Abstract: The formation of collaborating pairs by individuals belonging to two different classes occurs in the contexts of reproduction and intea-specific cooperation as well as of inter-specific mutualism. There is potential for partner choice and for competition for access to preferred partners in all three contexts. These selective forces have long been recognised as important in sexual selection, but their impact is not yet appreciated in cooperative and mutualistic systems. The formation of partnerships between members of different classes has much in common with the conclusion of trade agreements in human markets with two classes of traders, like producers and consumers, or employers and employees. Similar game-theoretical models can be used to predict the behaviour of rational traders in human markets and the evolutionarily stable strategies used in biological markets. We present a formal model in which the influence of the market mechanism on selection is made explicit. We restrict ourselves to biological markets in which: (1) Individuals do not compete over access to partners in an agonistic manner, but rather by outcompeting each other in those aspects that are preferred by the choosing party. (2) The commodity the partner has to offer cannot be obtained by the use of force, but requires the consent of the partner. These two restrictions ensure a dominant role for partner choice in the formation of partnerships. In a biological market model the decision to cooperate is based on the comparison between the offers of several potential partners, rather than on the behaviour of a single potential partner, as is implicitly assumed in currently accepted models of cooperation. In our example the members of one class A offer a commodity of fixed value in exchange for a commodity of variable value supplied by the other class, B. We show that when the B-class outnumbers the A-class sufficiently and the cost for the A-class to sample the offers of the B-class are low, the choosiness of the A-class will lead to selection for the supply of high value commodities by the B-class (Fig. 3a). Under the same market conditions, but with a high sampling cost this may still be the evolutionariy stable outcome, but another pair of strategies proves to be stable too: relaxed choosiness of class A coupled with low value commodities supplied by class B (Fig. 3b). We give a number of examples of mating, cooperative and mutualistic markets that resemble the low sampling cost situation depicted in Fig. 3a.

Abstract: Forced copulation and induced abortion were investigated in a herd of feral horses inhabiting a coastal barrier island. Eight mares were diagnosed pregnant in August and October 1989 by means of urinary and fecal steroid metabolites, prior to documented changes in herd stallions. These mares were observed for harassment and forced copulation by the new stallions and for the presence of foals during the spring and summer of 1990. No incidents of harassment or attempts at forced copulation were witnessed and seven of the eight mares produced foals in 1990. These data indicate that forced copulation and induced abortion are not common events among all feral horse herds and suggest reinvestigation of this hypothesized phenomenon.

Abstract: There is an established and very influential view that primate societies have identifiable, persistent social organizations. It assumes that association patterns reflect long-term strategic interests that are not qualitatively perturbed by short-term environmental variability. We used data from two baboon troops in markedly different habitats over three consecutive seasons to test this assumption. Our results demonstrate pronounced cyclicity in the extent to which females maintained differentiated relationships. When food was plentiful, the companionships identified by social network analysis in the food-scarce season disappeared and were replaced by casual acquaintanceships more representative of mere gregariousness. Data from the fourth, food-scarce, season at one site indicated that few companions were re-united. It is likely that this reflected stochastic variation in individual circumstances. These results suggest that attention could profitably be paid to the effects of short-term local contingencies on social dynamics, and has implications for current theories of primate cognitive evolution.

Abstract: One well-known solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is the TIT FOR TAT strategy. This strategy has three “characteristics” associated with it. TIT FOR TAT is nice (cooperates on the first move of a game), retaliatory (plays defect against an individual that defected on the prior move), and forgiving (cooperates with an individual which has defected in the past but cooperates in the present). Predator inspection behavior in guppies (Poecilia reticulata) was examined in order to determine whether guppies displayed these three characteristics. Results indicate that while it can be quite difficult to translate the abstract concepts of niceness, retaliation, and forgiveness into measurable behaviors, the data support the hypothesis that guppies display the three characteristics associated with the TIT FOR TAT strategy.

Abstract: Animal communication often occurs in communication networks in which multiple signalers and receivers are within signaling range of each other. In such networks, individuals can obtain information on the quality and motivation of territorial neighbors by eavesdropping on their signaling interactions. In songbirds, extracting information from interactions involving neighbors is thought to be an important factor in the evolution of strategies of territory defense. In a playback experiment with radio-tagged nightingales Luscinia megarhynchos we here demonstrate that territorial males use their familiar neighbors' performance in a vocal interaction with an unfamiliar intruder as a standard for their own response. Males were attracted by a vocal interaction between their neighbor and a simulated stranger and intruded into the neighbor's territory. The more intensely the neighbor had interacted with playback, the earlier the intrusions were made, indicating that males eavesdropped on the vocal contest involving a neighbor. However, males never intruded when we had simulated by a second playback that the intruder had retreated and sang outside the neighbor's territory. These results suggest that territorial males use their neighbors' singing behavior as an early warning system when territorial integrity is threatened. Simultaneous responses by neighboring males towards unfamiliar rivals are likely to be beneficial to the individuals in maintaining territorial integrity.