Abstract: The papers in this special issue examine the relationship between social and ecological cognition in primates. We refer to the intersection of these two domains as socioecological cognition. Examples of socioecological cognition include socially learned predator alarm calls and socially sensitive foraging decisions. In this review we consider how primate cognition may have been shaped by the interaction of social and ecological influences in their evolutionary history. The ability to remember distant, out-of-sight locations is an ancient one, shared by many mammals and widespread among primates. It seems some monkeys and apes have evolved the ability to form more complex representations of resources, integrating “what-where-how much” information. This ability allowed anthropoids to live in larger, more cohesive groups by minimizing competition for limited resources between group members. As group size increased, however, competition for resources also increased, selecting for enhanced social skills. Enhanced social skills in turn made a more sophisticated relationship to the environment possible. The interaction of social and ecological influences created a spiraling effect in the evolution of primate intelligence. In contrast, lemurs may not have evolved the ability to form complex representations which would allow them to consider the size and location of resources. This lack in lemur ecological cognition may restrict the size of frugivorous lemur social groups, thereby limiting the complexity of lemur social life. In this special issue, we have brought together two review papers, five field studies, and one laboratory study to investigate the interaction of social and ecological factors in relation to foraging. Our goal is to stimulate research that considers social and ecological factors acting together on cognitive evolution, rather than in isolation. Cross fertilization of experimental and observational studies from captivity and the field is important for increasing our understanding of this relationship.

Abstract: Use of the right hand by humans for speech-related hand gestures, writing and throwing exemplifies motoric asymmetry. There are reports of asymmetry in many other animal species, including reports of left preference in emotional responsivity, spontaneous behaviour and the trained performance of the horse, Equus ferus caballus. The present study used the novel approach of using judges' scores to examine asymmetry in an equestrian event. The study analysed the scores of five judges evaluating the reining performance of 482, three-year-old American Quarter Horses competing in a major competition. Reining requires that the horses perform the manoeuvres of spin, circle and stop directed to either the left or right and symmetrical performance is featured in the judging criteria. The scores were sensitive to performance level, sex and manoeuvre, but there was no evidence of a population asymmetry in the left vs. right direction of the manoeuvres. The results are discussed in relation to need of using a large number of subjects in measuring asymmetry, the expression of individual vs. population asymmetry as a function of morphological and behavioural measures, and the influence of behavioural training on asymmetry.

Abstract: A chimpanzee acquired an auditory–visual intermodal matching-to-sample (AVMTS) task, in which, following the presentation of a sample sound, the subject had to select from two alternatives a photograph that corresponded to the sample. The acquired AVMTS performance might shed light on chimpanzee intermodal cognition, which is one of the least understood aspects in chimpanzee cognition. The first aim of this paper was to describe the training process of the task. The second aim was to describe through a series of experiments the features of the chimpanzee AVMTS performance in comparison with results obtained in a visual intramodal matching task, in which a visual stimulus alone served as the sample. The results show that the acquisition of AVMTS was facilitated by the alternation of auditory presentation and audio-visual presentation (i.e., the sample sound together with a visual presentation of the object producing the particular sample sound). Once AVMTS performance was established for the limited number of stimulus sets, the subject showed rapid transfer of the performance to novel sets. However, the subject showed a steep decay of matching performance as a function of the delay interval between the sample and the choice alternative presentations when the sound alone, but not the visual stimulus alone, served as the sample. This might suggest a cognitive limitation for the chimpanzee in auditory-related tasks.

Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.

Abstract: In experiment 1, pigeons were trained to match temporal (2, 8, and 10 s of houselight) and location (feeder light, left key, center key illumination) samples to color comparison stimuli. Red choices were correct following the 2-s and feeder light, orange choices were correct following the 8-s and center key, and green choices were correct following the 10-s and left key. Samples that were harder to discriminate (8- vs 10-s, and left vs center key) were mapped onto comparisons that were easy to discriminate (orange vs green), while samples that were easier to discriminate (2- vs 8-s, and feeder light vs left key) were mapped onto comparisons that were hard to discriminate(red vs orange). The pattern of errors for temporal and location samples indicated that these samples were not represented by a common code even though they were associated with the same comparison stimuli. In experiment 2, the same pigeons were trained with visual samples in which samples that were hard to discriminate (triangle vs circle) were mapped onto comparisons that were easy to discriminate (orange vs green), while samples that were easy to discriminate(plus vs triangle) were mapped onto comparisons that were hard to discriminate (red vs orange). Following acquisition of the visual discrimination, the temporal samples were re-introduced and many-to-one training was continued. During delay testing, the pattern of errors for temporal and visual samples was equivalent and consistent with the hypothesis that visual samples were being coded in terms of the duration appropriate for the temporal sample with which it shared a common comparison response. Data from no-sample test sessions ruled out a simple response bias explanation of the data. The properties of common codes for temporal and nontemporal events can be somewhat flexible and more complicated than previously envisaged.