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Oliveira, R. F., McGregor, P. K., & Latruffe, C. (1998). Know thine enemy: fighting fish gather information from observing conspecific interactions. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 265(1401), 1045–1049.
Abstract: Many of the signals that animals use to communicate transmit relatively large distances and therefore encompass several potential signallers and receivers. This observation challenges the common characterization of animal communication systems as consisting of one signaller and one receiver. Furthermore, it suggests that the evolution of communication behaviour must be considered as occurring in the context of communication networks rather than dyads. Although considerations of selection pressures acting upon signallers in the context of communication networks have rarely been expressed in such terms, it has been noted that many signals exchanged during aggressive interactions will transmit far further than required for information transfer between the individuals directly involved, suggesting that these signals have been designed to be received by other, more distant, individuals. Here we consider the potential for receivers in communication networks to gather information, one aspect of which has been termed eavesdropping. We show that male Betta splendens monitor aggressive interactions between neighbouring conspecifics and use the information on relative fighting ability in subsequent aggressive interactions with the males they have observed.
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C. K. Hemelrijk,. (1999). An individual-orientated model of the emergence of despotic and egalitarian societies. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 266(1417), 361.
Abstract: Single behavioural differences between egalitarian and despotic animal societies are often assumed to reflect specific adaptations. However, in the present paper, I will show in an individual-orientated model, how many behavioural traits of egalitarian and despotic virtual societies arise as emergent characteristics. The artificial entities live in a homogeneous world and only aggregate, and upon meeting one another and may perform dominance interactions in which the effects of winning and losing are self-reinforcing. The behaviour of these entities is studied in a similar way to that of real animals. It will be shown that by varying the intensity of aggression only, one may switch from egalitarian to despotic virtual societies. Differences between the two types of society appear to correspond closely to those between despotic and egalitarian macaque species in the real world. In addition, artificial despotic societies show a clearer spatial centrality of dominants and, counter-intuitively, more rank overlap between the sexes than the egalitarian ones. Because of the correspondence with patterns in real animals, the model makes it worthwhile comparing despotic and egalitarian species for socio-spatial structure and rank overlap too. Furthermore, it presents us with parsimonious hypotheses which can be tested in real animals for patterns of aggression, spatial structure and the distribution of social positive and sexual behaviour.
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Reeve, H. K. (1997). Evolutionarily stable communication between kin: a general model. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 264((1384)). Retrieved June 1, 2024, from http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1997.0143
Abstract: At present, the most general evolutionary theory of honest communication is Grafen's model of Zahavi's 'handicap' signalling system, in which honesty of signals about the signaller's quality (e.g. mate suitability or fighting ability) is maintained by the differentially high cost of signals to signallers having lower quality. The latter model is here further generalized to include any communication between signallers and receivers that are genetically related (e.g. parents and begging offspring, cooperative or competing siblings). Signalling systems involving relatives are shown to be evolutionarily stable, despite a potential pay-off for false signalling, if the Zahavian assumption of differential signal costs holds and there are diminishing reproductive returns to the signaller as the receiver's assessed value of its attribute increases, or if, regardless of whether the Zahavian assumption holds, signallers with high values of the attribute benefit more from a given receiver assessment than signallers with low values (e.g. begging chicks that are hungrier benefit more from being fed). In stable systems of signalling among kin, it is also shown to be generally true that (i) levels of signalling and thus observed signal costs will decline as relatedness increases or as the receiver's reproductive penalty for erroneous assessment increases, and (ii) receivers will consistently, altruistically overestimate the true value of the signalled attribute.
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