Equine and Animal Cognition Reference Database -- Query Results

	Equine and Animal Cognition Reference Database Home \| Show All \| Simple Search \| Advanced Search	Login Quick Search: Field: contains: ...
	471-480 of 5304 records found matching your query:

Search & Display Options

Select All Deselect All

[31–40] << 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 >> [51–60]

List View

Citations

Details

	Records
	Author	Suzuki, Y.; Toquenaga, Y.
	Title	Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses			Type	Journal Article
	Year	2005	Publication	Journal of theoretical biology	Abbreviated Journal	J. Theor. Biol.
	Volume	232	Issue	2	Pages	191-201
	Keywords	Altruism; Analysis of Variance; Communication; Cooperative Behavior; Evolution; Game Theory; Group Structure; Humans; Models, Genetic; Models, Psychological; Selection (Genetics); Trust
	Abstract	An altruistic individual has to gamble on cooperation to a stranger because it does not know whether the stranger is trustworthy before direct interaction. Nowak and Sigmund (Nature 393 (1998a) 573; J. Theor. Biol. 194 (1998b) 561) presented a new theoretical framework of indirect reciprocal altruism by image scoring game where all individuals are informed about a partner's behavior from its image score without direct interaction. Interestingly, in a simplified version of the image scoring game, the evolutionarily stability condition for altruism became a similar form of Hamilton's rule, i.e. inequality that the probability of getting correct information is more than the ratio of cost to benefit. Since the Hamilton's rule was derived by evolutionarily stable analysis, the evolutionary meaning of the probability of getting correct information has not been clearly examined in terms of kin and group selection. In this study, we applied covariance analysis to the two-score model for deriving the Hamilton's rule. We confirmed that the probability of getting correct information was proportional to the bias of altruistic interactions caused by using information about a partner's image score. The Hamilton's rule was dependent on the number of game bouts even though the information reduced the risk of cooperation to selfish one at the first encounter. In addition, we incorporated group structure to the two-score model to examine whether the probability of getting correct information affect selection for altruism by group selection. We calculated a Hamilton's rule of group selection by contextual analysis. Group selection is very effective when either the probability of getting correct information or that of future interaction, or both are low. The two Hamilton's rules derived by covariance and contextual analyses demonstrated the effects of information and group structure on the evolution of altruism. We inferred that information about a partner's behavior and group structure can produce flexible pathways for the evolution of altruism.
	Address	Integrative Environmental Sciences, Graduate School of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1, Ten-Nou-Dai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8572, Japan. yukari@pe.ies.life.tsukuba.ac.jp
	Corporate Author				Thesis
	Publisher		Place of Publication		Editor
	Language	English	Summary Language		Original Title
	Series Editor		Series Title		Abbreviated Series Title
	Series Volume		Series Issue		Edition
	ISSN	0022-5193	ISBN		Medium
	Area		Expedition		Conference
	Notes	PMID:15530489			Approved	no
	Call Number	refbase @ user @			Serial	556
Permanent link to this record



	Author	Reeve, H. Kern
	Title	Evolutionarily stable communication between kin: a general model			Type	Journal Article
	Year	1997	Publication	Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences	Abbreviated Journal	Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci.
	Volume	264	Issue	(1384)	Pages	1037-1040.
	Keywords	Signalling Systems
	Abstract	At present, the most general evolutionary theory of honest communication is Grafen's model of Zahavi's 'handicap' signalling system, in which honesty of signals about the signaller's quality (e.g. mate suitability or fighting ability) is maintained by the differentially high cost of signals to signallers having lower quality. The latter model is here further generalized to include any communication between signallers and receivers that are genetically related (e.g. parents and begging offspring, cooperative or competing siblings). Signalling systems involving relatives are shown to be evolutionarily stable, despite a potential pay-off for false signalling, if the Zahavian assumption of differential signal costs holds and there are diminishing reproductive returns to the signaller as the receiver's assessed value of its attribute increases, or if, regardless of whether the Zahavian assumption holds, signallers with high values of the attribute benefit more from a given receiver assessment than signallers with low values (e.g. begging chicks that are hungrier benefit more from being fed). In stable systems of signalling among kin, it is also shown to be generally true that (i) levels of signalling and thus observed signal costs will decline as relatedness increases or as the receiver's reproductive penalty for erroneous assessment increases, and (ii) receivers will consistently, altruistically overestimate the true value of the signalled attribute.
	Address
	Corporate Author				Thesis
	Publisher		Place of Publication		Editor
	Language		Summary Language		Original Title
	Series Editor		Series Title		Abbreviated Series Title
	Series Volume		Series Issue		Edition
	ISSN		ISBN		Medium
	Area		Expedition		Conference
	Notes				Approved	no
	Call Number	refbase @ user @			Serial	557
Permanent link to this record



	Author	Brilot, B.O.; Johnstone, R.A.
	Title	The limits to cost-free signalling of need between relatives			Type	Journal Article
	Year	2003	Publication	Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society	Abbreviated Journal	Proc Biol Sci
	Volume	270	Issue	1519	Pages	1055-1060
	Keywords	Animal Communication; Animals; Birds/physiology; Models, Biological; Social Behavior
	Abstract	Theoretical models have demonstrated the possibility of stable cost-free signalling of need between relatives. The stability of these cost-free equilibria depends on the indirect fitness cost of cheating and deceiving a donor into giving away resources. We show that this stability is highly sensitive to the distribution of need among signallers and receivers. In particular, cost-free signalling is likely to prove stable only if there is very large variation in need (such that the least-needy individuals stand to gain much less than the most-needy individuals from additional resources). We discuss whether these conditions are likely to be found in altricial avian breeding systems--the most intensively studied instance of signalling of need between relatives. We suggest that cost-free signalling is more likely to prove stable and will provide parents with more information during the earlier phases of chick growth, when parents can more easily meet the demands of a brood (and chicks are more likely to reach satiation). Later, informative yet cost-free signalling is unlikely to persist.
	Address	Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EJ, UK. bob21@cam.ac.uk
	Corporate Author				Thesis
	Publisher		Place of Publication		Editor
	Language	English	Summary Language		Original Title
	Series Editor		Series Title		Abbreviated Series Title
	Series Volume		Series Issue		Edition
	ISSN	0962-8452	ISBN		Medium
	Area		Expedition		Conference
	Notes	PMID:12803895			Approved	no
	Call Number	refbase @ user @			Serial	558
Permanent link to this record



	Author	Bergstrom,C. T.; Lachmann, M.
	Title	Signalling among relatives. I. Is costly signalling too costly?			Type	Journal Article
	Year	1997	Publication	Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America	Abbreviated Journal	Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
	Volume	352(1353)	Issue		Pages	609-617
	Keywords	Signalling
	Abstract	ahavi's handicap principle,originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection ofelaborate male traits, suggests that a sufficient cost to dishonest signals can outweigh the rewards of deception and allow individuals to communicate honestly. Maynard Smith (1991) and Johnstone and Grafen (1992) introduce the Sir Philip Sidney game in order to extend the handicap principle to interactions among related individuals, and to demonstrate that stable costly signalling systems can exist among relatives. In this paper we demonstrate that despite the benefits associated with honest information transfer, the costs incurred in a stable costly signalling system may leave all participants worse off than they would be in a system with no signalling at all. In both the discrete and continuous forms of the Sir Philip Sidney game, there exist conditions under which costly signalling among relatives, while stable, is so costly that it is disadvantageous compared with no signalling at all. We determine the factors which dictate signal cost and signal benefit in a generalized version of this game, and explain how signal cost can exceed signal value. Such results raise concerns about theevolutionary pathways which could have led to the existence of signalling equilibria in nature. The paper stresses the importance of comparing signalling equilibria with other possible strategies, beforedrawing conclusions regarding the optimality of signalling.
	Address
	Corporate Author				Thesis
	Publisher		Place of Publication		Editor
	Language		Summary Language		Original Title
	Series Editor		Series Title		Abbreviated Series Title
	Series Volume		Series Issue		Edition
	ISSN		ISBN		Medium
	Area		Expedition		Conference
	Notes				Approved	no
	Call Number	refbase @ user @			Serial	559
Permanent link to this record



	Author	Lachmann M.; Bergstrom C.T.
	Title	Signalling among Relatives II. Beyond the Tower of Babel			Type	Journal Article
	Year	1998	Publication	Theoretical Population Biology	Abbreviated Journal	Theor. Pop. Biol.
	Volume	54	Issue	2	Pages	146-160
	Keywords
	Abstract	Models of costly signalling are commonly employed in evolutionary biology in order to explain how honest communication between individuals with conflicting interests can be stable. These models have focused primarily on a single type of honest signalling equilibrium, the separating equilibrium in which any two different signallers send distinct signals, thereby providing signal receivers with complete information. In this paper, we demonstrate that in signalling among relatives (modelled using the Sir Philip Sidney game), there is not one but a large number of possible signalling equilibria, most of which are pooling equilibria in which different types of signallers may share a common signal. We prove that in a general Sir Philip Sidney game, any partition of signallers into equi-signalling classes can have a stable signalling equilibrium if and only if it is a contiguous partition, and provide examples of such partitions. A similar (but slightly stricter) condition is shown to hold when signals are transmitted through a medium with signalling error. These results suggest a solution to a problem faced by previous signalling theory models: when we consider the separating equilibrium, signal cost is independent of the frequency of individuals sending that signal and, consequently, even very rare signaller types can drastically affect signal cost. Here, we show that by allowing these rare signallers to pool with more common signallers, signal cost can be greatly reduced. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.
	Address
	Corporate Author				Thesis
	Publisher		Place of Publication		Editor
	Language	English	Summary Language		Original Title
	Series Editor		Series Title		Abbreviated Series Title
	Series Volume		Series Issue		Edition
	ISSN		ISBN		Medium
	Area		Expedition		Conference
	Notes				Approved	no
	Call Number	refbase @ user @			Serial	560
Permanent link to this record



	Author	Bergstrom, C.T.; Lachmann, M.
	Title	Signaling among relatives. III. Talk is cheap			Type	Journal Article
	Year	1998	Publication	Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America	Abbreviated Journal	Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
	Volume	95	Issue	9	Pages	5100-5105
	Keywords	Animal Communication; Animals; Costs and Cost Analysis; *Evolution; Interpersonal Relations; Models, Biological
	Abstract	The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, under very general conditions. Moreover, these cost-free signals are better for all participants than the previously explored alternatives. Recent empirical evidence suggests that begging is energetically inexpensive for nestling birds; this finding led some researchers to question the applicability of the costly signaling framework to nestling begging. Our results show that cost-free or inexpensive signals, as observed empirically, fall within the framework of signaling theory.
	Address	Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. carl@charles.stanford.edu
	Corporate Author				Thesis
	Publisher		Place of Publication		Editor
	Language	English	Summary Language		Original Title
	Series Editor		Series Title		Abbreviated Series Title
	Series Volume		Series Issue		Edition
	ISSN	0027-8424	ISBN		Medium
	Area		Expedition		Conference
	Notes	PMID:9560235			Approved	no
	Call Number	refbase @ user @			Serial	561
Permanent link to this record



	Author	Lindberg, A.C.; Kelland, A.; Nicol, C.J.
	Title	Effects of observational learning on acquisition of an operant response in horses			Type	Journal Article
	Year	1999	Publication	Applied Animal Behaviour Science	Abbreviated Journal	Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci.
	Volume	61	Issue	3	Pages	187-199
	Keywords	Horse; Observational learning; Stereotyped behaviour; Operant behaviour; Breed influence; Age influence
	Abstract	The effect of observational learning on the acquisition of an operant response was examined in eighteen riding horses and ponies. The test horses were randomly divided into three groups of six and individually exposed to one of three treatments. An additional horse was trained as a demonstrator, to perform the operant response. The observer horses watched either the demonstrator performing the bin-opening response (Group D+B); the demonstrator standing passively (Group D); or the operant bin in the absence of the demonstrator (Group B). Observers had access to and were free to interact with an identical bin during testing. Observers in Groups D+B and D were socially familiar with the demonstrator. Each test horse was tested once a day for 10 days. An ANOVA revealed no significant differences between treatment groups in the number of responses or the time taken to reach the learning criterion. However, there were highly significant differences between breed types, with non-warmbloods performing more bouts of opening the bin and feeding (p=0.02), feeding from the bin sooner (p=0.01) and reaching the criterion for learning sooner than warmbloods (p=0.05). There was also a significant negative linear relationship between horses' ages and time spent investigating the bin, with younger horses performing more investigative behaviour (y=-3.08x+106.86; p=0.02).
	Address
	Corporate Author				Thesis
	Publisher		Place of Publication		Editor
	Language		Summary Language		Original Title
	Series Editor		Series Title		Abbreviated Series Title
	Series Volume		Series Issue		Edition
	ISSN		ISBN		Medium
	Area		Expedition		Conference
	Notes				Approved	no
	Call Number	refbase @ user @			Serial	562
Permanent link to this record



	Author	Clarke, J.V.; Nicol, C.J.; Jones, R.; McGreevy, P.D.
	Title	Effects of observational learning on food selection in horses			Type	Journal Article
	Year	1996	Publication	Applied Animal Behaviour Science	Abbreviated Journal	Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci.
	Volume	50	Issue	2	Pages	177-184
	Keywords	Horse; Observational learning; Food discrimination
	Abstract	Fourteen riding horses of mixed age and breed were randomly allocated to observer and control treatments. An additional horse was pre-trained as a demonstrator to walk the 13.8 m length of the test arena and select one of two food buckets using colour and pattern cues. Observer horses were exposed to correct performances of the task by the trained demonstrator, for 20 trials held over 2 days. Control horses were subjected to the same handling and placement procedures as the observer horses but without exposure to the behaviour of the demonstrator. The third day for all subjects was designated as a test day. Each subject was released individually in a predetermined place in the arena, and the latency to walk the length of the test arena to the food buckets, the latency to feed, the identity of the bucket approached and the identity of the bucket selected were recorded on ten consecutive trials. During tests both food buckets contained food to minimize the possibility of individual trial and error learning. On the first trial the mean latency to approach the goal area was 18 s for observer horses, compared with 119 s for control horses (t = 2.8, d.f. = 12, P < 0.01) and the mean latency to eat was 35 s for observer horses, compared with 181 s for control horses (t = 4.86, d.f. = 11, P < 0.001). However, observer horses were no more likely to choose the demonstrated bucket than control horses on the first trial. Twelve of the 14 horses decreased their latency to approach the goal area during the series of ten trials, but there were no significant changes in the buckets selected.
	Address
	Corporate Author				Thesis
	Publisher		Place of Publication		Editor
	Language		Summary Language		Original Title
	Series Editor		Series Title		Abbreviated Series Title
	Series Volume		Series Issue		Edition
	ISSN		ISBN		Medium
	Area		Expedition		Conference
	Notes				Approved	no
	Call Number	refbase @ user @			Serial	563
Permanent link to this record



	Author	Nicol, C.J.
	Title	How animals learn from each other			Type	Journal Article
	Year	2006	Publication	Applied Animal Behaviour Science	Abbreviated Journal	Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci.
	Volume	100	Issue	1-2	Pages	58-63
	Keywords	Social learning; Chickens; Demonstrators; Dominance
	Abstract	This paper explores ways by which animals may learn from one another, using examples drawn mostly from the chicken, an animal for which social learning is likely to be less dangerous than individual learning. In early life, the behaviour of the hen is important in encouraging chicks to peck at edible items. Maternal display not only attracts chicks to profitable food items, but also redirects their attention away from harmful or non-profitable items. Older chicks can enhance their foraging success by observing the behaviour of conspecifics within their own social group. Hens have been trained to perform a novel behaviour (key-pecking for food) by observation of a trained demonstrator bird. Moreover, observers learnt most from watching dominant demonstrators. Thus the ability to learn from others is not `fixed', but depends on the context and the social identity of both the observer and the demonstrator.
	Address
	Corporate Author				Thesis
	Publisher		Place of Publication		Editor
	Language		Summary Language		Original Title
	Series Editor		Series Title		Abbreviated Series Title
	Series Volume		Series Issue		Edition
	ISSN		ISBN		Medium
	Area		Expedition		Conference
	Notes				Approved	no
	Call Number	refbase @ user @			Serial	564
Permanent link to this record



	Author	Pongrácz, P.; Miklósi, Á.; Kubinyi, E.; Topál, J.; Csányi, V.
	Title	Interaction between individual experience and social learning in dogs			Type	Journal Article
	Year	2003	Publication	Animal Behaviour.	Abbreviated Journal	Anim. Behav.
	Volume	65	Issue	3	Pages	595-603
	Keywords
	Abstract	We investigated the interaction between individual experience and social learning in domestic dogs,Canis familiaris . We conducted two experiments using detour tests, where an object or food was placed behind a transparent, V-shaped wire-mesh fence, such that the dogs could get the reward by going around the fence. In some groups, two open doors were offered as an alternative, easier way to reach the reward. In experiment 1 we opened the doors only in trial 1, then closed them for trials 2 and 3. In experiment 2 other dogs were first taught to detour the fence with closed doors after they had observed a detouring human demonstrator, then we opened the doors for three subsequent trials. In experiment 1 all dogs reached the reward by going through the doors in trial 1, but their detouring performance was poor after the doors had been closed, if they had to solve the task on their own. However, dogs in the experimental group that were allowed to watch a detouring human demonstrator after the doors had been closed showed improved detouring ability compared with those that did not receive a demonstration of detouring. In experiment 2 the dogs tended to keep on detouring along the fence even if the doors had been opened, giving up a chance to get behind the fence by a shorter route. These results show that dogs can use information gained by observing a human demonstrator to overcome their own mistakenly preferred solution in a problem situation. In a reversed situation social learning can also contribute to a preference for a less adaptive behaviour. However, only repeated individual and social experience leads to a durable manifestation of maladaptive behaviour. Copyright 2003 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd on behalf of The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.
	Address
	Corporate Author				Thesis
	Publisher		Place of Publication		Editor
	Language		Summary Language		Original Title
	Series Editor		Series Title		Abbreviated Series Title
	Series Volume		Series Issue		Edition
	ISSN		ISBN		Medium
	Area		Expedition		Conference
	Notes				Approved	no
	Call Number	refbase @ user @			Serial	565
Permanent link to this record

Select All Deselect All

[31–40] << 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 >> [51–60]

Details

CQL Search | Library Search | Show Record | Extract Citations

Help