Abstract: In animal communication natural selection favors callers who vocalize to affect the behavior of listeners and listeners who acquire information from vocalizations, using this information to represent their environment. The acquisition of information in the wild is similar to the learning that occurs in laboratory conditioning experiments. It also has some parallels with language. The dichotomous view that animal signals must be either referential or emotional is false, because they can easily be both: The mechanisms that cause a signaler to vocalize do not limit a listener's ability to extract information from the call. The inability of most animals to recognize the mental states of others distinguishes animal communication most clearly from human language. Whereas signalers may vocalize to change a listener's behavior, they do not call to inform others. Listeners acquire information from signalers who do not, in the human sense, intend to provide it.

Abstract: Historically, a dichotomy has been drawn between the semantic communication of human language and the apparently emotional calls of animals. Current research paints a more complicated picture. Just as scientists have identified elements of human speech that reflect a speaker's emotions, field experiments have shown that the calls of many animals provide listeners with information about objects and events in the environment. Like human speech, therefore, animal vocalizations simultaneously provide others with information that is both semantic and emotional. In support of this conclusion, we review the results of field experiments on the natural vocalizations of African vervet monkeys, diana monkeys, baboons, and suricates (a South African mongoose). Vervet and diana monkeys give acoustically distinct alarm calls in response to the presence of leopards, eagles, and snakes. Each alarm call type elicits a different, adaptive response from others nearby. Field experiments demonstrate that listeners compare these vocalizations not just according to their acoustic properties but also according to the information they convey. Like monkeys, suricates give acoustically distinct alarm calls in response to different predators. Within each predator class, the calls also differ acoustically according to the signaler's perception of urgency. Like speech, therefore, suricate alarm calls convey both semantic and emotional information. The vocalizations of baboons, like those of many birds and mammals, are individually distinctive. As a result, when one baboon hears a sequence of calls exchanged between two or more individuals, the listener acquires information about social events in its group. Baboons, moreover, are skilled “eavesdroppers:” their response to different call sequences provides evidence of the sophisticated information they acquire from other individuals' vocalizations. Baboon males give loud “wahoo” calls during competitive displays. Like other vocalizations, these highly emotional calls provide listeners with information about the caller's dominance rank, age, and competitive ability. Although animal vocalizations, like human speech, simultaneously encode both semantic and emotional information, they differ from language in at least one fundamental respect. Although listeners acquire rich information from a caller's vocalization, callers do not, in the human sense, intend to provide it. Listeners acquire information as an inadvertent consequence of signaler behavior.

Abstract: What should an individual do if there are no reliable cues to the strength of a competitor when fighting with it for resources? We herein examine the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the hawk-dove game, if the opponent's resource-holding potential (RHP) can only indirectly be inferred from the outcome of past interactions in the population. The strategies we examined include the classical mixed strategy in which no information on past games is utilized, the `imprinting' strategy in which a player increases/decreases its aggressiveness if it wins/loses a game, the `immediate inference' strategy in which a player can infer the strength of those opponents it fought before, and the `transitive inference' strategy in which a player can infer the strength of a new opponent through a third party with which both players have fought before. Invasibility analysis for each pair of strategies revealed that (i) the transitive-inference strategy can always invade the mixed strategy and the imprinting strategy, and itself refuses invasion by these strategies; (ii) the largest advantage for transitive inference is achieved when the number of games played per individual in one generation is small and when the cost of losing an escalated game is large; (iii) the immediate inference, rather than the transitive inference, can be an ESS if the cost of fighting is small; (iv) a strong linear ranking is established in the population of transitive-inference strategists, though it does not perfectly correlate to the ranking by actual RHPs. We found that the advantage of the transitive inference is not in its ability to correct a misassessment (it is actually the worst in doing so), but in the ability of quickly lining up either incorrect or correct assessments to form a linear dominance hierarchy.

Abstract: Capuchin monkeys were tested in five experiments in which two individuals competed over food. When given a choice between retrieving a piece of food that was visible or hidden from the dominant, subordinate animals preferred to retrieve hidden food. This preference is consistent with the hypotheses that either (1) the subordinate knew what the dominant could and could not see or (2) the subordinate was monitoring the behaviour of the dominant and avoiding the piece of food that it approached. To test between these alternatives, we released subordinates with a slight head start forcing them to make their choice (between a piece of food hidden or visible to the dominant) before the dominant entered the area. Unlike chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, subordinates that were given a head start did not preferentially approach hidden pieces of food first. Therefore, our experiments provide little support for the hypothesis that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to what another individual does or does not see. We compare our results with those obtained with chimpanzees in the same paradigm and discuss the evolution of primate social cognition. Copyright 2003 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Abstract: Theoretical models have demonstrated the possibility of stable cost-free signalling of need between relatives. The stability of these cost-free equilibria depends on the indirect fitness cost of cheating and deceiving a donor into giving away resources. We show that this stability is highly sensitive to the distribution of need among signallers and receivers. In particular, cost-free signalling is likely to prove stable only if there is very large variation in need (such that the least-needy individuals stand to gain much less than the most-needy individuals from additional resources). We discuss whether these conditions are likely to be found in altricial avian breeding systems--the most intensively studied instance of signalling of need between relatives. We suggest that cost-free signalling is more likely to prove stable and will provide parents with more information during the earlier phases of chick growth, when parents can more easily meet the demands of a brood (and chicks are more likely to reach satiation). Later, informative yet cost-free signalling is unlikely to persist.