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Aust, U., & Huber, L. (2006). Picture-object recognition in pigeons: evidence of representational insight in a visual categorization task using a complementary information procedure. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 190–195.
Abstract: Success in tasks requiring categorization of pictorial stimuli does not prove that a subject understands what the pictures stand for. The ability to achieve representational insight is by no means a trivial one because it exceeds mere detection of 2-D features present in both the pictorial images and their referents. So far, evidence for such an ability in nonhuman species is weak and inconclusive. Here, the authors report evidence of representational insight in pigeons. After being trained on pictures of incomplete human figures, the birds responded significantly more to pictures of the previously missing parts than to nonrepresentative stimuli, which demonstrates that they actually recognized the pictures' representational content.
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Washburn, D. A., Smith, J. D., & Shields, W. E. (2006). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) immediately generalize the uncertain response. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 185–189.
Abstract: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.
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Brannon, E. M., Cantlon, J. F., & Terrace, H. S. (2006). The role of reference points in ordinal numerical comparisons by rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 120–134.
Abstract: Two experiments examined ordinal numerical knowledge in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Experiment 1 replicated the finding (E. M. Brannon & H. S. Terrace, 2000) that monkeys trained to respond in descending numerical order (4-->3-->2-->1) did not generalize the descending rule to the novel values 5-9 in contrast to monkeys trained to respond in ascending order. Experiment 2 examined whether the failure to generalize a descending rule was due to the direction of the training sequence or to the specific values used in the training sequence. Results implicated 3 factors that characterize a monkey's numerical comparison process: Weber's law, knowledge of ordinal direction, and a comparison of each value in a test pair with the reference point established by the first value of the training sequence.
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Beran, M. J., Smith, J. D., Redford, J. S., & Washburn, D. A. (2006). Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) monitor uncertainty during numerosity judgments. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 111–119.
Abstract: Two rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) judged arrays of dots on a computer screen as having more or fewer dots than a center value that was never presented in trials. After learning a center value, monkeys were given an uncertainty response that let them decline to make the numerosity judgment on that trial. Across center values (3-7), errors occurred most often for sets adjacent in numerosity to the center value. The monkeys also used the uncertainty response most frequently on these difficult trials. A 2nd experiment showed that monkeys' responses reflected numerical magnitude and not the surface-area illumination of the displays. This research shows that monkeys' uncertainty-monitoring capacity extends to the domain of numerical cognition. It also shows monkeys' use of the purest uncertainty response possible, uncontaminated by any secondary motivator.
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Nissani, M. (2006). Do Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) apply causal reasoning to tool-use tasks? J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(1), 91–96.
Abstract: Two experiments addressed contradictory claims about causal reasoning in elephants. In Experiment 1, 4 Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) were pretrained to remove a lid from the top of a bucket and retrieve a food reward. Subsequently, in the first 5 critical trials, when the lid was placed alongside the bucket and no longer obstructed access to the reward, each elephant continued to remove the lid before retrieving the reward. Experiment 2, which involved 11 additional elephants and variations of the original design, yielded similarly counterintuitive observations. Although the results are open to alternative interpretations, they appear more consistent with associative learning than with causal reasoning. Future applications of Fabrean methodologies (J. H. Fabre, 1915) to animal cognition are proposed.
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Katz, J. S., & Wright, A. A. (2006). Same/different abstract-concept learning by pigeons. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(1), 80–86.
Abstract: Eight pigeons were trained and tested in a simultaneous same/different task. After pecking an upper picture, they pecked a lower picture to indicate same or a white rectangle to indicate different. Increases in the training set size from 8 to 1,024 items produced improved transfer from 51.3% to 84.6%. This is the first evidence that pigeons can perform a two-item same/different task as accurately with novel items as training items and both above 80% correct. Fixed-set control groups ruled out training time or transfer testing as producing the high level of abstract-concept learning. Comparisons with similar experiments with rhesus and capuchin monkeys showed that the ability to learn the same/different abstract concept was similar but that pigeons require more training exemplars.
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Vlamings, P. H. J. M., Uher, J., & Call, J. (2006). How the great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) perform on the reversed contingency task: the effects of food quantity and food visibility. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(1), 60–70.
Abstract: S. T. Boysen and G. G. Berntson (1995) found that chimpanzees performed poorly on a reversed contingency task in which they had to point to the smaller of 2 food quantities to acquire the larger quantity. The authors compared the performance of 4 great ape species (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) on the reversed contingency task while manipulating food quantity (0-4 or 1-4) and food visibility (visible pairs or covered pairs). Results showed no systematic species differences but large individual differences. Some individuals of each species were able to solve the reversed contingency task. Both quantity and visibility of the food items had a significant effect on performance. Subjects performed better when the disparity between quantities was smaller and the quantities were not directly visible.
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Fabrega, H. J. (2006). Making sense of behavioral irregularities of great apes. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 30(8), 1260–73; discussion 1274–7.
Abstract: Psychopathology, mental illness, and psychiatric treatment are concepts relevant to modern medicine and medical psychology and replete with cumbersome intellectual and literary baggage. They bear the imprint of suppositions, world views, and general beliefs and values exemplified in the science, history, and general culture of Anglo European societies. The study in higher apes of phenomena addressed by such concepts raises conceptual dilemmas, usually termed speciesism and anthropomorphism, not unlike those encountered in comparative human studies of similar phenomena across cultures and historical periods, namely, ethnocentrism and anachronism. The authors' synthesis of literature and their analysis of the implications of higher ape psychopathology represent an epistemically compelling account that broadens the scope of the comparative study of behavioral irregularities, a topic that provides a different slant for examining challenging questions in evolutionary biology and primatology, such as cognition, self awareness, intentional behavior, culture and behavioral traditions, social intelligence, sickness and healing, and altruism. Theoretical and empirical study of this topic expands formulation and can help provide informative answers about human evolution as well as essential features of human psychiatric syndromes, with potential practical implications. The study of psychopathology of higher apes and other non human primates represents an appropriate focus for neuroscience and bio-behavioral sciences.
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Heschl, A., & Burkart, J. (2006). A new mark test for mirror self-recognition in non-human primates. Primates, 47(3), 187–198.
Abstract: For 30 years Gallup's (Science 167:86-87, 1970) mark test, which consists of confronting a mirror-experienced test animal with its own previously altered mirror image, usually a color mark on forehead, eyebrow or ear, has delivered valuable results about the distribution of visual self-recognition in non-human primates. Chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans and, less frequently, gorillas can learn to correctly understand the reflection of their body in a mirror. However, the standard version of the mark test is good only for positively proving the existence of self-recognition. Conclusive statements about the lack of self-recognition are more difficult because of the methodological constraints of the test. This situation has led to a persistent controversy about the power of Gallup's original technique. We devised a new variant of the test which permits more unequivocal decisions about both the presence and absence of self-recognition. This new procedure was tested with marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus), following extensive training with mirror-related tasks to facilitate performance in the standard mark test. The results show that a slightly altered mark test with a new marking substance (chocolate cream) can help to reliably discriminate between true negative results, indicating a real lack of ability to recognize oneself in a mirror, from false negative results that are due to methodological particularities of the standard test. Finally, an evolutionary hypothesis is put forward as to why many primates can use a mirror instrumentally – i.e. know how to use it for grasping at hidden objects – while failing in the decisive mark test.
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Wich, S. A., & de Vries, H. (2006). Male monkeys remember which group members have given alarm calls. Proc Biol Sci, 273(1587), 735–740.
Abstract: Primates give alarm calls in response to the presence of predators. In some species, such as the Thomas langur (Presbytis thomasi), males only emit alarm calls if there is an audience. An unanswered question is whether the audience's behaviour influences how long the male will continue his alarm calling. We tested three hypotheses that might explain the alarm calling duration of male Thomas langurs: the fatigue, group size and group member behaviour hypotheses. Fatigue and group size did not influence male alarm calling duration. We found that males only ceased calling shortly after all individuals in his group had given at least one alarm call. This shows that males keep track of and thus remember which group members have called.
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