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Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(9), 5359–5362.
Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.
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Maestripieri, D. (2001). Comparing cognition in animals, and researchers. Trends Cogn Sci, 5(10), 452–453.
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Slotnick, B. (2001). Animal cognition and the rat olfactory system. Trends Cogn Sci, 5(5), 216–222.
Abstract: Is smell a 'primitive' sense used primarily to guide biologically basic behaviors or might it be the sensory modality that allows some species to express complex learning and other forms of cognitive behavior? Historically, the olfactory system has been considered primitive and it is not surprising that, until recently, cognitive neuroscientists have ignored odor-guided behavior. However, we now know that the olfactory system has projections to the prefrontal cortex, entorhinal cortex and hippocampus, and that these connections support the acquisition of simple and higher-order instrumental tasks, as well as a robust memory for odors. It appears that animals with a well-developed sense of smell have the neural machinery to think with their noses.
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McLean, A. N. (2001). Cognitive abilities -- the result of selective pressures on food acquisition? Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 71(3), 241–258.
Abstract: Locating and capturing food are suggested as significant selection pressures for the evolution of various cognitive abilities in mammals and birds. The hypothesis is proposed that aspects of food procuring behaviour should be strongly indicative of particular cognitive abilities. Experimental data concerning higher mental abilities in mammals and birds are reviewed. These data deal with self-recognition studies, rule-learning experiments, number concept, deceptive abilities, tool-use and observational learning. A Darwinian approach reveals: (1) the adaptiveness of particular abilities for particular niches, (2) that in complex foraging environments, increases in foraging efficiencies in animals should result from the evolution of particular cognitive abilities, (3) that phenomena such as convergent mental evolution should be expected to have taken place across taxonomic groups for species exploiting similar niches, (4) that divergence in mental ability should also have taken place where related species have exploited dissimilar niches. Experimental data of higher mental abilities in animals concur with a Darwinian explanation for the distribution of these cognitive abilities and no anomalies have been found. There are, as a consequence, significant implications for the welfare of animals subject to training when training methodology gives little or no consideration to the various mental abilities of species.
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Tomasello, M. (2001). Cultural Transmission: A View from Chimpanzees and Human Infants. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32(2), 135–146.
Abstract: Human beings are biologically adapted for culture in ways that other primates are not, as evidenced most clearly by the fact that only human cultural traditions accumulate modifications over historical time (the ratchet effect). The key adaptation is one that enables individuals to understand other individuals as intentional agents like the self. This species-unique form of social cognition emerges in human ontogeny at around 1 year of age as infants begin to engage with other persons in various kinds of joint attentional activities involving gaze following, social referencing, and gestural communication. Young children's joint attentional skills then engender some uniquely powerful forms of cultural learning, enabling the acquisition of language, discourse skills, tool use practices, and many other conventional activities. These novel forms of cultural learning allow human beings to pool their cognitive resources both contemporaneously and over historical time in ways that are unique in the animal kingdom.
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Pearce JM, & Bouton ME. (2001). Theories of associative learning in animals. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 52, 111.
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Povinelli DJ, & Dunphy-Lelii S. (2001). Do chimpanzees seek explanations? Preliminary comparative investigations. Can. J. Exp. Psychol., 55, 185.
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Santos LR, Hauser MD, & Spelke ES. (2001). Recognition and categorization of biologically significant objects by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): the domain of food. Cognition, 82, 127.
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Cook, R. G., Shaw, R., & Blaisdell, A. P. (2001). Dynamic object perception by pigeons: discrimination of action in video presentations. Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 137–146.
Abstract: Two experiments examined the discrimination by pigeons of relative motion using computer-generated video stimuli. Using a go/no-go procedure, pigeons were tested with video stimuli in which the camera's perspective went either “around” or “through” an approaching object in a semi-realistic context. Experiment 1 found that pigeons could learn this discrimination and transfer it to videos composed from novel objects. Experiment 2 found that the order of the video's frames was critical to the discrimination of the videos. We hypothesize that the pigeons perceived a three-dimensional representation of the objects and the camera's relative motion and used this as the primary basis for discrimination. It is proposed that the pigeons might be able to form generalized natural categories for the different kinds of motions portrayed in the videos.
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De Lillo,, C. De Lillo, Floreano,, D. Floreano, Antinucci,, & F. Antinucci. (2001). Transitive choices by a simple, fully connected, backpropagation neural network: implications for the comparative study of transitive inference. Anim. Cogn., 4(1), 61–68.
Abstract: In search of the minimal requirements for transitive reasoning, a simple neural network was trained and tested on the non-verbal version of the conventional “five-term-series task” – a paradigm used with human adults, children and a variety of non-human species. The transitive performance of the network was analogous in several aspects to that reported for children and animals. The three effects usually associated with transitive choices i.e. “symbolic distance”, “lexical marking” and “end-anchor”, were also clearly shown by the neural network. In a second experiment, where the training conditions were manipulated, the network failed to match the behavioural pattern reported for human adults in the test following an ordered presentation of the premises. However, it mimicked young children's performance when tested with a novel comparison term. Although we do not intend to suggest a new model of transitive inference, we conclude, in line with other authors, that a simple error-correcting rule can generate transitive behaviour similar to the choice pattern of children and animals in the binary form of the five-term-series task without requiring high-order logical or paralogical abilities. The analysis of the training history and of the final internal structure of the network reveals the associative strategy employed. However, our results indicate that the scope of the associative strategy used by the network might be limited. The extent to which the conventional five-term-series task, in absence of appropriate manipulations of training and testing conditions, is suitable to detect cognitive differences across species is also discussed on the basis of our results.
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