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Author Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Dugatkin, L.A.
Title (up) Cooperation and the Prisoner's Dilemma: towards testable models of mutualism versus reciprocity Type Journal Article
Year 1997 Publication Animal Behaviour. Abbreviated Journal Anim. Behav.
Volume 54 Issue 3 Pages 551-557
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Abstract For the purpose of distinguishing between mutualism and reciprocity in nature, recent work on the evolution of cooperation has both oversimplifed and undersimplified the distinction between these two categories of cooperation. This article addresses the resulting issues of model testability, clarifies the role of time and argues that the category of `pseudo-reciprocity' is an unnecessary complication.
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Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 480
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.
Title (up) Cooperation in animals: An evolutionary overview Type Journal Article
Year 2002 Publication Biology and Philosophy Abbreviated Journal
Volume 17 Issue 4 Pages 459-476
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Abstract Evolutionary biologists have grappled with the question of the emergenceand maintenance of cooperation since Darwin first listed animal cooperation asapotential problem for his theory of natural selection. Here I review four pathsthat have been delineated in the study of intra-specific cooperation amonganimals. These paths – kinship, reciprocity, byproduct mutualism andgroupselection – serve as a starting point for behavioral ecologistsinterestedstudying the initiation and maintenance of cooperation. After reviewing theempirical and theoretical underpinnings of these paths to cooperation, I touchupon some recent work that has attempted to examine (or reexamine) the role ofphylogeny, punishment and morality in the light of cooperative behavior.
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Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2179
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Hoglund, J.
Title (up) Delayed breeding and the evolution of mate copying in lekking species Type Journal Article
Year 1995 Publication Journal of Theoretical Biology Abbreviated Journal J. Theor. Biol.
Volume 174 Issue 3 Pages 261-267
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Abstract Recent experimental evidence indicates that females may copy the mate choice of others. Here, we present a model for the evolution of mate copying strategies in lekking species. In the model, all females (copiers and non-copiers) assess male quality, but a copier's assessment of a male's quality increases after males have mated with other females. The model demonstrates that mate copying is favored when breeding late in the season has a relatively high cost. We hope that our results will spur empirical work quantifying the time constraints associated with breeding, thus allowing more direct tests of the model's predictions.
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Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 482
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.
Title (up) Dynamics of the TIT FOR TAT strategy during predator inspection in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata) Type Journal Article
Year 1991 Publication Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology Abbreviated Journal Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.
Volume 29 Issue 2 Pages 127-132
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Abstract One well-known solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is the TIT FOR TAT strategy. This strategy has three “characteristics” associated with it. TIT FOR TAT is nice (cooperates on the first move of a game), retaliatory (plays defect against an individual that defected on the prior move), and forgiving (cooperates with an individual which has defected in the past but cooperates in the present). Predator inspection behavior in guppies (Poecilia reticulata) was examined in order to determine whether guppies displayed these three characteristics. Results indicate that while it can be quite difficult to translate the abstract concepts of niceness, retaliation, and forgiveness into measurable behaviors, the data support the hypothesis that guppies display the three characteristics associated with the TIT FOR TAT strategy.
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Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2178
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Author Earley, R.L.; Dugatkin, L.A.
Title (up) Eavesdropping on visual cues in green swordtail (Xiphophorus helleri) fights: a case for networking Type Journal Article
Year 2002 Publication Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society Abbreviated Journal Proc Biol Sci
Volume 269 Issue 1494 Pages 943-952
Keywords *Aggression; Animals; *Behavior, Animal; *Cyprinodontiformes; Female; Male
Abstract Aggressive contests probably occur in networking environments where information about fighting ability is conveyed both to an opponent and to individuals peripheral to the fight itself, the bystanders. Our primary aim was to investigate the relative influences of eavesdropping and prior social experience on the dynamics of aggressive contests in Xiphophorus helleri. A bystander's ability to witness an encounter was manipulated using clear, one-way mirror, and opaque partitions. After watching (or not watching) the initial contest, the bystander encountered either the winner or loser of the bout. Treatment comparisons of bystander-winner or bystander-loser contest dynamics indicated the presence or absence of winner, loser, or eavesdropping effects. Winner and loser effects had negligible influences on bystander contest dynamics. Eavesdropping significantly reduced the bystander's propensity to initiate aggression, escalate, and win against seen winners regardless of whether the watched bout had escalated or not. Though eavesdropping had relatively little effect on bystander-loser contest dynamics, bystanders were less prone to initiate aggression and win against losers that had escalated in the witnessed bout. Thus, bystanders appear to preferentially retain and utilize information gained about potentially dangerous opponents (winners or persistent losers). Our data lend clear support for the importance of eavesdropping in visually based aggressive signalling systems.
Address Department of Biology, Life Science, Room 139, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292, USA. rlearl01@athena.louisville.edu
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Notes PMID:12028778 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 498
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Author Crowley, P.H.; Provencher, L.; Sloane, S.; Dugatkin, L.A.; Spohn, B.; Rogers, L.; Alfieri, M.
Title (up) Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition Type Journal Article
Year 1996 Publication Biosystems Abbreviated Journal Biosystems
Volume 37 Issue 1-2 Pages 49-66
Keywords Game theory; Genetic algorithms; Individual recognition; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Reciprocal altruism
Abstract To evaluate the role of individual recognition in the evolution of cooperation, we formulated and analyzed a genetic algorithm model (EvCo) for playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. Strategies compete against each other during each generation, and successful strategies contribute more of their attributes to the next generation. Each strategy is encoded on a `chromosome' that plays the IPD, responding to the sequences of most recent responses by the interacting individuals (chromosomes). The analysis reported in this paper considered different memory capabilities (one to five previous interactions), pairing continuities (pairs of individuals remain together for about one, two, five, or 1000 consecutive interactions), and types of individual recognition (recognition capability was maximal, nil, or allowed to evolve between these limits). Analysis of the results focused on the frequency of mutual cooperation in pairwise interactions (a good indicator of overall success in the IPD) and on the extent to which previous responses by the focal individual and its partner were associated with the partner's identity (individual recognition). Results indicated that a fixed, substantial amount of individual recognition could maintain high levels of mutual cooperation even at low pairing continuities, and a significant but limited capability for individual recognition evolved under selection. Recognition generally increased mutual cooperation more when the recent responses of individuals other than the current partner were ignored. Titrating recognition memory under selection using a fitness cost suggested that memory of the partner's previous responses was more valuable than memory of the focal's previous responses. The dynamics produced to date by EvCo are a step toward understanding the evolution of social networks, for which additional benefits associated with group interactions must be incorporated.
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Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 483
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Godin, J.-G.J.
Title (up) Female mate copying in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata): age-dependent effects Type Journal Article
Year 1993 Publication Behavioral Ecology Abbreviated Journal Behav. Ecol.
Volume 4 Issue 4 Pages 289-292
Keywords mate choice, copying, guppy, Poecilia reticulata
Abstract Virtually all studies of mate choice to date have assumed that females choose mates independent of one another. Social cues, however, such as the mate choice of conspecifics, may also play an important role in such decisions. Previous work has shown that female guppies of similar age copy each other's choice of mates. Here we examine the effect of relative age on mate choice copying in the guppy, Poecilia reticulata, and examine whether younger individuals are more likely to copy the mate choice of older conspecifics than vice versa. Results indicate that younger females copy the mate choice of older females, but older individuals do not appear to be influenced by the mate choice of younger individuals.
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Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 2181
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Earley, R.L.
Title (up) Group fusion: the impact of winner, loser, and bystander effects on hierarchy formation in large groups Type Journal Article
Year 2003 Publication Behavioral Ecology Abbreviated Journal Behav. Ecol.
Volume 14 Issue 3 Pages 367-373
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Abstract We present the results of a series of computer simulations that examined the impact of winner, loser, and bystander effects on hierarchy formation in fused groups. These effects and their implications for hierarchy structure and aggressive interactions were first examined in small four-member groups. Subsequent to this, the two small groups were fused into a single larger group. Further interactions took place in this fused group, generating a new hierarchy. Our models demonstrate clearly that winner, loser, and bystander effects strongly influence both the structure and types of interactions that emerge from the fusion of smaller groups. Four conditions produced results in which the same general patterns were uncovered in pre- and postfusion groups: (1) winner effects alone, (2) bystander loser effects alone, (3) winner and bystander winner effects operating simultaneously, and (4) all four effects in play simultaneously. Outside this parameter space, hierarchy structure and the nature of aggressive interactions differed in pre- and postfusion groups. When only loser effects were in play, one of the two clear alphas from the prefused groups dropped in rank in the eight-member fused group. When bystander winner effects were in play, it was difficult to rank any of the eight individuals in the fused group, and players interacted almost exclusively with those that were not in their original four-member group. When loser and bystander loser effects operated simultaneously, two top-ranking individuals emerged in the fused groups, but the relative rank of the other players was difficult to assign.
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Notes 10.1093/beheco/14.3.367 Approved no
Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 519
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Alfieri, M.
Title (up) Guppies and the TIT FOR TAT strategy: preference based on past interaction Type Journal Article
Year 1991 Publication Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology Abbreviated Journal Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.
Volume 28 Issue 4 Pages 243-246
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Abstract The evolution of cooperation requires either (a) nonrandom interactions, such that cooperators preferentially interact with other cooperators, or (b) conditional behaviors, such that individuals act cooperatively primarily towards other cooperators. Although these conditions can be met without assuming sophisticated animal cognition, they are more likely to be met if animals can remember individuals with whom they have interacted, associate past interactions with these individuals, and base future behavior on this information. Here we show that guppies (Poecilia reticulata), in the context of predator inspection behavior, can identify and remember (for at least 4 h) the “more cooperative” among two conspecifics and subsequently choose to be near these individuals in future encounters.
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Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 3397
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Bekoff, M.
Title (up) Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model Type Journal Article
Year 2003 Publication Behavioural Processes Abbreviated Journal Behav. Process.
Volume 60 Issue 3 Pages 209-214
Keywords Play; Fairness; Game theory
Abstract Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether `fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies--fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness.
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Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 488
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