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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1992). Meaning and mind in monkeys. Sci Am, 267(6), 122–128.
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Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980). Monkey responses to three different alarm calls: evidence of predator classification and semantic communication. Science, 210(4471), 801–803.
Abstract: Vervet monkeys give different alarm calls to different predators. Recordings of the alarms played back when predators were absent caused the monkeys to run into trees for leopard alarms, look up for eagle alarms, and look down for snake alarms. Adults call primarily to leopards, martial eagles, and pythons, but infants give leopard alarms to various mammals, eagle alarms to many birds, and snake alarms to various snakelike objects. Predator classification improves with age and experience.
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Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Bergman, T. J. (2005). Primate social cognition and the origins of language. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(6), 264–266.
Abstract: Are the cognitive mechanisms underlying language unique, or can similar mechanisms be found in other domains? Recent field experiments demonstrate that baboons' knowledge of their companions' social relationships is based on discrete-valued traits (identity, rank, kinship) that are combined to create a representation of social relations that is hierarchically structured, open-ended, rule-governed, and independent of sensory modality. The mechanisms underlying language might have evolved from the social knowledge of our pre-linguistic primate ancestors.
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Rendall, D., Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2000). Proximate factors mediating “contact” calls in adult female baboons (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) and their infants. J Comp Psychol, 114(1), 36–46.
Abstract: “Contact” calls are widespread in social mammals and birds, but the proximate factors that motivate call production and mediate their contact function remain poorly specified. Field study of chacma baboons (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) revealed that contact barks in adult females were motivated by separation both from the group at large and from their dependent infants. A variety of social and ecological factors affect the probability of separation from either one or both. Results of simultaneous observations and a playback experiment indicate that the contact function of calling between mothers and infants was mediated by occasional maternal retrieval rather than coordinated call exchange. Mothers recognized the contact barks of their own infants and often were strongly motivated to locate them. However, mothers did not produce contact barks in reply unless they themselves were at risk of becoming separated from the group.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1999). Recognition of other individuals' social relationships by female baboons. Anim. Behav., 58(1), 67–75.
Abstract: We describe a series of playback experiments designed to test whether free-ranging baboons, Papio cynocephalus ursinus, recognize the calls of other group members and also associate signallers with their close genetic relatives. Pairs of unrelated females were played sequences of calls that mimicked a fight between their relatives. As controls, the same females heard sequences that involved either (1) only the more dominant female's relative or (2) neither of the females' relatives. When call sequences involved their relatives, subjects looked towards the speaker for a longer duration than when the sequences involved nonkin. When the sequences involved the other female's relative, they also looked towards that female. Subjects did not look towards one another when call sequences involved nonkin. Dominant subjects were more likely to supplant their subordinate partners following playbacks of sequences that mimicked a dispute between their relatives than following the two control trials. In contrast, both subjects were more likely to approach one another and to interact in a friendly manner following the two control trials than following the test trial. Results indicate that female baboons recognize the screams and threat grunts not only of their own close relatives but also of unrelated individuals. They also replicate previous studies in suggesting that female monkeys recognize the close associates of other individuals and adjust their interactions with others according to recent events involving individuals other than themselves. Copyright 1999 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1989). Reconciliation and redirected aggression in vervet monkeys, Behaviour. Behaviour, 110, 258–275.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1997). Reconciliatory grunts by dominant female baboons influence victims' behaviour. Anim. Behav., 54(2), 409–418.
Abstract: Following aggressive interactions, dominant female baboons, Papio cynocephalus ursinusoccasionally grunt to their victims. To examine the effect of these apparently reconciliatory grunts on victims' subsequent behaviour, a series of playback experiments was designed to mimic reconciliation. Victims were played their opponents' grunts in the minutes immediately following a fight and then observed for half an hour. After hearing these grunts, victims approached their former opponents and also tolerated their opponents' approaches at significantly higher rates than they did under control conditions. They were also supplanted by their opponents at significantly lower rates. By contrast, playbacks of control females' grunts did not influence victims' behaviour. Playbacks of reconciliatory grunts did not increase the rate at which opponents approached or initiated friendly interactions with their former victims. Playbacks of reconciliatory grunts, therefore, appeared to influence victims', but not opponents', perception of recent events.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2003). Signalers and receivers in animal communication. Annu Rev Psychol, 54, 145–173.
Abstract: In animal communication natural selection favors callers who vocalize to affect the behavior of listeners and listeners who acquire information from vocalizations, using this information to represent their environment. The acquisition of information in the wild is similar to the learning that occurs in laboratory conditioning experiments. It also has some parallels with language. The dichotomous view that animal signals must be either referential or emotional is false, because they can easily be both: The mechanisms that cause a signaler to vocalize do not limit a listener's ability to extract information from the call. The inability of most animals to recognize the mental states of others distinguishes animal communication most clearly from human language. Whereas signalers may vocalize to change a listener's behavior, they do not call to inform others. Listeners acquire information from signalers who do not, in the human sense, intend to provide it.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1988). Social and non.social knowledge in vervet monkeys. In Machiavellian Intelligence (pp. 255–270). Oxford: Oxford Univ Press.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2000). Social Awareness in Monkeys. Amer. Zool., 40(6), 902–909.
Abstract: Tests of self-awareness in nonhuman primates have to date been concerned almost entirely with the recognition of an animal's reflection in a mirror. By contrast, we know much less about non-human primates' perception of their place within a social network, or of their understanding of themselves as individuals with unique sets of social relationships. Here we review evidence that monkeys who fail the mirror test may nonetheless behave as if they recognize themselves as distinct individuals, each of whom occupies a unique place in society and has a specific set of relations with others. A free-ranging vervet monkey, baboon, or macaque recognizes other members of his group as individuals. He also recognizes matrilineal kin groups, linear dominance rank orders, and behaves as if he recognizes his own unique place within them. This sense of “social self” in monkeys, however, is markedly different from self-awareness in humans. Although monkeys may behave in ways that accurately place themselves within a social network, they are unaware of the knowledge that allows them to do so: they do not know what they know, cannot reflect on what they know, and cannot become the object of their own attention.
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