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Benard, J., Stach, S., & Giurfa, M. (2006). Categorization of visual stimuli in the honeybee Apis mellifera. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 257–270.
Abstract: Categorization refers to the classification of perceptual input into defined functional groups. We present and discuss evidence suggesting that stimulus categorization can also be found in an invertebrate, the honeybee Apis mellifera, thus underlining the generality across species of this cognitive process. Honeybees show positive transfer of appropriate responding from a trained to a novel set of visual stimuli. Such a transfer was demonstrated for specific isolated features such as symmetry or orientation, but also for assemblies (layouts) of features. Although transfer from training to novel stimuli can be achieved by stimulus generalization of the training stimuli, most of these transfer tests involved clearly distinguishable stimuli for which generalization would be reduced. Though in most cases specific experimental controls such as stimulus balance and discriminability are still required, it seems appropriate to characterize the performance of honeybees as reflecting categorization. Further experiments should address the issue of which categorization theory accounts better for the visual performances of honeybees.
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McGonigle, B., Chalmers, M., & Dickinson, A. (2003). Concurrent disjoint and reciprocal classification by Cebus apella in seriation tasks: evidence for hierarchical organization. Anim. Cogn., 6(3), 185–197.
Abstract: We report the results of a 4-year-long study of capuchin monkeys ( Cebus apella ) on concurrent three-way classification and linear size seriation tasks using explicit ordering procedures, requiring subjects to select icons displayed on touch screens rather than manipulate and sort actual objects into groups. The results indicate that C. apella is competent to classify nine items concurrently, first into three disjoint classes where class exemplars are identical to one another, then into three reciprocal classes which share common exemplar (size) features. In the final phase we compare the relative efficiency of executive control under conditions where both hierarchical and/or linear organization can be utilized. Whilst this shows a superiority of categorical based size seriation for a nine item test set suggesting an adaptive advantage for hierarchical over linear organization, Cebus nevertheless achieved high levels of principled linear size seriation with sequence lengths not normally achieved by children below the age of six years.
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Iversen, I. H., & Matsuzawa, T. (2003). Development of interception of moving targets by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in an automated task. Anim. Cogn., 6(3), 169–183.
Abstract: The experiments investigated how two adult captive chimpanzees learned to navigate in an automated interception task. They had to capture a visual target that moved predictably on a touch monitor. The aim of the study was to determine the learning stages that led to an efficient strategy of intercepting the target. The chimpanzees had prior training in moving a finger on a touch monitor and were exposed to the interception task without any explicit training. With a finger the subject could move a small “ball” at any speed on the screen toward a visual target that moved at a fixed speed either back and forth in a linear path or around the edge of the screen in a rectangular pattern. Initial ball and target locations varied from trial to trial. The subjects received a small fruit reinforcement when they hit the target with the ball. The speed of target movement was increased across training stages up to 38 cm/s. Learning progressed from merely chasing the target to intercepting the target by moving the ball to a point on the screen that coincided with arrival of the target at that point. Performance improvement consisted of reduction in redundancy of the movement path and reduction in the time to target interception. Analysis of the finger's movement path showed that the subjects anticipated the target's movement even before it began to move. Thus, the subjects learned to use the target's initial resting location at trial onset as a predictive signal for where the target would later be when it began moving. During probe trials, where the target unpredictably remained stationary throughout the trial, the subjects first moved the ball in anticipation of expected target movement and then corrected the movement to steer the ball to the resting target. Anticipatory ball movement in probe trials with novel ball and target locations (tested for one subject) showed generalized interception beyond the trained ball and target locations. The experiments illustrate in a laboratory setting the development of a highly complex and adaptive motor performance that resembles navigational skills seen in natural settings where predators intercept the path of moving prey.
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Shettleworth, S. J., & Westwood, R. P. (2002). Divided attention, memory, and spatial discrimination in food-storing and nonstoring birds, black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapilla) and dark-eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(3), 227–241.
Abstract: Food-storing birds, black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapilla), and nonstoring birds, dark-eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis), matched color or location on a touch screen. Both species showed a divided attention effect for color but not for location (Experiment 1). Chickadees performed better on location than on color with retention intervals up to 40 s, but juncos did not (Experiment 2). Increasing sample-distractor distance improved performance similarly in both species. Multidimensional scaling revealed that both use a Euclidean metric of spatial similarity (Experiment 3). When choosing between the location and color of a remembered item, food storers choose location more than do nonstorers. These results explain this effect by differences in memory for location relative to color, not division of attention or spatial discrimination ability.
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Bennett, A. T. (1996). Do animals have cognitive maps? J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 219–224.
Abstract: Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
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Fremouw, T., Herbranson, W. T., & Shimp, C. P. (2002). Dynamic shifts of pigeon local/global attention. Anim. Cogn., 5(4), 233–243.
Abstract: It has previously been shown that pigeons can shift attention between parts and wholes of complex stimuli composed of larger, “global” characters constructed from smaller, “local” characters. The base-rate procedure used biased target level within any condition at either the local or global level; targets were more likely at one level than at the other. Biasing of target level in this manner demonstrated shifts of local/global attention over a time span consisting of several days with a fixed base rate. Experiment 1 examined the possibility that pigeons can shift attention between local and global levels of perceptual analysis in seconds rather than days. The experiment used priming cues the color of which predicted on a trial-by-trial basis targets at different perceptual levels. The results confirmed that pigeons, like humans, can display highly dynamic stimulus-driven shifts of local/global attention. Experiment 2 changed spatial relations between features of priming cues and features of targets within a task otherwise similar to that used in experiment 1. It was predicted that this change in cues might affect asymmetry but not the occurrence of a priming effect. A priming effect was again obtained, thereby providing generality to the claim that pigeons can learn that trial-by-trial primes predict targets at different levels of perceptual analysis. Pigeons can display perceptual, stimulus-driven priming of a highly dynamic nature.
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Washburn, D. A., & Astur, R. S. (2003). Exploration of virtual mazes by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Anim. Cogn., 6(3), 161–168.
Abstract: A chasm divides the huge corpus of maze studies found in the literature, with animals tested in mazes on the one side and humans tested with mazes on the other. Advances in technology and software have made possible the production and use of virtual mazes, which allow humans to navigate computerized environments and thus for humans and nonhuman animals to be tested in comparable spatial domains. In the present experiment, this comparability is extended even further by examining whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) can learn to explore virtual mazes. Four male macaques were trained to manipulate a joystick so as to move through a virtual environment and to locate a computer-generated target. The animals succeeded in learning this task, and located the target even when it was located in novel alleys. The search pattern within the maze for these animals resembled the pattern of maze navigation observed for monkeys that were tested on more traditional two-dimensional computerized mazes.
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Neiworth, J. J., Hassett, J. M., & Sylvester, C. J. (2007). Face processing in humans and new world monkeys: the influence of experiential and ecological factors. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 125–134.
Abstract: This study tests whether the face-processing system of humans and a nonhuman primate species share characteristics that would allow for early and quick processing of socially salient stimuli: a sensitivity toward conspecific faces, a sensitivity toward highly practiced face stimuli, and an ability to generalize changes in the face that do not suggest a new identity, such as a face differently oriented. The look rates by adult tamarins and humans toward conspecific and other primate faces were examined to determine if these characteristics are shared. A visual paired comparison (VPC) task presented subjects with either a human face, chimpanzee face, tamarin face, or an object as a sample, and then a pair containing the previous stimulus and a novel stimulus was presented. The stimuli were either presented all in an upright orientation, or all in an inverted orientation. The novel stimulus in the pair was either an orientation change of the same face/object or a new example of the same type of face/object, and the stimuli were shown either in an upright orientation or in an inverted orientation. Preference to novelty scores revealed that humans attended most to novel individual human faces, and this effect decreased significantly if the stimuli were inverted. Tamarins showed preferential looking toward novel orientations of previously seen tamarin faces in the upright orientation, but not in an inverted orientation. Similarly, their preference to look longer at novel tamarin and human faces within the pair was reduced significantly with inverted stimuli. The results confirmed prior findings in humans that novel human faces generate more attention in the upright than in the inverted orientation. The monkeys also attended more to faces of conspecifics, but showed an inversion effect to orientation change in tamarin faces and to identity changes in tamarin and human faces. The results indicate configural processing restricted to particular kinds of primate faces by a New World monkey species, with configural processing influenced by life experience (human faces and tamarin faces) and specialized to process orientation changes specific to conspecific faces.
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Regolin, L., Marconato, F., & Vallortigara, G. (2004). Hemispheric differences in the recognition of partly occluded objects by newly hatched domestic chicks (Gallus gallus). Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 162–170.
Abstract: Domestic chicks are capable of perceiving as a whole objects partly concealed by occluders (“amodal completion”). In previous studies chicks were imprinted on a certain configuration and at test they were required to choose between two alternative versions of it. Using the same paradigm we now investigated the presence of hemispheric differences in amodal completion by testing newborn chicks with one eye temporarily patched. Separate groups of newly hatched chicks were imprinted binocularly: (1) on a square partly occluded by a superimposed bar, (2) on a whole or (3) on an amputated version of the square. At test, in monocular conditions, each chick was presented with a free choice between a complete and an amputated square. In the crucial condition 1, chicks tested with only their left eye in use chose the complete square (like binocular chicks would do); right-eyed chicks, in contrast, tended to choose the amputated square. Similar results were obtained in another group of chicks imprinted binocularly onto a cross (either occluded or amputated in its central part) and required to choose between a complete or an amputated cross. Left-eyed and binocular chicks chose the complete cross, whereas right-eyed chicks did not choose the amputated cross significantly more often. These findings suggest that neural structures fed by the left eye (mainly located in the right hemisphere) are, in the chick, more inclined to a “global” analysis of visual scenes, whereas those fed by the right eye seem to be more inclined to a “featural” analysis of visual scenes.
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Wolfe, J. M. (1983). Hidden visual processes. Sci Am, 248(2), 94–103.
Abstract: Isoluminant stimulus is an image whose edges are defined only by a change in color, not by change in brightness. The stimulus here is imperfect: the blue parts and the green parts of the image are only as nearly equal in brightness as they can be on the printed page. Moreover, the change in brightness beyond the edge of the page is apparent, and so is the fact that the reader is holding the magazine at reading distance. When such cues are removed under laboratory conditions, subjects faced with an isoluminant stimulus prove unable to bring its edges into focus. This deficiency contributes to making a familiar face hard to recognize. The experiment indicates that the brain process underlying visual accommodation (the focusing of the eyes) cannot “see” color; it is a hidden process distinct from the processes that lead to perception. The image shows Groucho Marx as he appeared in the motion picture Horse Feathers.
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