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Sukhomlinov, B. F., Korobov, V. N., Gonchar, M. V., Datsiuk, L. A., & Korzhev, V. A. (1987). [Comparative analysis of the peroxidase activity of myoglobins in mammals]. Zh Evol Biokhim Fiziol, 23(1), 37–41.
Abstract: Studies have been made on the peroxidase activity of metmyoglobins in animals from various ecological groups--the horse Equus caballus, cattle Bos taurus, beaver Castor fiber, otter Lutra lutra, mink Mustela vison and dog Canis familiaris. It was found that the level of this activity in diving animals depends on the duration of their diving, whereas in terrestrial species--on the strength of muscular contraction.
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Rumiantsev, S. N. (1973). [Biological function of Clostridium tetani toxin (ecological and evolutionary aspects)]. Zh Evol Biokhim Fiziol, 9(5), 474–480.
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Wasserman, E. A. (1997). The science of animal cognition: past, present, and future. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 23(2), 123–135.
Abstract: The field of animal cognition is strongly rooted in the philosophy of mind and in the theory of evolution. Despite these strong roots, work during the most famous and active period in the history of our science-the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s-may have diverted us from the very questions that were of greatest initial interest to the comparative analysis of learning and behavior. Subsequently, the field has been in steady decline despite its increasing breadth and sophistication. Renewal of the field of animal cognition may require a return to the original questions of animal communication and intelligence using the most advanced tools of modern psychological science. Reclaiming center stage in contemporary psychology will be difficult; planning that effort with a host of strategies should enhance the chances of success.
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Crook, J. H. (1983). On attributing consciousness to animals. Nature, 303(5912), 11–14.
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Kozarovitskii, L. B. (1988). [Further comment on the distinction between humans and animals]. Nauchnye Doki Vyss Shkoly Biol Nauki, (3), 42–45.
Abstract: The problem of mind is considered in the aspect of natural scientific and philosophical problem of distinction between human and animal. The widespread confusion of the terms “rudiments”, “elements” of specifically human properties in animals and “biological prerequisites” of these properties are critically analysed. The idea is formulated according to which only in the process of anthropogenesis the rudiments of new social property--mind, conscience--could appear in the developing human beings.
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Overli, O., Sorensen, C., Pulman, K. G. T., Pottinger, T. G., Korzan, W., Summers, C. H., et al. (2007). Evolutionary background for stress-coping styles: relationships between physiological, behavioral, and cognitive traits in non-mammalian vertebrates. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 31(3), 396–412.
Abstract: Reactions to stress vary between individuals, and physiological and behavioral responses tend to be associated in distinct suites of correlated traits, often termed stress-coping styles. In mammals, individuals exhibiting divergent stress-coping styles also appear to exhibit intrinsic differences in cognitive processing. A connection between physiology, behavior, and cognition was also recently demonstrated in strains of rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) selected for consistently high or low cortisol responses to stress. The low-responsive (LR) strain display longer retention of a conditioned response, and tend to show proactive behaviors such as enhanced aggression, social dominance, and rapid resumption of feed intake after stress. Differences in brain monoamine neurochemistry have also been reported in these lines. In comparative studies, experiments with the lizard Anolis carolinensis reveal connections between monoaminergic activity in limbic structures, proactive behavior in novel environments, and the establishment of social status via agonistic behavior. Together these observations suggest that within-species diversity of physiological, behavioral and cognitive correlates of stress responsiveness is maintained by natural selection throughout the vertebrate sub-phylum.
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Fabrega, H. J. (2006). Making sense of behavioral irregularities of great apes. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 30(8), 1260–73; discussion 1274–7.
Abstract: Psychopathology, mental illness, and psychiatric treatment are concepts relevant to modern medicine and medical psychology and replete with cumbersome intellectual and literary baggage. They bear the imprint of suppositions, world views, and general beliefs and values exemplified in the science, history, and general culture of Anglo European societies. The study in higher apes of phenomena addressed by such concepts raises conceptual dilemmas, usually termed speciesism and anthropomorphism, not unlike those encountered in comparative human studies of similar phenomena across cultures and historical periods, namely, ethnocentrism and anachronism. The authors' synthesis of literature and their analysis of the implications of higher ape psychopathology represent an epistemically compelling account that broadens the scope of the comparative study of behavioral irregularities, a topic that provides a different slant for examining challenging questions in evolutionary biology and primatology, such as cognition, self awareness, intentional behavior, culture and behavioral traditions, social intelligence, sickness and healing, and altruism. Theoretical and empirical study of this topic expands formulation and can help provide informative answers about human evolution as well as essential features of human psychiatric syndromes, with potential practical implications. The study of psychopathology of higher apes and other non human primates represents an appropriate focus for neuroscience and bio-behavioral sciences.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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Van Schaik, C. (2006). Why are some animals so smart? Sci Am, 294(4), 64–71.
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Man's best friend(s) reveal the possible roots of social intelligence (Vol. 312).
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