Abstract: This study investigated the ability of a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) to recognise when he is being imitated. In the experimental condition of test 1a, an experimenter imitated the postures and behaviours of the chimpanzee as they were being displayed. In three control conditions the same experimenter exhibited (1) actions that were contingent on, but different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, (2) actions that were not contingent on, and different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, or (3) no action at all. The chimpanzee showed more “testing” sequences (i.e., systematically varying his actions while oriented to the imitating experimenter) and more repetitive behaviour when he was being imitated, than when he was not. This finding was replicated 4 months later in test 1b. When the experimenter repeated the same actions she displayed in the experimental condition of test 1a back to the chimpanzee in test 2, these actions now did not elicit those same testing sequences or repetitive behaviours. However, a live imitation condition did. Together these results provide the first evidence of imitation recognition in a nonhuman animal.

Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.

Abstract: This study investigated the ability of chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos to make inferences by exclusion using the procedure pioneered by Premack and Premack (Cognition 50:347-362, 1994) with chimpanzees. Thirty apes were presented with two different food items (banana vs. grape) on a platform and covered with identical containers. One of the items was removed from the container and placed between the two containers so that subjects could see it. After discarding this item, subjects could select between the two containers. In Experiment 1, apes preferentially selected the container that held the item that the experimenter had not discarded, especially if subjects saw the experimenter remove the item from the container (but without seeing the container empty). Experiment 3 in which the food was removed from one of the containers behind a barrier confirmed these results. In contrast, subjects performed at chance levels when a stimulus (colored plastic chip: Exp. 1; food item: Exp. 2 and Exp. 3) designated the item that had been removed. These results indicated that apes made inferences, not just learned to use a discriminative cue to avoid the empty container. Apes perceived and treated the item discarded by the experimenter as if it were the very one that had been hidden under the container. Results suggested a positive relationship between age and inferential ability independent of memory ability but no species differences.

Abstract: When birds raised by another species become adults, they (if they are non-brood-parasitic species) usually attempt to mate with birds of their foster species rather than with birds of their own species, a phenomenon called sexual imprinting. Avian brood parasites lay their eggs in nests of other species (the hosts) that rear the young, but the problem of sexual imprinting among brood parasites has generally been neglected, and brood parasites have been considered as an exception among birds. Here, we show, with data from field observations and field experiments, firstly, that adult great spotted cuckoos Clamator glandarius sometimes maintain contact with both older nestling and fledgling cuckoos. Adult cuckoos visited parasitized nests during the last days of the nestling period (5 observations) and, when parasitic chicks left the nest, adult cuckoos maintained contact with the young (14 observations). Adults and fledgling cuckoos communicated vocally (5 observations), and an adult great spotted cuckoo even fed a parasite fledgling in two cases. Secondly, when experimentally cross-fostered in nests of magpie Pica pica hosts outside the parasite breeding range (thus avoiding visual and acoustic communication with adult cuckoos), young cuckoos did not learn to recognize their own species when only one cuckoo chick was introduced per nest, but they learnt to recognize conspecifics when two cuckoos were reared together. This means that young great spotted cuckoos apparently must learn to recognize conspecifics, that is, recognition is not innate. Social interactions between adult brood parasites and young have also been reported in other brood parasites; thus, brood parasites are probably not an exception to the general phenomenon of imprinting, and young brood parasites may need to be imprinted on conspecifics, although more studies on other brood parasite species are needed to confirm this.

Abstract: Abstract  Most studies of spatial memory in primates focus on species that inhabit large home ranges and have dispersed, patchy resources. Researchers assume that primates use memory to minimize distances traveled between resources. We investigated the use of spatial memory in a group of six white-faced sakis (Pithecia pithecia) on 12.8-ha Round Island, Guri Lake, Venezuela during a period of fruit abundance. The sakis movements were analyzed with logistic regressions, a predictive computer model and a computer model that simulates movements. We considered all the resources available to the sakis and compared observed distances to predicted distances from a computer model for foragers who know nothing about the location of resources. Surprisingly, the observed distances were four times greater than the predicted distances, suggesting that the sakis passed by a majority of the available fruit trees without feeding. The odds of visiting a food tree, however, were significantly increased if the tree had been visited in the previous 3 days and had more than 100 fruit. The sakis preferred resources were highly productive fruit trees, Capparis trees, and trees with water holes. They traveled efficiently to these sites. The sakis choice of feeding sites indicate that they combined knowledge acquired by repeatedly traveling through their home range with “what” and “where” information gained from individual visits to resources. Although the sakis foraging choices increased the distance they traveled overall, choosing more valued sites allowed the group to minimize intragroup feeding competition, maintain intergroup dominance over important resources, and monitor the state of resources throughout their home range. The sakis foraging decisions appear to have used spatial memory, elements of episodic-like memory and social and nutritional considerations.