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Nowak, S., Jedrzejewski, W., Schmidt, K., Theuerkauf, J., Myslajek, R. W., & Jedrzejewska, B. (2006). Howling activity of free-ranging wolves (Canis lupus) in the Bialowieza Primeval Forest and the Western Beskidy Mountains (Poland). J Ethol, 25.
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Gese, E. M., & Ruff, R. L. (1998). Howling by coyotes (Canis latrans): variation among social classes, seasons, and pack sizes. Can J Zool, 76.
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Burla, J. - B., Siegwart, J., & Nawroth, C. (2018). Human Demonstration Does Not Facilitate the Performance of Horses (Equus caballus) in a Spatial Problem-Solving Task. Animal, 8(6), 96.
Abstract: Horses’ ability to adapt to new environments and to acquire new information plays an important role in handling and training. Social learning in particular would be very adaptive for horses as it enables them to flexibly adjust to new environments. In the context of horse handling, social learning from humans has been rarely investigated but could help to facilitate management practices. We assessed the impact of human demonstration on the spatial problem-solving abilities of horses during a detour task. In this task, a bucket with a food reward was placed behind a double-detour barrier and 16 horses were allocated to two test groups of 8 horses each. One group received a human demonstration of how to solve the spatial task while the other group received no demonstration. We found that horses did not solve the detour task more often or faster with human demonstration. However, both test groups improved rapidly over trials. Our results suggest that horses prefer to use individual rather than social information when solving a spatial problem-solving task
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Palacios, V., Font, E., & Marquez, R. (2007). Iberian wolf howls: acoustic structure, individual variation, and a comparison with North American populations. J Mammal, 88.
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Baragli, P., Scopa, C., Maglieri, V., & Palagi, E. (2021). If horses had toes: demonstrating mirror self recognition at group level in Equus caballus. Anim. Cogn., .
Abstract: Mirror self-recognition (MSR), investigated in primates and recently in non-primate species, is considered a measure of self-awareness. Nowadays, the only reliable test for investigating MSR potential skills consists in the untrained response to a visual body mark detected using a reflective surface. Here, we report the first evidence of MSR at group level in horses, by facing the weaknesses of methodology present in a previous pilot study. Fourteen horses were used in a 4-phases mirror test (covered mirror, open mirror, invisible mark, visible colored mark). After engaging in a series of contingency behaviors (looking behind the mirror, peek-a-boo, head and tongue movements), our horses used the mirror surface to guide their movements towards their colored cheeks, thus showing that they can recognize themselves in a mirror. The analysis at the group level, which 'marks' a turning point in the analytical technique of MSR exploration in non-primate species, showed that horses spent a longer time in scratching their faces when marked with the visible mark compared to the non-visible mark. This finding indicates that horses did not see the non-visible mark and that they did not touch their own face guided by the tactile sensation, suggesting the presence of MSR in horses. Although a heated debate on the binary versus gradualist model in the MSR interpretation exists, recent empirical pieces of evidence, including ours, indicate that MSR is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon that appeared once in phylogeny and that a convergent evolution mechanism can be at the basis of its presence in phylogenetically distant taxa.
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Galef, B. G. (2013). Imitation and local enhancement: Detrimental effects of consensus definitions on analyses of social learning in animals. Behavioural Processes, 100, 123–130.
Abstract: Development of a widely accepted vocabulary referring to various types of social learning has made important contributions to decades of progress in analyzing the role of socially acquired information in the development of behavioral repertoires. It is argued here that emergence of a consensus vocabulary, while facilitating both communication and research, has also unnecessarily restricted research on social learning. The article has two parts. In the first, I propose that Thorndike, 1898, Thorndike, 1911 definition of imitation as “learning to do an act from seeing it done” has unduly restricted studies of the behavioral processes involved in the propagation of behavior. In part 2, I consider the possibility that success in labeling social learning processes believed to be less cognitively demanding than imitation (e.g. local and stimulus enhancement, social facilitation, etc.) has been mistaken for understanding of those processes, although essentially nothing is known of their stimulus control, development, phylogeny or substrate either behavioral or physiological.
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Whiten, A. (1998). Imitation of the sequential structure of actions by chimpanzees. J Comp Psychol, 11.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Imitation: definitions, evidence, and mechanisms. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 335–353.
Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.
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Gardner, E. L., & Engel, D. R. (1971). Imitational and social facilitatory aspects of observational learning in the laboratory rat. Psychon. Sci., 25(1), 5–6.
Abstract: Rats acquired a food-motivated leverpressing response by “observational learning” or by trial-and-error learning under conditions of social facilitation or isolation. Both the observational learning and social facilitation Ss learned faster than did the isolated trial-and-error Ss. There was no difference in speed of learning between the observational learning and social facilitation groups. It is suggested that some previous studies purporting to demonstrate observational learning may have demonstrated socially facilitated trial-and-error learning instead.
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Whiten, A., Custance, D. M., Gomez, J. C., Teixidor, P., & Bard, K. A. (1996). Imitative learning of artificial fruit processing in children (Homo sapiens) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J Comp Psychol, 110(1), 3–14.
Abstract: Observational learning in chimpanzees and young children was investigated using an artificial fruit designed as an analog of natural foraging problems faced by primates. Each of 3 principal components could be removed in 2 alternative ways, demonstration of only one of which was watched by each subject. This permitted subsequent imitation by subjects to be distinguished from stimulus enhancement. Children aged 2-4 years evidenced imitation for 2 components, but also achieved demonstrated outcomes through their own techniques. Chimpanzees relied even more on their own techniques, but they did imitate elements of 1 component of the task. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental evidence of chimpanzee imitation in a functional task designed to simulate foraging behavior hypothesized to be transmitted culturally in the wild.
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