Abstract: Two contrasting results emerge from comparisons of the social systems of several odontocetes with terrestrial mammals. Researchers have identified remarkable convergence in prominent features of the social systems of odontocetes such as the sperm whale and bottlenose dolphin with a few well-known terrestrial mammals such as the elephant and chimpanzee. In contrast, studies on killer whales and Baird's beaked whale reveal novel social solutions to aquatic living. The combination of convergent and novel features in odontocete social systems promise a more general understanding of the ecological determinants of social systems in both terrestrial and aquatic habitats, as well as the relationship between relative brain size and social evolution.

Abstract: Abstract  Until recently, few studies have used social network theory (SNT) and metrics to examine how social network structure (SNS) might influence social behavior and social dynamics in non-human animals. Here, we present an overview of why and how the social network approach might be useful for behavioral ecology. We first note four important aspects of SNS that are commonly observed, but relatively rarely quantified: (1) that within a social group, differences among individuals in their social experiences and connections affect individual and group outcomes; (2) that indirect connections can be important (e.g., partners of your partners matter); (3) that individuals differ in their importance in the social network (some can be considered keystone individuals); and (4) that social network traits often carry over across contexts (e.g., SN position in male–male competition can influence later male mating success). We then discuss how these four points, and the social network approach in general, can yield new insights and questions for a broad range of issues in behavioral ecology including: mate choice, alternative mating tactics, male–male competition, cooperation, reciprocal altruism, eavesdropping, kin selection, dominance hierarchies, social learning, information flow, social foraging, and cooperative antipredator behavior. Finally, we suggest future directions including: (1) integrating behavioral syndromes and SNT; (2) comparing space use and SNS; (3) adaptive partner choice and SNS; (4) the dynamics and stability (or instability) of social networks, and (5) group selection shaping SNS.

Abstract: Abstract  SOCPROG is a set of programs which analyses data on animal associations. Data usually come from observations of the social behaviour of individually identifiable animals. Associations among animals, sampling periods, restrictions on the data and association indices can be defined very flexibly. SOCPROG can analyse data sets including 1,000 or more individuals. Association matrices are displayed using sociograms, principal coordinates analysis, multidimensional scaling and cluster analyses. Permutation tests, Mantel and related tests and matrix correlation methods examine hypotheses about preferred associations among individuals and classes of individual. Weighted network statistics are calculated and can be tested against null hypotheses. Temporal analyses include displays of lagged association rates (rates of reassociation following an association). Models can be fitted to lagged association rates. Multiple association measures, including measures produced by other programs such as genetic or range use data, may be analysed using Mantel tests and principal components analysis. SOCPROG also performs mark-recapture population analyses and movement analyses. SOCPROG is written in the programming language MATLAB and may be downloaded free from the World Wide Web.

Abstract: Abstract   We present here an attempt to understand behaviors of dominant individuals and of subordinate individuals as behavior strategies in an asymmetric “hawk-dove” game. We assume that contestants have perfect information about relative fighting ability and the value of the resource. Any type of asymmetry, both relevant to and irrelevant to the fighting ability, can be considered. It is concluded that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) depend on the resource value (V), the cost of injury (D), and the probability that the individual in one role will win (x). Different ESSs can exist even when values of V, D, and x are the same. The characteristics of dominance relations detected by observers may result from the ESSs that the individuals are adopting. The model explains some characteristics of dominance relations, for example, the consistent outcome of contests, the rare occurrence of escalated fights, and the discrepancy between resource holding potential (RHP) and dominance relations, from the viewpoint of individual selection.