Abstract: For 30 years Gallup's (Science 167:86-87, 1970) mark test, which consists of confronting a mirror-experienced test animal with its own previously altered mirror image, usually a color mark on forehead, eyebrow or ear, has delivered valuable results about the distribution of visual self-recognition in non-human primates. Chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans and, less frequently, gorillas can learn to correctly understand the reflection of their body in a mirror. However, the standard version of the mark test is good only for positively proving the existence of self-recognition. Conclusive statements about the lack of self-recognition are more difficult because of the methodological constraints of the test. This situation has led to a persistent controversy about the power of Gallup's original technique. We devised a new variant of the test which permits more unequivocal decisions about both the presence and absence of self-recognition. This new procedure was tested with marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus), following extensive training with mirror-related tasks to facilitate performance in the standard mark test. The results show that a slightly altered mark test with a new marking substance (chocolate cream) can help to reliably discriminate between true negative results, indicating a real lack of ability to recognize oneself in a mirror, from false negative results that are due to methodological particularities of the standard test. Finally, an evolutionary hypothesis is put forward as to why many primates can use a mirror instrumentally – i.e. know how to use it for grasping at hidden objects – while failing in the decisive mark test.

Abstract: Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.

Abstract: We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences.

Abstract: Because most learning studies in cephalopods have been performed on octopods, it remains unclear whether such abilities are specific to octopus, or whether they correlate with having a larger and more centrally organized brain. To investigate associative learning in a different cephalopod, six sexually mature cuttlefish (Sepia officinalis) participated in a counterbalanced, within-subjects, appetitive, classical conditioning procedure. Two plastic spheres (conditioned stimuli, CSs), differing in brightness, were presented sequentially. Presentation of the CS+ was followed 5 s later by a live feeder fish (unconditioned stimulus, US). Cuttlefish began to attack the CS+ with the same type of food-acquisition seizures used to capture the feeder fish. After seven blocks of training (42 presentations of each CS) the difference in seizure probability between CS+ and CS- trials more than doubled; and was found to be significantly higher in late versus early blocks. These results indicate that cuttlefish exhibit autoshaping under some conditions. The possible ecological significance of this type of learning is briefly discussed.

Abstract: Domestic chicks are capable of perceiving as a whole objects partly concealed by occluders (“amodal completion”). In previous studies chicks were imprinted on a certain configuration and at test they were required to choose between two alternative versions of it. Using the same paradigm we now investigated the presence of hemispheric differences in amodal completion by testing newborn chicks with one eye temporarily patched. Separate groups of newly hatched chicks were imprinted binocularly: (1) on a square partly occluded by a superimposed bar, (2) on a whole or (3) on an amputated version of the square. At test, in monocular conditions, each chick was presented with a free choice between a complete and an amputated square. In the crucial condition 1, chicks tested with only their left eye in use chose the complete square (like binocular chicks would do); right-eyed chicks, in contrast, tended to choose the amputated square. Similar results were obtained in another group of chicks imprinted binocularly onto a cross (either occluded or amputated in its central part) and required to choose between a complete or an amputated cross. Left-eyed and binocular chicks chose the complete cross, whereas right-eyed chicks did not choose the amputated cross significantly more often. These findings suggest that neural structures fed by the left eye (mainly located in the right hemisphere) are, in the chick, more inclined to a “global” analysis of visual scenes, whereas those fed by the right eye seem to be more inclined to a “featural” analysis of visual scenes.