Abstract: A modified spontaneous object recognition test was used to examine object recognition memory in the domestic pig. This test uses preference for a novel object over a previously encountered sample object as indicating recognition of the sample object, and no preference as indicating no recognition. Two factors hypothesized to affect object recognition are duration of exposure to the sample stimulus and delay interval before re-exposure. Both of these factors could be manipulated in a rotational object enrichment program for pigs. Reducing exposure time and increasing the delay interval before re-exposure should decrease object recognition and prolong novelty-induced object exploration. We exposed 5-week-old pigs to different sample objects in their home pens for 10 min and 2 days, respectively. We tested for object recognition memory at various delay intervals after initial exposure by placing littermate pairs in a test pen for 10 min and recording snout contact with a sample object and a completely novel object. At a 1-h delay, half the pairs were tested with the 2-day sample object; the other half received the 10-min sample object. At a 3-h delay, pairs were tested with the opposite sample object. Pairs were also tested with the 2-day sample at a 5-day delay and the 10-min sample at a 6-day delay. We predicted that pigs would show a preference for the novel versus the 2-day sample object at all three delays, but would only prefer the novel object over the 10-min sample object at the 1-h and 3-h delays. Pigs did not show novelty preference in the presence of the 10-min sample object at any delay. Novelty preference in the presence of the 2-day sample object occurred at the 3-h (P < 0.05) and 5-day delays (P < 0.001), but not the 1-h delay. The lack of novelty preference when pigs were tested with the 10-min sample object may have been due to failure to habituate to the sample object. Testing in a different location from the initial sample object exposure and retroactive interference from exposure to the 10-min sample object may have contributed to a temporary lack of novelty preference when pigs were tested with the 2-day sample object at the 1-h delay. The finding that pigs retained a memory for the 2-day sample object for at least 5 days suggests that restricting object exposure to less than 2 days may help to preserve the exploratory value of objects rotated among pens.

Abstract: Cognitive mechanisms are an important part of the organization of the behavior systems of animals. In the wild, animals regularly face problems that they must overcome in order to survive and thrive. Solving such problems often requires animals to process, store, retrieve, and act upon information from the environment--in other words, to use their cognitive skills. For example, animals may have to use navigational, tool-making or cooperative social skills in order to procure their food. However, many enrichment programs for captive animals do not include the integration of these types of cognitive challenges. Thus, foraging enrichments typically are designed to facilitate the physical expression of feeding behaviors such as food-searching and food consumption, but not to facilitate complex problem solving behaviors related to food acquisition. Challenging animals by presenting them with problems is almost certainly a source of frustration and stress. However, we suggest here that this is an important, and even necessary, feature of an enrichment program, as long as animals also possess the skills and resources to effectively solve the problems with which they are presented. We discuss this with reference to theories about the emotional consequences of coping with challenge, the association between lack of challenge and the development of abnormal behavior, and the benefits of stress (arousal) in facilitating learning and memory of relevant skills. Much remains to be done to provide empirical support for these theories. However, they do point the way to a practical approach to improving animal welfare--to design enrichments to facilitate the cognitive mechanisms which underlie the performance of complex behaviors that cannot be performed due to the restrictions inherent to the captive environment.

Abstract: To understand the animal mind, we have to reconstruct how animals recognize the external world through their own eyes. For the reconstruction to be realistic, explanations must be made both in their proximate causes (brain mechanisms) as well as ultimate causes (evolutionary backgrounds). Here, we review recent advances in the behavioral, psychological, and system-neuroscience studies accomplished using the domestic chick as subjects. Diverse behavioral paradigms are compared (such as filial imprinting, sexual imprinting, one-trial passive avoidance learning, and reinforcement operant conditioning) in their behavioral characterizations (development, sensory and motor aspects of functions, fitness gains) and relevant brain mechanisms. We will stress that common brain regions are shared by these distinct paradigms, particularly those in the ventral telencephalic structures such as AIv (in the archistriatum) and LPO (in the medial striatum). Neuronal ensembles in these regions could code the chick's anticipation for forthcoming events, particularly the quality/quantity and the temporal proximity of rewards. Without the internal representation of the anticipated proximity in LPO, behavioral tolerance will be lost, and the chick makes impulsive choice for a less optimized option. Functional roles of these regions proved compatible with their anatomical counterparts in the mammalian brain, thus suggesting that the neural systems linking between the memorized past and the anticipated future have remained highly conservative through the evolution of the amniotic vertebrates during the last 300 million years. With the conservative nature in mind, research efforts should be oriented toward a unifying theory, which could explain behavioral deviations from optimized foraging, such as “naive curiosity,” “contra-freeloading,” “Concorde fallacy,” and “altruism.”

Abstract: The comparative study of infant development and animal cognition brings to cognitive science the promise of insights into the nature and origins of cognitive skills. In this article, I review a recent wave of comparative studies conducted with similar methodologies and similar theoretical frameworks on how two core components of human cognition--object permanence and gaze following--develop in different species. These comparative findings call for an integration of current competing accounts of developmental change. They further suggest that evolution has produced developmental devices capable at the same time of preserving core adaptive components, and opening themselves up to further adaptive change, not only in interaction with the external environment, but also in interaction with other co-developing cognitive systems.