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Tomasello M., Call J., & Hare B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological states – the question is which ones and to what extent. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7, 153–156.
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Povinelli, D. J., & Vonk, J. (2003). Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7(4), 157–160.
Abstract: Chimpanzees undoubtedly form concepts related to the statistical regularities in behavior. But do they also construe such abstractions in terms of mental states – that is, do they possess a [`]theory of mind'? Although both anecdotal and experimental data have been marshaled to support this idea, we show that no explanatory power or economy of expression is gained by such an assumption. We suggest that additional experiments will be unhelpful as long as they continue to rely upon determining whether subjects interpret behavioral invariances in terms of mental states. We propose a paradigm shift to overcome this limitation.
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Pinchbeck, G. L., Clegg, P. D., Proudman, C. J., Morgan, K. L., & French, N. P. (2003). Case-control study to investigate risk factors for horse falls in hurdle racing in England and Wales. Vet. Rec., 152(19), 583–587.
Abstract: Between March 1, 2000 and August 31, 2001, a case-control study was conducted on 12 racecourses in England and Wales to identify and quantify the risk factors associated with horse falls in hurdle races. The cases and controls were defined so that variables relating to the horse, the jockey, the race and racecourse, and the jump could be considered. The cases were defined as a jumping effort at a hurdle flight that resulted in a fall, and the controls were defined as a successful jump over a hurdle at any of the 12 racecourses within 14 days before or after the case fall. Conditional logistic regression was used to examine the univariable and multivariable relationships between the predictor variables and the risk of falling. The risk of falling was significantly associated with the position of the jump in the race, and with the distance and speed of the race. A horse's previous racing experience and history were also significantly associated with the risk of falling and horses participating in their first hurdle race were at almost five times greater risk of falling than horses that had hurdled before.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Davis, J. M. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia, 41(2), 221–228.
Abstract: Stable cooperation requires that each party's pay-offs exceed those available through individual action. The present experimental study on brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) investigated if decisions about cooperation are (a) guided by the amount of competition expected to follow the cooperation, and (b) made instantaneously or only after a period of familiarization. Pairs of adult monkeys were presented with a mutualistic cooperative task with variable opportunities for resource monopolization (clumped versus dispersed rewards), and partner relationships (kin versus nonkin). After pre-training, each pair of monkeys (N=11) was subjected to six tests, consisting of 15 2 min trials each, with rewards available to both parties. Clumped reward distribution had an immediate negative effect on cooperation: this effect was visible right from the start, and remained visible even if clumped trials alternated with dispersed trials. The drop in cooperation was far more dramatic for nonkin than kin, which was explained by the tendency of dominant nonkin to claim more than half of the rewards under the clumped condition. The immediacy of responses suggests a decision-making process based on predicted outcome of cooperation. Decisions about cooperation thus take into account both the opportunity for and the likelihood of subsequent competition over the spoils.
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Nakamaru, M., & Sasaki, A. (2003). Can transitive inference evolve in animals playing the hawk-dove game? J. Theor. Biol., 222(4), 461–470.
Abstract: What should an individual do if there are no reliable cues to the strength of a competitor when fighting with it for resources? We herein examine the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the hawk-dove game, if the opponent's resource-holding potential (RHP) can only indirectly be inferred from the outcome of past interactions in the population. The strategies we examined include the classical mixed strategy in which no information on past games is utilized, the `imprinting' strategy in which a player increases/decreases its aggressiveness if it wins/loses a game, the `immediate inference' strategy in which a player can infer the strength of those opponents it fought before, and the `transitive inference' strategy in which a player can infer the strength of a new opponent through a third party with which both players have fought before. Invasibility analysis for each pair of strategies revealed that (i) the transitive-inference strategy can always invade the mixed strategy and the imprinting strategy, and itself refuses invasion by these strategies; (ii) the largest advantage for transitive inference is achieved when the number of games played per individual in one generation is small and when the cost of losing an escalated game is large; (iii) the immediate inference, rather than the transitive inference, can be an ESS if the cost of fighting is small; (iv) a strong linear ranking is established in the population of transitive-inference strategists, though it does not perfectly correlate to the ranking by actual RHPs. We found that the advantage of the transitive inference is not in its ability to correct a misassessment (it is actually the worst in doing so), but in the ability of quickly lining up either incorrect or correct assessments to form a linear dominance hierarchy.
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