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Houpt, K. A. (1981). Equine behavior problems in relation to humane management. Int. J. Stud. Anim. Prob., 2(6), 329–337.
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McCall, C. A., Potter, G. D., Friend, T. H., & Ingram, R. S. (1981). Learning abilities in yearling horses using the Hebb-Williams closed field maze. J. Anim. Sci., 53(4), 928–933.
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Joynson, R. B. (1981). Towards understanding relationships, by Robert A. Hinde. London: Academic, 1979, pp xii + 367. Aggressive Behavior, 7(3), 275–280.
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Bean, P. (1981). Punishment: A Philosophical and Criminological Enquiry.
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Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211(4489), 1390–1396.
Abstract: Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
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Parker, G. A., & Rubenstein, D. I. (1981). Role assessment, reserve strategy, and acquisition of information in asymmetric animal conflicts. Anim. Behav., 29(1), 221–240.
Abstract: It was formerly argued that alternative evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are possible for animal contests characterized by some asymmetry that can be perceived with perfect accuracy. Where roles A and B refer to the asymmetry between opponents, ESSs are: [`]fight when A, retreat when B', and vice versa. Either can be an ESS, but only if the [`]reserve strategy' (=what an animal does when it fights) is sufficiently damaging. We examine the [`]war of attrition' (winner = opponent that persists longer). In a population at either ESS, reserve strategy is never normally shown; it is therefore subject to drift unless the selective action of rare individuals which break the convention is considered. These could arise either by mutation or by mistakes in role assessment. When mutations and mistakes simply specify that occasionally an animal fights when it [`]should' retreat, selection adjusts reserve strategy to a level where only one ESS (the [`]commonsense' ESS) is possible, if the asymmetry is relevant to payoff. Thus for asymmetries in fighting ability or resource value, the individual with the lower score will retreat. However, we are particularly concerned with cases where both payoff-relevant aspects (fighting ability and resource value) are asymmetric. If opponents sustain contest costs at rates KA and KB, and their resource values are VA and VB, an [`]optimal assessor' strategy defined by the interaction between the two asymmetries, is a unique ESS. It obeys the rule [`]fight on estimating role A, where VA/KA>VB/KB; retreat in B'. If mistakes can occur in both roles, but are very rate, the ESS is not fundamentally altered though there will be infinitesimal tendencies for persisting in role B. Selection to improve assessment abilities intensifies as abilities improve, but is weak if roles A and B are rather similar. Over a range of similarity between roles, an [`]owner wins' convention may be adopted if ownership correlates positively with role A and an individual cannot tell when it would otherwise pay him to break the convention. We also examine a contest in which information about roles can be acquired only during a contest itself, and at a cost. Much depends on the rate at which information is acquired relative to the rate at which costs are expended, and on whether contests normally escalate in intensity, remain at the same level, or de-escalate. Selection favours short contests when costs are high relative to resource value, where the outcome of a round contains much information about fighting ability, and where the actual disparity in fighting ability is large.
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Mace, G. M., Harvey, P. H., & Clutton-Brock, T. H. (1981). Brain size and ecology in small mammals. J Zool, 193(3), 333–354.
Abstract: Relative brain size (measured as gross brain size after body size effects are removed) differs systematically between families of rodents, insectivores and lagomorphs. The Sciuridae have the largest relative brain size, the Soricidae and Bathyergidae the smallest. These results are discussed and compared with previous analyses of relative brain sizes among primates and bats. These differences complicate comparisons between relative brain size across phylogenetically diverse species and attempts to relate differences in relative brain size to ecological variables. To overcome these problems, best fit relationships were estimated for each family, and values for each genus were expressed as deviations from the lines of best fit. We refer to these values as Comparative Brain Size (CBS). Differences in CBS are related to differences in habitat type (forest-dwelling genera have larger CBS' than grassland forms), in diet (folivores have smaller CBS' than generalists or insectivores, frugivores and granivores), in zonation (arboreal genera have larger CBS' than terrestrial ones) and in activity timing (nocturnal genera have larger CBS' than dirurnal ones). However, these ecological categories are interrelated and, when the effects of other ecological differences are taken into account using analyses of variance, only the differences associated with diet, and possibly habitat remain.
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