Abstract: New Caledonian crows are reported to have impressive pandanus-tool manufacture abilities. These claims are based on an extensive artefact record. However, inferring behavioural and cognitive abilities without direct observation of tool manufacture is problematic. Here we report (and document on video) direct observations of a crow making and using stepped pandanus tools at Pic Ningua. We observed (1) a bias for making tools on left edges consistent with that previously found at the site, (2) faithful manufacture of a stepped design with high overall congruence in the shapes of tools, (3) the use of convergent rips to first form the tapered end working away from the trunk then the wide end working towards the trunk, (4) appropriate functional use of stepped tools by use of the leaf-edge barbs to hook food from holes, and (5) consistent holding of tools on the left side of its head when using them. Our observations verify most of the claims based on the artefact record, but the crow's exact manufacture technique was slightly different to that inferred previously.

Abstract: Tool use and transport represent cognitively important aspects of early hominid evolution, and nonhuman primates are often used as models to examine the cognitive, ecological, morphological and social correlates of these behaviors in order to gain insights into the behavior of our early human ancestors. In 2001, Jalles-Filho et al. found that free-ranging capuchin monkeys failed to transport tools (stones) to food sites (nuts), but transported the foods to the tool sites. This result cast doubt on the usefulness of Cebus to model early human tool-using behavior. In this study, we examined the performance of six captive tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) in a tool transport task. Subjects were provided with the opportunity to transport two different tools to fixed food reward sites when the food reward was visible from the tool site and when the food reward was not visible from the tool site. We found that the subjects quickly and readily transported probing tools to an apparatus baited with syrup, but rarely transported stones to a nut-cracking apparatus. We suggest that the performance of the capuchins here reflects an efficient foraging strategy, in terms of energy return, among wild Cebus monkeys.

Abstract: This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.

Abstract: This research examined exchange and value attribution in tufted capuchin monkeys ( Cebus apella). We presented subjects with opportunities to obtain various foods and a tool from an experimenter in exchange for the foods or tool in the subjects' possession. The times elapsed before the first chow biscuits were expelled and/or an exchange took place were recorded as the dependent measures. Laboratory chow biscuits, grapes, apples, and a metal bolt (a tool used to probe for syrup) were used as experimental stimuli. The subjects demonstrated the ability to recognize that exchanges could occur when an experimenter was present with a desirable food. Results indicate that subjects exhibited significant variation in their willingness to barter based upon the types of foods that were both in their possession and presented by the experimenter. Subjects more readily traded chow biscuits for fruit, and more readily traded apples for grapes than grapes for apples. During the exchange of tools and food, the subjects preferred the following in descending order when the probing apparatus was baited with sweet syrup: grapes, metal bolts, and chow biscuits. However when the apparatus was not baited, the values changed to the following in descending order: grapes, chow, and metal bolts. These results indicate that tufted capuchins recognize opportunities to exchange and engage in a simple barter system whereby low-valued foods are readily traded for more highly valued food. Furthermore, these capuchins demonstrate that their value for a tool changes depending upon its utility.

Abstract: Techniques traditionally used in developmental research with infants have been widely used with nonhuman primates in the investigation of comparative cognitive abilities. Recently, researchers have shown that human infants and monkeys select the larger of two numerosities in a spontaneous forced-choice discrimination task. Here we adopt the same method to assess in a series of experiments spontaneous choice of the larger of two numerosities in a species of amphibian, red-backed salamanders ( Plethodon cinereus). The findings indicate that salamanders “go for more,” just like human babies and monkeys. This rudimentary capacity is a type of numerical discrimination that is spontaneously present in this amphibian.