Gammell, M. P., de Vries, H., Jennings, D. J., Carlin, C. M., & Hayden, T. J. (2003). David's score: a more appropriate dominance ranking method than Clutton-Brock et al.'s index. Anim. Behav., 66(3), 601–605.
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Cameron, E. Z.,, Linklater, W. L.,, Stafford, K. J.,, & Minot, E. O.,. (2003). Social grouping and maternal behaviour in feral horses (Equus caballus): the influence of males on maternal protectiveness. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 53(2), 92–101.
Abstract: The risk of infant injury or mortality influences maternal behaviour, particularly protectiveness. Mares are found in bands with a single stallion or bands with more than one stallion in which paternity is less certain. We investigated maternal behaviour in relation to band type. Mares in bands with more than one stallion were more protective of their foals, particularly when stallions and foals approached one another. The rate of aggression between the stallion and foal was a significant predictor of maternal protectiveness, and mare protectiveness was significantly correlated with reduced reproductive success in the subsequent year. Mares that changed band types with a foal at foot, or had their band type experimentally altered, were more protective of their foal in multi-stallion bands than they were in single-stallion bands. Equids are unusual amongst ungulates in that infanticide and feticide have been reported. Both occur where paternity has been uncertain, and equid social structure is similar to other species in which infanticide has been reported. Stallions benefit from infanticide as the mare has greater reproductive success in the subsequent year. Stallion aggression is a significant modifier of mare behaviour and maternal effort, probably due to the risk of infanticide.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2003). The Structure of Social Knowledge in Monkeys. In F. B. M. de Waal, & P. L. Tyack (Eds.), Animal Social Complexity: Intelligence, Culture, and Individualized Societies. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
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Johnson, D. D. P., Stopka, P., & Knights, S. (2003). Sociology: The puzzle of human cooperation. Nature, 421(6926), 911–2; discussion 912.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Bekoff, M. (2003). Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model. Behav. Process., 60(3), 209–214.
Abstract: Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether `fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies--fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness.
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Dugatkin, L. A., Perlin, M., & Atlas, R. (2003). The Evolution of Group-beneficial Traits in the Absence of Between-group Selection. J. Theor. Biol., 220(1), 67–74.
Abstract: One specific prediction emerging from trait-group models of natural selection is that when individuals possess traits that benefit other group members, natural selection will favor “cheating” (i.e. not possessing the group-beneficial trait) within groups. Cheating is selected within groups because it allows individuals to avoid bearing the relative costs typically associated with group-beneficial traits, but to still reap the benefits associated with the acts of other group members. Selection between groups favors traits that benefit other group members. The relative strength of within- and between-group selection then determines the equilibrium frequency of those who produce group-beneficial traits and those that do not. Here we demonstrate that individual-level selection, that is selection within groups can also produce an intermediate frequency of such group-beneficial traits by frequency-dependent selection. The models we develop are general in nature, but were inspired by the evolution of antibiotic resistance in bacteria. The theory developed here is distinct from prior work that relies on reciprocity or kinship per'se to achieve cooperation and altruism among group members.
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Mettke-Hofmann, C., & Gwinner, E. (2003). Long-term memory for a life on the move. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 100(10), 5863–5866.
Abstract: Evidence is accumulating that cognitive abilities are shaped by the specific ecological conditions to which animals are exposed. Long-distance migratory birds may provide a striking example of this. Field observations have shown that, at least in some species, a substantial proportion of individuals return to the same breeding, wintering, and stopover sites in successive years. This observation suggests that migrants have evolved special cognitive abilities that enable them to accomplish these feats. Here we show that memory of a particular feeding site persisted for at least 12 months in a long-distance migrant, whereas a closely related nonmigrant could remember such a site for only 2 weeks. Thus, it seems that the migratory lifestyle has influenced the learning and memorizing capacities of migratory birds. These results build a bridge between field observations suggesting special memorization feats of migratory birds and previous neuroanatomical results from the same two species indicating an increase in relative hippocampal size from the first to the second year of life in the migrant but not in the nonmigrant.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Earley, R. L. (2003). Group fusion: the impact of winner, loser, and bystander effects on hierarchy formation in large groups. Behav. Ecol., 14(3), 367–373.
Abstract: We present the results of a series of computer simulations that examined the impact of winner, loser, and bystander effects on hierarchy formation in fused groups. These effects and their implications for hierarchy structure and aggressive interactions were first examined in small four-member groups. Subsequent to this, the two small groups were fused into a single larger group. Further interactions took place in this fused group, generating a new hierarchy. Our models demonstrate clearly that winner, loser, and bystander effects strongly influence both the structure and types of interactions that emerge from the fusion of smaller groups. Four conditions produced results in which the same general patterns were uncovered in pre- and postfusion groups: (1) winner effects alone, (2) bystander loser effects alone, (3) winner and bystander winner effects operating simultaneously, and (4) all four effects in play simultaneously. Outside this parameter space, hierarchy structure and the nature of aggressive interactions differed in pre- and postfusion groups. When only loser effects were in play, one of the two clear alphas from the prefused groups dropped in rank in the eight-member fused group. When bystander winner effects were in play, it was difficult to rank any of the eight individuals in the fused group, and players interacted almost exclusively with those that were not in their original four-member group. When loser and bystander loser effects operated simultaneously, two top-ranking individuals emerged in the fused groups, but the relative rank of the other players was difficult to assign.
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Dunbar, R. (2003). Evolution of the social brain. Science, 302(5648), 1160–1161.
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Brilot, B. O., & Johnstone, R. A. (2003). The limits to cost-free signalling of need between relatives. Proc Biol Sci, 270(1519), 1055–1060.
Abstract: Theoretical models have demonstrated the possibility of stable cost-free signalling of need between relatives. The stability of these cost-free equilibria depends on the indirect fitness cost of cheating and deceiving a donor into giving away resources. We show that this stability is highly sensitive to the distribution of need among signallers and receivers. In particular, cost-free signalling is likely to prove stable only if there is very large variation in need (such that the least-needy individuals stand to gain much less than the most-needy individuals from additional resources). We discuss whether these conditions are likely to be found in altricial avian breeding systems--the most intensively studied instance of signalling of need between relatives. We suggest that cost-free signalling is more likely to prove stable and will provide parents with more information during the earlier phases of chick growth, when parents can more easily meet the demands of a brood (and chicks are more likely to reach satiation). Later, informative yet cost-free signalling is unlikely to persist.
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