|
Hampton, R. R., Healy, S. D., Shettleworth, S. J., & Kamil, A. C. (2002). Neuroecologists' are not made of straw. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 6(1), 6–7.
|
|
|
Hampton, R. R., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1996). Hippocampus and memory in a food-storing and in a nonstoring bird species. Behav Neurosci, 110(5), 946–964.
Abstract: Food-storing birds maintain in memory a large and constantly changing catalog of the locations of stored food. The hippocampus of food-storing black-capped chickadees (Parus atricapillus) is proportionally larger than that of nonstoring dark-eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis). Chickadees perform better than do juncos in an operant test of spatial non-matching-to-sample (SNMTS), and chickadees are more resistant to interference in this paradigm. Hippocampal lesions attenuate performance in SNMTS and increase interference. In tests of continuous spatial alternation (CSA), juncos perform better than chickadees. CSA performance also declines following hippocampal lesions. By itself, sensitivity of a given task to hippocampal damage does not predict the direction of memory differences between storing and nonstoring species.
|
|
|
Hampton, R. R., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1996). Hippocampal lesions impair memory for location but not color in passerine birds. Behav Neurosci, 110(4), 831–835.
Abstract: The effects of hippocampal complex lesions on memory for location and color were assessed in black-capped chickadees (Parus atricapillus) and dark-eyed juncos (Junco hyemalis) in operant tests of matching to sample. Before surgery, most birds were more accurate on tests of memory for location than on tests of memory for color. Damage to the hippocampal complex caused a decline in memory for location, whereas memory for color was not affected in the same birds. This dissociation indicates that the avian hippocampus plays an important role in spatial cognition and suggests that this brain structure may play no role in working memory generally.
|
|
|
Krebs, J. R., Clayton, N. S., Hampton, R. R., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1995). Effects of photoperiod on food-storing and the hippocampus in birds. Neuroreport, 6(12), 1701–1704.
Abstract: Birds that store food have a relatively large hippocampus compared to non-storing species. The hippocampus shows seasonal differences in neurogenesis and volume in black-capped chikadees (Parus atricapillus) taken from the wild at different times of year. We compared hippocampal volumes in black-capped chickadees captured at the same time but differing in food-storing behaviour because of manipulations of photoperiod in the laboratory. Differences in food-storing behaviour were not accompanied by differences in the volume of the hippocampus. Hippocampal volumes also did not differ between two groups of a non-food-storing control species, house sparrows (Passer domesticus), exposed to the same conditions as the chickadees.
|
|
|
Hampton, R. R., Sherry, D. F., Shettleworth, S. J., Khurgel, M., & Ivy, G. (1995). Hippocampal volume and food-storing behavior are related in parids. Brain Behav Evol, 45(1), 54–61.
Abstract: The size of the hippocampus has been previously shown to reflect species differences and sex differences in reliance on spatial memory to locate ecologically important resources, such as food and mates. Black-capped chickadees (Parus atricapillus) cached more food than did either Mexican chickadees (P. sclateri) or bridled titmice (P. wollweberi) in two tests of food storing, one conducted in an aviary and another in smaller home cages. Black-capped chickadees were also found to have a larger hippocampus, relative to the size of the telencephalon, than the other two species. Differences in the frequency of food storing behavior among the three species have probably produced differences in the use of hippocampus-dependent memory and spatial information processing to recover stored food, resulting in graded selection for size of the hippocampus.
|
|
|
Hampton, R. R., Zivin, A., & Murray, E. A. (2004). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) discriminate between knowing and not knowing and collect information as needed before acting. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 239–246.
Abstract: Humans use memory awareness to determine whether relevant knowledge is available before acting, as when we determine whether we know a phone number before dialing. Such metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can improve selection of appropriate behavior. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta) are capable of a simple form of metacognitive access to the contents of short-term memory. Monkeys chose among four opaque tubes, one of which concealed food. The tube containing the reward varied randomly from trial to trial. On half the trials the monkeys observed the experimenter baiting the tube, whereas on the remaining trials their view of the baiting was blocked. On each trial, monkeys were allowed a single chance to select the tube containing the reward. During the choice period the monkeys had the opportunity to look down the length of each tube, to determine if it contained food. When they knew the location of the reward, most monkeys chose without looking. In contrast, when ignorant, monkeys often made the effort required to look, thereby learning the location of the reward before choosing. Looking improved accuracy on trials on which monkeys had not observed the baiting. The difference in looking behavior between trials on which the monkeys knew, and trials on which they were ignorant, suggests that rhesus monkeys discriminate between knowing and not knowing. This result extends similar observations made of children and apes to a species of Old World monkey, suggesting that the underlying cognitive capacities may be widely distributed among primates.
|
|
|
Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(9), 5359–5362.
Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.
|
|
|
Hampton, R. R. (2001). Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness. Ethology, 107, 1055–1056.
|
|