Abstract: Hawk-dove games have been extensively used to predict the conditions under which group-living animals should defend their resources against potential usurpers. Typically, game-theoretic models on aggression consider that resource defense may entail energetic and injury costs. However, intruders may also take advantage of owners who are busy fighting to sneak access to unguarded resources, imposing thereby an additional cost on the use of the escalated hawk strategy. In this article we modify the two-strategy hawk-dove game into a three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game that incorporates a distraction-sneaking tactic, allowing us to explore its consequences on the expected level of aggression within groups. Our model predicts a lower proportion of hawks and hence lower frequencies of aggressive interactions within groups than do previous two-strategy hawk-dove games. The extent to which distraction sneakers decrease the frequency of aggression within groups, however, depends on whether they search only for opportunities to join resources uncovered by other group members or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp.

Abstract: Although many variants of the hawk-dove game predict the frequency at which group foraging animals should compete aggressively, none of them can explain why a large number of group foraging animals share food clumps without any overt aggression. One reason for this shortcoming is that hawk-dove games typically consider only a single contest, while most group foraging situations involve opponents that interact repeatedly over discovered food clumps. The present iterated hawk-dove game predicts that in situations that are analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, animals should share the resources without aggression, provided that the number of simultaneously available food clumps is sufficiently large and the number of competitors is relatively small. However, given that the expected gain of an aggressive animal is more variable than the gain expected by nonaggressive individuals, the predicted effect of the number of food items in a clump-clump richness-depends on whether only the mean or both the mean and variability associated with payoffs are considered. More precisely, the deterministic game predicts that aggression should increase with clump richness, whereas the stochastic risk-sensitive game predicts that the frequency of encounters resulting in aggression should peak at intermediate clump richnesses or decrease with increasing clump richness if animals show sensitivity to the variance or coefficient of variation, respectively.

Abstract: Commonly invoked foraging advantages of group membership include increased mean food intake rates and/or reduced variance in foraging success. These foraging advantages rely on the occurrence of 'joining': feeding from food discovered or captured by others. Joining occurs in most social species but the assumptions underlying its analysis have been clarified only recently, giving rise to two classes of model: information-sharing and producer-scrounger models. Recent experimental evidence suggests that joining in ground-feeding birds might be best analysed as a producer-scrounger game, with some intriguing consequences for the spatial distribution of foragers and patch exploitation.

Abstract: Information is a crucial currency for animals from both a behavioural and evolutionary perspective. Adaptive behaviour relies upon accurate estimation of relevant ecological parameters; the better informed an individual, the better it can develop and adjust its behaviour to meet the demands of a variable world. Here, we focus on the burgeoning interest in the impact of ecological uncertainty on adaptation, and the means by which it can be reduced by gathering information, from both 'passive' and 'responsive' sources. Our overview demonstrates the value of adopting an explicitly informational approach, and highlights the components that one needs to develop useful approaches to studying information use by animals. We propose a quantitative framework, based on statistical decision theory, for analysing animal information use in evolutionary ecology. Our purpose is to promote an integrative approach to studying information use by animals, which is itself integral to adaptive animal behaviour and organismal biology.

Abstract: When foraging together, animals are often observed to feed from food discoveries of others. The producer-scrounger (PS) game predicts how frequently this phenomenon of food parasitism should occur. The game assumes: (1) at any moment all individuals can unambiguously be categorized as either playing producer (searching for undiscovered food resources) or scrounger (searching for exploitation opportunities), and (2) the payoffs received from the scrounger tactic are negatively frequency dependent; a scrounger does better than a producer when the scrounger tactic is rare, but worse when it is common. No study to date has shown that the payoffs of producer and scrounger conform to the game's assumptions or that groups of foragers reach the predicted stable equilibrium frequency (SEF) of scrounger, whereby both tactics obtain the same payoff. The current study of three captive flocks of spice finches, Lonchura punctulata, provides the first test of the PS game using an apparatus in which both assumptions of the PS game are met. The payoffs to the scrounger, measured as feeding rate (seeds/s), were highly negatively frequency dependent on the frequency of scrounger. The feeding rate for scrounger declined linearly while the rate for producer either declined only slightly or not at all with increasing scrounger frequency. When given the opportunity to alternate between tactics, the birds changed their use of each, such that the group converged on the predicted SEF of scrounger after 5-8 days of testing. Individuals in this study, therefore, demonstrated sufficient plasticity in tactic use such that the flock foraged at the SEF of scrounger. Copyright 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.