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Lafferty, K. D. (2005). Look what the cat dragged in: do parasites contribute to human cultural diversity? Behav. Process., 68(3), 279–282.
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Santos, L. R., Rosati, A., Sproul, C., Spaulding, B., & Hauser, M. D. (2005). Means-means-end tool choice in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus): finding the limits on primates' knowledge of tools. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 236–246.
Abstract: Most studies of animal tool use require subjects to use one object to gain access to a food reward. In many real world situations, however, animals perform more than one action in sequence to achieve their goals. Of theoretical interest is whether animals have the cognitive capacity to recognize the relationship between consecutive action sequences in which there may be one overall goal and several subgoals. Here we ask if cotton-top tamarins, a species that in captivity uses tools to solve means-end problems, can go one step further and use a sequence of tools (means) to obtain food (end). We first trained subjects to use a pulling tool to obtain a food reward. After this initial training, subjects were presented with problems in which one tool had to be used in combination with a second in order to obtain food. Subjects showed great difficulty when two tools were required to obtain the food reward. Although subjects attended to the connection between the tool and food reward, they ignored the physical connection between the two tools. After training on a two-tool problem, we presented subjects with a series of transfer tests to explore if they would generalize to new types of connections between the tools. Subjects readily transferred to new connections. Our results therefore provide the first evidence to date that tamarins can learn to solve problems involving two tools, but that they do so only with sufficient training.
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Craig, J. V. (1986). Measuring social behavior: social dominance. J. Anim Sci., 62(4), 1120–1129.
Abstract: Social dominance develops more slowly when young animals are kept in intact peer groups where they need not compete for resources. Learned generalizations may cause smaller and weaker animals to accept subordinate status readily when confronted with strangers that would be formidable opponents. Sexual hormones and sensitivity to them can influence the onset of aggression and status attained. After dominance orders are established, they tend to be stable in female groups but are less so in male groups. Psychological influences can affect dominance relationships when strangers meet and social alliances within groups may affect relative status of individuals. Whether status associated with agonistic behavior is correlated with control of space and scarce resources needs to be determined for each species and each kind of resource. When such correlations exists, competitive tests and agonistic behavior associated with gaining access to scarce resources can be useful to the observer in learning about dominance relationships rapidly. Examples are given to illustrate how estimates of social dominance can be readily attained and some strengths and weaknesses of the various methods.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
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Marchal, P., & Anderson, J. R. (1993). Mirror-image responses in capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus): social responses and use of reflected environmental information. Folia Primatol (Basel), 61(3), 165–173.
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Friedberger, J. C. (1970). Modern horse training methods--what is justifiable? Vet. Rec., 87(8), 229–231.
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de Waal, F. B., & Johanowicz, D. L. (1993). Modification of reconciliation behavior through social experience: an experiment with two macaque species. Child Dev, 64(3), 897–908.
Abstract: Reconciliation, defined as a friendly reunion between former opponents shortly after an aggressive encounter, is common in the stumptail macaque (Macaca arctoides) but rare in the rhesus macaque (M. mulatta). Juveniles of the two species were cohoused for 5 months, after which they were observed with conspecifics only. Control rhesus monkeys, matched in age and sex to the experimental subjects, went through the same procedure without exposure to the other species. A threefold increase in the proportion of reconciled fights was measured in the rhesus subjects. The difference emerged gradually during cohousing with the tutor species and was sustained following removal of this species. Other behavior, such as grooming and aggression, decreased over time. It is suggested that the social attitude of the subjects was affected through contact with a species characterized by a more relaxed dominance style.
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Barton, R. A. (1996). Neocortex size and behavioural ecology in primates. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B, 263(1367), 173–177.
Abstract: The neocortex is widely held to have been the focus of mammalian brain evolution, but what selection pressures explain the observed diversity in its size and structure? Among primates, comparative studies suggest that neocortical evolution is related to the cognitive demands of sociality, and here I confirm that neocortex size and social group size are positively correlated once phylogenetic associations and overall brain size are taken into account. This association holds within haplorhine but not strepsirhine primates. In addition, the neocortex is larger in diurnal than in nocturnal primates, and among diurnal haplorhines its size is positively correlated with the degree of frugivory. These ecological correlates reflect the diverse sensory-cognitive functions of the neocortex.
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Griffin, D. R., & Speck, G. B. (2004). New evidence of animal consciousness. Anim. Cogn., 7(1), 5–18.
Abstract: This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.
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Morell, V. (2007). Nicola Clayton profile. Nicky and the jays (Vol. 315).
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