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Watanabe, S., & Huber, L. (2006). Animal logics: decisions in the absence of human language. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 235–245.
Abstract: Without Abstract
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Bergmüller, R. (2010). Animal Personality and Behavioural Syndromes. In P. Kappeler (Ed.), Animal Behaviour – Evolution and Mechanisms (pp. 587–621). Heidelberg: Springer.
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Waiblinger, S. (2009). Animal welfare and housing. In F. J. Smulders (Ed.), Welfare of Production Animals:: Assessment and Management of Risks (Food Safety Assurance and Veterinary Public Health) (pp. 79–111). Wageningen: Wageningen Acad. Publ.
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Watts, J. M. (1998). Animats: computer-simulated animals in behavioral research. J. Anim Sci., 76(10), 2596–2604.
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Lea, S. E. G. (2001). Anticipation and Memory as Criteria for Special Welfare Consideration. Animal Welfare, 10, 195–208.
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Herrmann, E., Melis, A. P., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Apes' use of iconic cues in the object-choice task. Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 118–130.
Abstract: In previous studies great apes have shown little ability to locate hidden food using a physical marker placed by a human directly on the target location. In this study, we hypothesized that the perceptual similarity between an iconic cue and the hidden reward (baited container) would help apes to infer the location of the food. In the first two experiments, we found that if an iconic cue is given in addition to a spatial/indexical cue – e.g., picture or replica of a banana placed on the target location – apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, gorillas) as a group performed above chance. However, we also found in two further experiments that when iconic cues were given on their own without spatial/indexical information (iconic cue held up by human with no diagnostic spatial/indexical information), the apes were back to chance performance. Our overall conclusion is that although iconic information helps apes in the process of searching hidden food, the poor performance found in the last two experiments is due to apes' lack of understanding of the informative (cooperative) communicative intention of the experimenter.
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McBride, S. D., Parker, M. O., Roberts, K., & Hemmings, A. (2017). Applied neurophysiology of the horse; implications for training, husbandry and welfare. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 190, 90–101.
Abstract: Understanding the neural circuits underlying equine behaviour has the potential to help optimise strategies of husbandry and training. This review discusses two areas of neurophysiological research in a range of species and relates this information to the horse. The first discussion focuses on mechanisms of learning and motivation and assesses how this information can be applied to improve the training of the horse. The second concerns the identification of the equine neurophysiological phenotype, through behavioural and genetic probes, as a way of improving strategies for optimal equine husbandry and training success. The review finishes by identifying directions for future research with an emphasis on how neurophysiological systems (and thus behaviour) can be modified through strategic husbandry. This review highlights how a neurophysioloigical understanding of horse behaviour can play an important role in attaining the primary objectives of equitation science as well as improving the welfare of the horse.
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Gácsi, M., Miklósi, Á., Varga, O., Topál, J., & Csányi, V. (2004). Are readers of our face readers of our minds? Dogs (Canis familiaris) show situation-dependent recognition of human's attention. Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 144–153.
Abstract: The ability of animals to use behavioral/facial cues in detection of human attention has been widely investigated. In this test series we studied the ability of dogs to recognize human attention in different experimental situations (ball-fetching game, fetching objects on command, begging from humans). The attentional state of the humans was varied along two variables: (1) facing versus not facing the dog; (2) visible versus non-visible eyes. In the first set of experiments (fetching) the owners were told to take up different body positions (facing or not facing the dog) and to either cover or not cover their eyes with a blindfold. In the second set of experiments (begging) dogs had to choose between two eating humans based on either the visibility of the eyes or direction of the face. Our results show that the efficiency of dogs to discriminate between “attentive” and “inattentive” humans depended on the context of the test, but they could rely on the orientation of the body, the orientation of the head and the visibility of the eyes. With the exception of the fetching-game situation, they brought the object to the front of the human (even if he/she turned his/her back towards the dog), and preferentially begged from the facing (or seeing) human. There were also indications that dogs were sensitive to the visibility of the eyes because they showed increased hesitative behavior when approaching a blindfolded owner, and they also preferred to beg from the person with visible eyes. We conclude that dogs are able to rely on the same set of human facial cues for detection of attention, which form the behavioral basis of understanding attention in humans. Showing the ability of recognizing human attention across different situations dogs proved to be more flexible than chimpanzees investigated in similar circumstances.
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Potì, P. (2000). Aspects of spatial cognition in capuchins (Cebus apella): frames of reference and scale of space. Anim. Cogn., 3(2), 69–77.
Abstract: Frames of reference (i.e. sets of loci defining spatial locations) determine animals' performances in object search tasks. Reference frames are used at different scales. Although much behavioural research has been conducted on search strategies in many animal species, relatively little has been done on nonhuman primates. The two experiments reported here focused on the relative strength and the level of functioning of different reference frames at the small-scale level in four capuchins (Cebus apella). Two identical boxes and a landmark were placed on a round platform that could be rotated. A reward was hidden in subject's view under one box, and then a sash-screen was lowered to hide the rotation of the platform; the sash-screen was then lifted and the subject allowed to search for the reward. In experiment 1 the rewarded box was always the closer to the landmark, in experiment 2 it could be either the box closer to or the box farther from the landmark. Capuchins were successful after invisible rotations in experiment 1, but they failed after invisible rotations in experiment 2. Two possible explanations are proposed: (1) capuchins relied heavily on the left-right body-axis as a frame, and they could only substitute it with a simple association between the rewarded position and the landmark; or (2) capuchins failed because they chose external cues in the room, therefore on a inappropriate scale. The latter explanation allows two further inferences: (a) the capuchins' choice was indirectly related to their body-axes; and (b) the capuchins revealed a cognitive asymmetry between small-scale and large-scale spaces, thus differing from humans.
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Epstein H,. (1984). Ass, mule and onager. In In Manson: Evolution of domesticatd animals. (pp. 174–184).
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