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Krueger, K., Marr, I., & Farmer, K. (2017). Equine Cognition. In J. Vonk, & T. Shackelford (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior (pp. 1–11). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
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Ottoni, E., de Resende, B., & Izar, P. (2006). Erratum. Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 156.
Abstract: Without Abstract
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Ringhofer, M., & Yamamoto, S. (2017). Erratum to: Domestic horses send signals to humans when they are faced with an unsolvable task. Anim. Cogn., 20(3), 407.
Abstract: Some domestic animals are thought to be skilled at social communication with humans due to the process of domestication. Horses, being in close relationship with humans, similar to dogs, might be skilled at communication with humans. Previous studies have indicated that they are sensitive to bodily signals and the attentional state of humans; however, there are few studies that investigate communication with humans and responses to the knowledge state of humans. Our first question was whether and how horses send signals to their potentially helpful but ignorant caretakers in a problem-solving situation where a food item was hidden in a bucket that was accessible only to the caretakers. We then examined whether horses alter their behaviours on the basis of the caretakers’ knowledge of where the food was hidden. We found that horses communicated to their caretakers using visual and tactile signals. The signalling behaviour of the horses significantly increased in conditions where the caretakers had not seen the hiding of the food. These results suggest that horses alter their communicative behaviour towards humans in accordance with humans’ knowledge state.
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Waite, T. A., & Field, K. L. (2000). Erroneous choice and foregone gains in hoarding gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis). Anim. Cogn., 3(3), 127–134.
Abstract: Under the conventional assumption that natural selection favors choice behavior that maximizes some fitness-related currency, a forager making repeated binary choices should consistently choose the more valuable option. Under the alternative assumption that natural selection favors choice behavior that minimizes costly errors, erroneous choice is not only expected but is expected to be common when the cost of errors is low. This cost depends on the potential rate of return: the higher this rate, the smaller the cost of choosing the less valuable option. When this rate is very high, a forager may err frequently and yet forego no appreciable fitness gain. Errors should thus be more common when interruptions to foraging are shorter. Our experimental results supported this prediction: gray jays chose the less valuable option more frequently when subjected to shorter interruptions (experimentally imposed delays to access to food rewards). This tendency is consistent with the idea that an adaptive decision-making process may routinely produce errors, not because errors are in some way adaptive but because their fitness cost is minimal, particularly when delays are short. From a proximate perspective, this tendency to commit errors more frequently following shorter delays may be due to constraints on the jays' information-processing capacity. In general, choice behavior should be viewed as the joint byproduct of adaptive decision making and cognitive constraints.
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Schwartz, B. L., Meissner, C. A., Hoffman, M., Evans, S., & Frazier, L. D. (2004). Event memory and misinformation effects in a gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 93–100.
Abstract: Event memory and misinformation effects were examined in an adult male gorilla ( Gorilla gorilla gorilla). The gorilla witnessed a series of unique events, involving a familiar person engaging in a novel behavior (experiment 1), a novel person engaging in a novel behavior (experiment 2), or the presentation of a novel object (experiment 3). Following a 5- to 10-min retention interval, a tester gave the gorilla three photographs mounted on wooden cards: a photograph depicting the correct person or object and two distractor photographs drawn from the same class. The gorilla responded by returning a photograph. If correct, he was reinforced with food. Across three experiments, the gorilla performed significantly above chance at recognizing the target photograph. In experiment 4, the gorilla showed at-chance performance when the event was followed by misinformation (a class-consistent, but incorrect photograph), but significantly above-chance performance when no misinformation occurred (either correct photograph or no photograph). Although the familiarity can account for these data, they are also consistent with an episodic-memory interpretation.
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Sturz, B. R., Bodily, K. D., & Katz, J. S. (2006). Evidence against integration of spatial maps in humans. Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 207–217.
Abstract: A dynamic 3-D virtual environment was constructed for humans as an open-field analogue of Blaisdell and Cook's (2005) pigeon foraging task to determine if humans, like pigeons, were capable of integrating separate spatial maps. Participants used keyboard keys and a mouse to search for a hidden goal in a 4x4 grid of raised cups. During Phase 1 training, a goal was consistently located between two landmarks (Map 1: blue T and red L). During Phase 2 training, a goal was consistently located down and left of a single landmark (Map 2: blue T). Transfer trials were then conducted in which participants were required to make choices in the presence of the red L alone. Cup choices during transfer assessed participants' strategies: association (from Map 1), generalization (from Map 2), or integration (combining Map 1 and 2). During transfer, cup choices increased to a location which suggested an integration strategy and was consistent with results obtained with pigeons. However, additional analyses of the human data suggested participants initially used a generalization strategy followed by a progressive shift in search behavior away from the red L. This shift in search behavior during transfer was responsible for the changes in cup choices across transfer trials and was confirmed by a control condition. These new analyses offer an alternative explanation to the spatial integration account proposed for pigeons.
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Dacke, M., & Srinivasan, M. (2008). Evidence for counting in insects. Anim. Cogn., 11(4), 683–689.
Abstract: Abstract  Here we investigate the counting ability in honeybees by training them to receive a food reward after they have passed a specific number of landmarks. The distance to the food reward is varied frequently and randomly, whilst keeping the number of intervening landmarks constant. Thus, the bees cannot identify the food reward in terms of its distance from the hive. We find that bees can count up to four objects, when they are encountered sequentially during flight. Furthermore, bees trained in this way are able count novel objects, which they have never previously encountered, thus demonstrating that they are capable of object-independent counting. A further experiment reveals that the counting ability that the bees display in our experiments is primarily sequential in nature. It appears that bees can navigate to food sources by maintaining a running count of prominent landmarks that are passed en route, provided this number does not exceed four.
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Malavasi, R., & Huber, L. (2016). Evidence of heterospecific referential communication from domestic horses (Equus caballus) to humans. Anim. Cogn., 19(5), 899–909.
Abstract: Referential communication occurs when a sender elaborates its gestures to direct the attention of a recipient to its role in pursuit of the desired goal, e.g. by pointing or showing an object, thereby informing the recipient what it wants. If the gesture is successful, the sender and the recipient focus their attention simultaneously on a third entity, the target. Here we investigated the ability of domestic horses (Equus caballus) to communicate referentially with a human observer about the location of a desired target, a bucket of food out of reach. In order to test six operational criteria of referential communication, we manipulated the recipient’s (experimenter) attentional state in four experimental conditions: frontally oriented, backward oriented, walking away from the arena and frontally oriented with other helpers present in the arena. The rate of gaze alternation was higher in the frontally oriented condition than in all the others. The horses appeared to use both indicative (pointing) and non-indicative (nods and shakes) head gestures in the relevant test conditions. Horses also elaborated their communication by switching from a visual to a tactile signal and demonstrated perseverance in their communication. The results of the tests revealed that horses used referential gestures to manipulate the attention of a human recipient so to obtain an unreachable resource. These are the first such findings in an ungulate species.
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BRYSON, J. O. A. N. N. A. J. EVIDENCE OF MODULARITY FROM PRIMATE ERRORS DURING TASK LEARNING. Retrieved June 12, 2024, from http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812701886_0031
Abstract: The last two decades have seen a great deal of theorising and speculation about
the modular nature of human intelligence, as well as a rise in use of modular
architectures in artificial intelligence. Nevertheless, whether such models of natural
intelligence are well supported is still an issue of debate. In this paper, I propose
that the most important criteria for modularity is specialised representations. I
present a modular model of primate learning of the transitive inference task, and
propose an extension to this model which would explain task-learning results in
other domains. I also briefly relate this work to both neuroscience and established
AI learning architectures.
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Hare, J. F., Sealy, S. G., Underwood, T. J., Ellison, K. S., & Stewart, R. L. M. (2003). Evidence of self-referent phenotype matching revisited: airing out the armpit effect. Anim. Cogn., 6(1), 65–68.
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