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Thomas R. Zentall. (1999). Animal Cognition: The Bridge BetweenAnimal Learning and Human Cognition. Psychological Science, 10, 206–208.
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Wynne C. D. L. (2001). Animal Cognition: The Mental Lives of Animals. Palgrave.
Abstract: Covering a wide range of key topics, from reasoning and communication to sensation and complex problem-solving, this engagingly-written text presents a comprehensive survey of contemporary research on animal cognition. Written for anyone with an interest in animal cognition, but without a background in animal behaviour, it endeavours to explain what makes animals tick.
With numerous illustrations and including exciting recent studies from many little-studied species (such as the weakly electric African fish), this text is ideal for psychology students who are interested in how much of our human cognition is shared by other species, for students of biology who want to know how complex animal behaviour can get, and for all those with an interest in the animal mind.
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Gallistel, C. R. (1989). Animal Cognition: The Representation of Space, Time and Number. Annual Review of Psychology, 40(1), 155–189.
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Terrace, H. S. (1985). Animal Cognition: Thinking without Language. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences (1934-1990), 308(1135), 113–128.
Abstract: Recent attempts to teach apes rudimentary grammatical skills have produced negative results. The basic obstacle appears to be at the level of the individual symbol which, for apes, functions only as a demand. Evidence is lacking that apes can use symbols as names, that is, as a means of simply transmitting information. Even though non-human animals lack linguistic competence, much evidence has recently accumulated that a variety of animals can represent particular features of their environment. What then is the non-verbal nature of animal representations? This question will be discussed with reference to the following findings of studies of serial learning by pigeons. While learning to produce a particular sequence of four elements (colours), pigeons also acquire knowledge about the relation between non-adjacent elements and about the ordinal position of a particular element. Learning to produce a particular sequence also facilitates the discrimination of that sequence from other sequences.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Animal communication: panel discussion. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1000, 79–87.
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Trillmich, F., & Rehling, A. (2006). Animal Communication: Parent-Offspring. In Keith Brown (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics (pp. 284–288). Oxford: Elsevier.
Abstract: Parent-offspring communication has evolved under strong selection to guarantee that the valuable resource of parental care is expended efficiently on raising offspring. To ensure allocation of parental care to their own offspring, individual recognition becomes established in higher vertebrates when the young become mobile at a time when a nest site can no longer provide a safe cue to recognition. Such recognition needs to be established by rapid, sometimes imprinting-like, processes in animals producing precocial offspring. In parents, offering strategies that stimulate feeding and entice offspring to approach the right site have evolved. Such parental signals can be olfactory, acoustic, or visual. In offspring, begging strategies involve shuffling for the best place to obtain food – be this the most productive teat or the best position in the nest. This involves signals that make the offspring particularly obvious to the parent. Parents often feed young according to their signaling intensity but may also show favoritism for weaker offspring. Offspring signals also serve to communicate the continuing presence of the young and may thereby maintain brood-care behavior in parents. Internal processes in parents may end parental care irrespective of further signaling by offspring, thus ensuring that offspring cannot manipulate parents into providing substantially more care than is optimal for their own fitness.
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Huntingford, F., & Turner, A. (1987). Animal Conflict.
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Kirkwood, J. K., & Hubrecht, R. (2001). Animal Consciousness, Cognition and Welfare. Animal Welfare, 10, 5–17.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (2002). Animal cooperation among unrelated individuals. Naturwissenschaften, 89(12), 533–541.
Abstract: The evolution of cooperation has long been a topic near and dear to the hearts of behavioral and evolutionary ecologists. Cooperative behaviors run the gamut from fairly simple to very complicated and there are a myriad of ways to study cooperation. Here I shall focus on three paths that have been delineated in the study of intraspecific cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocity, byproduct mutualism, and group selection. In each case, I attempt to delineate the theory underlying each of these paths and then provide examples from the empirical literature. In addition, I shall briefly touch upon some recent work that has attempted to examine (or re-examine) the role of cognition and phylogeny in the study of cooperative behavior. While empirical and theoretical work has made significant strides in the name of better understanding the evolution and maintenance of cooperative behavior in animals, much work remains for the future. “From the point of view of the moralist, the animal world is on about the same level as the gladiator's show. The creatures are fairly well treated, and set to fight; whereby the strongest, the swiftest and the cunningest live to fight another day. The spectator has no need to turn his thumb down, as no quarter is given em leader the weakest and the stupidest went to the wall, while the toughest and the shrewdest, those who were best fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in any other way, survived. Life was a continuous free fight, and em leader a war of each against all was the normal state of existence.” (Huxley 1888)
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Helton, W. S. (2005). Animal expertise, conscious or not. Anim. Cogn., 8(2), 67–74.
Abstract: Rossano (Cognition 89:207, 2003) proposes expertise as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. Since there is strong evidence that the development of expertise requires deliberate practice (Ericsson in The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games 1996), and deliberate practice appears to be outside of the bounds of unconscious processing, then any signs of expertise development in an animal are indicators of consciousness. Rossano's argument may lead to an unsolvable debate about animal consciousness while causing researchers to overlook the underlying reality of animal expertise. This article provides evidence indicative of animals meeting each of the three definitions of expertise established in the scientific literature: expertise as a social construction, expertise as exceptional performance, and expertise as knowledge. In addition, cases of deliberate practice by non-human animals are offered. Acknowledging some animals as experts, regardless of consciousness, is warranted by the research findings and would prove useful in solving many issues remaining in the human expertise literature.
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