Abstract: Various experiments revealed that if an animal learns a stimulus-response-reinforcer relationship in one context and is then tested in another context there is usually a lessening of stimulus control, and the same discriminative stimuli that reliably controlled the behavior in the first context will have less effect in the new context. This reduction in performance is known as the “context shift effect.” The effect of changing context on the probability of detecting explosives was investigated in seven highly trained explosives detection dogs (EDDs). In experiment 1 the dogs were trained alternately on path A, which always had five hidden explosives, and on a very similar path B, which never had any explosives. Within a few sessions the dogs showed a significant decrease in search behavior on path B, but not on path A. In experiment 2 the same dogs were trained only on path B with a target density of one explosive hidden every 4th day. The probability of the dogs now detecting the explosive was found to be significantly lower than in experiment 1. In experiment 3 the effect of the low target density as used in experiment 2 was investigated on a new but very similar path C. Both the detection probability for the one explosive every 4th day on the new path and the motivation to search were significantly higher than found in experiment 2. Finally, in experiment 4, an attempt was made to recondition the dogs to search on path B. Although trained for 12 daily sessions with one explosive hidden every session, the dogs failed to regain the normal levels of motivation they had shown on both new paths and on the paths that they knew usually contained explosives. The findings reveal that even a very intensively trained EDD will rapidly learn that a specific stretch of path does not contain explosives. The dog will then be less motivated to search and will miss newly placed targets. This learning is specific to the formerly always-clean path and is to some extent irreversible. However, the dog will search and detect normally on new paths even if they are very similar to the always-clean path. The data are discussed in terms of variables affecting renewal. The results suggest that following training designed to make a behavior “context independent,” any extinction training will not generalize beyond that specific context used during the extinction training. In addition, if the behavior is extinguished in a specific context, it will be very difficult to restore that behavior in that context. These conclusions should be considered by anyone attempting to extinguish well-established trans-context behaviors.

Abstract: The transmission of tool use is a rare event in monkeys. Such an event arose in a group of semi-free-ranging Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) in which leaning a pole against the park's fence (branch leaning) appeared and spread to several males. This prompted us to test individual and social learning of this behavior in seven young males. In the first experiment, three males learned individually to obtain a food reward using a wooden pole as a climbing tool. They began using the pole to retrieve the reward only when they could alternatively experience acting on the object and reaching the target. In a second experiment, we first tested whether four other subjects could learn branch leaning after having observed a group-mate performing the task. Despite repeated opportunities to observe the demonstrator, they did not learn to use the pole as a tool. Hence we exposed the latter subjects to individual learning trials and they succeeded in the task. Tool use was not transmitted in the experimental situation, which contrasts with observations in the park. We can conclude that the subjects were not able to recognize the target as such. It is possible that they recognized it and learned the task individually when we alternated the opportunity to act upon the object and to reach the reward. This suggests that these macaques could then have associated the action they exercised upon the pole and the use of the pole as a means to reach the reward.

Abstract: Tool use and transport represent cognitively important aspects of early hominid evolution, and nonhuman primates are often used as models to examine the cognitive, ecological, morphological and social correlates of these behaviors in order to gain insights into the behavior of our early human ancestors. In 2001, Jalles-Filho et al. found that free-ranging capuchin monkeys failed to transport tools (stones) to food sites (nuts), but transported the foods to the tool sites. This result cast doubt on the usefulness of Cebus to model early human tool-using behavior. In this study, we examined the performance of six captive tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) in a tool transport task. Subjects were provided with the opportunity to transport two different tools to fixed food reward sites when the food reward was visible from the tool site and when the food reward was not visible from the tool site. We found that the subjects quickly and readily transported probing tools to an apparatus baited with syrup, but rarely transported stones to a nut-cracking apparatus. We suggest that the performance of the capuchins here reflects an efficient foraging strategy, in terms of energy return, among wild Cebus monkeys.

Abstract: The present work is part of a decade-long study on the spontaneous use of stones for cracking hard-shelled nuts by a semi-free-ranging group of brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Nutcracking events are frequently watched by other individuals--usually younger, less proficient, and that are well tolerated to the point of some scrounging being allowed by the nutcracker. Here we report findings showing that the choice of observational targets is an active, non-random process, and that observers seem to have some understanding of the relative proficiency of their group mates, preferentially watching the more skilled nutcrackers, which enhances not only scrounging payoffs, but also social learning opportunities.

Abstract: In a recent paper, Kaminski, Call and Fischer report pioneering research on word-learning in a dog. In this commentary we suggest ways of distinguishing referential word use from mere association. We question whether the dog is reasoning by exclusion and, if so, compare three explanations – learned heuristics, default assumptions, and pragmatic reasoning – as they apply to children and might apply to dogs. Kaminski et al.'s work clearly raises important questions about the origins and basis of word learning and social cognition.