Abstract: Abstract In recent years, behavioral ecologists have embraced social network analysis (SNA) in order to explore the structure of animal societies and the functional consequences of that structure. We provide a conceptual introduction to the field that focuses on historical developments, as well as on novel insights generated by recent work. First, we discuss major advances in the analysis of nonhuman societies, culminating in the use of SNA by behavioral ecologists. Next, we discuss how network-based approaches have enhanced our understanding of social structure and behavior over the past decade, focusing on: (1) information transmission, (2) collective behaviors, (3) animal personality, and (4) cooperation. These behaviors and phenomena possess several features—e.g., indirect effects, emergent properties—that network analysis is well equipped to handle. Finally, we highlight recent developments in SNA that are allowing behavioral ecologists to address increasingly sophisticated questions regarding the structure and function of animal sociality.

Abstract: The ability of ponies to learn to avoid a relatively novel food associated with illness was tested in three situations: when illness occurred immediately after consuming a feed; when illness occurred 30 min after consuming a feed; and when illness was contingent upon eating one of three feeds offered simultaneously. Apomorphine was used to produce illness. The feeds associated with illness were corn, alfalfa pellets, sweet feed and a complete pelleted feed. The ponies learned to avoid all the fees except the complete feed when apomorphine injection immediately followed consumption of the feed. However, the ponies did not learn to avoid a feed if apomorphine was delayed 30 min after feed consumption. They could learn to avoid alfalfa pellets, but not corn, when these feeds were presented with the familiar “safe foods,” oats and soybean meal. Ponies apparently are able to learn a taste aversion, but there were constraints on this learning ability. Under the conditions of this study, they did not learn to avoid a food that made them sick long after consumption of the food, and they had more difficulty learning to avoid highly palatable feeds.

Abstract: Empirical research with nonhuman primates appears to support the view that causal reasoning is a key cognitive faculty that divides humans from animals. The claim is that animals approximate causal learning using associative processes. The present results cast doubt on that conclusion. Rats made causal inferences in a basic task that taps into core features of causal reasoning without requiring complex physical knowledge. They derived predictions of the outcomes of interventions after passive observational learning of different kinds of causal models. These competencies cannot be explained by current associative theories but are consistent with causal Bayes net theories.

Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.

Abstract: In a recent paper, Kaminski, Call and Fischer report pioneering research on word-learning in a dog. In this commentary we suggest ways of distinguishing referential word use from mere association. We question whether the dog is reasoning by exclusion and, if so, compare three explanations – learned heuristics, default assumptions, and pragmatic reasoning – as they apply to children and might apply to dogs. Kaminski et al.'s work clearly raises important questions about the origins and basis of word learning and social cognition.