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Hasenjager, M. J., & Dugatkin, L. A. Social Network Analysis in Behavioral Ecology. Advances in the Study of Behavior. Academic Press.
Abstract: Abstract In recent years, behavioral ecologists have embraced social network analysis (SNA) in order to explore the structure of animal societies and the functional consequences of that structure. We provide a conceptual introduction to the field that focuses on historical developments, as well as on novel insights generated by recent work. First, we discuss major advances in the analysis of nonhuman societies, culminating in the use of SNA by behavioral ecologists. Next, we discuss how network-based approaches have enhanced our understanding of social structure and behavior over the past decade, focusing on: (1) information transmission, (2) collective behaviors, (3) animal personality, and (4) cooperation. These behaviors and phenomena possess several features—e.g., indirect effects, emergent properties—that network analysis is well equipped to handle. Finally, we highlight recent developments in SNA that are allowing behavioral ecologists to address increasingly sophisticated questions regarding the structure and function of animal sociality.
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Johnstone, R. A., & Dugatkin, L. A. (2000). Coalition formation in animals and the nature of winner and loser effects. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 267(1438), 17–21.
Abstract: Coalition formation has been documented in a diverse array of taxa, yet there has been little formal analysis of polyadic interactions such as coalitions. Here, we develop an optimality model which examines the role of winner and loser effects in shaping coalition formation. We demonstrate that the predicted patterns of alliances are strongly dependent on the way in which winner and loser effects change with contestant strength. When winner and loser effects decrease with the resource-holding power (RHP) of the combatants, coalitions will be favoured between the strongest members of a group, but not between the weakest. If, in contrast, winner and loser effects increase with RHP, exactly the opposite predictions emerge. All other things being equal, intervention is more likely to prove worthwhile when the beneficiary of the aid is weaker (and its opponent is stronger), because the beneficiary is then less likely to win without help. Consequently, intervention is more probable when the impact of victory on the subsequent performance of a combatant increases with that individual's strength because this selects for intervention in favour of weaker combatants. The published literature on hierarchy formation does not reveal how winner and loser effects actually change with contestant strength and we therefore hope that our model will spur others to collect such data; in this light we suggest an experiment which will help to elucidate the nature of winner and loser effects and their impact on coalition formation in animals.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (1998). Breaking up fights between others: a model of intervention behaviour. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B, 265(1394), 433–437.
Abstract: To examine when and why animals break up fights between others in their group, I modelled whether ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ effects might be one element driving the evolution of intervention behaviour. I considered one particular type of intervention: when the intervener simply breaks up fights between two others, but does not favour either party in so doing. When victories at time T + 1 are more likely given a victory at time T (i.e. winner effects), intervention is often favoured. Intervention is favoured in these circumstances because the intervening party in essence stops others from ‘getting on a roll’ and climbing up any hierarchy that exists. However, when loser effects alone are at work (defeats at time T + 1 are more likely given a defeat at time T), breaking up fights between others is never selected. If both winner and loser effects are operating simultaneously, then the likelihood of intervention behaviour evolving is a function of the relative strength of these two effects. The greater the winner effect relative to the loser effect, the more likely intervention behaviour is to evolve.
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Dugatkin, L. A., Mesterton-Gibbons, M., & Houston, A. I. (1992). Beyond the prisoner's dilemma: Toward models to discriminate among mechanisms of cooperation in nature. Trends Evol. Ecol., 7, 202–205.
Abstract: The iterated prisoner's dilemma game, or IPD, has now established itself as the orthodox paradigm for theoretical investigations of the evolution of cooperation; but its scope is restricted to reciprocity, which is only one of three categories of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Even within that category, a cooperative encounter has in general three phases, and the IPD has nothing to say about two of them. To distinguish among mechanisms of cooperation in nature, future theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation must distance itself from economics and develop games as a refinement of ethology's comparative approach.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Alfieri, M. (1991). Guppies and the TIT FOR TAT strategy: preference based on past interaction. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 28(4), 243–246.
Abstract: The evolution of cooperation requires either (a) nonrandom interactions, such that cooperators preferentially interact with other cooperators, or (b) conditional behaviors, such that individuals act cooperatively primarily towards other cooperators. Although these conditions can be met without assuming sophisticated animal cognition, they are more likely to be met if animals can remember individuals with whom they have interacted, associate past interactions with these individuals, and base future behavior on this information. Here we show that guppies (Poecilia reticulata), in the context of predator inspection behavior, can identify and remember (for at least 4 h) the “more cooperative” among two conspecifics and subsequently choose to be near these individuals in future encounters.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (2002). Animal cooperation among unrelated individuals. Naturwissenschaften, 89(12), 533–541.
Abstract: The evolution of cooperation has long been a topic near and dear to the hearts of behavioral and evolutionary ecologists. Cooperative behaviors run the gamut from fairly simple to very complicated and there are a myriad of ways to study cooperation. Here I shall focus on three paths that have been delineated in the study of intraspecific cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocity, byproduct mutualism, and group selection. In each case, I attempt to delineate the theory underlying each of these paths and then provide examples from the empirical literature. In addition, I shall briefly touch upon some recent work that has attempted to examine (or re-examine) the role of cognition and phylogeny in the study of cooperative behavior. While empirical and theoretical work has made significant strides in the name of better understanding the evolution and maintenance of cooperative behavior in animals, much work remains for the future. “From the point of view of the moralist, the animal world is on about the same level as the gladiator's show. The creatures are fairly well treated, and set to fight; whereby the strongest, the swiftest and the cunningest live to fight another day. The spectator has no need to turn his thumb down, as no quarter is given em leader the weakest and the stupidest went to the wall, while the toughest and the shrewdest, those who were best fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in any other way, survived. Life was a continuous free fight, and em leader a war of each against all was the normal state of existence.” (Huxley 1888)
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Godin, J. - G. J. (1993). Female mate copying in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata): age-dependent effects. Behav. Ecol., 4(4), 289–292.
Abstract: Virtually all studies of mate choice to date have assumed that females choose mates independent of one another. Social cues, however, such as the mate choice of conspecifics, may also play an important role in such decisions. Previous work has shown that female guppies of similar age copy each other's choice of mates. Here we examine the effect of relative age on mate choice copying in the guppy, Poecilia reticulata, and examine whether younger individuals are more likely to copy the mate choice of older conspecifics than vice versa. Results indicate that younger females copy the mate choice of older females, but older individuals do not appear to be influenced by the mate choice of younger individuals.
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Earley, R. L., Tinsley, M., & Dugatkin, L. A. (2003). To see or not to see: does previewing a future opponent affect the contest behavior of green swordtail males (Xiphophorus helleri)? Naturwissenschaften, 90(5), 226–230.
Abstract: Animals assess the fighting ability of conspecifics either by engaging in aggressive interactions or observing contests between others. However, whether individuals assess physical prowess outside the context of aggressive interactions remains unknown. We examined whether male green swordtails (Xiphophorus helleri) extract information about the fighting ability of solitary individuals via observation and whether acquiring such information elicits behavioral modifications. Contests preceded by mutual visual assessment were significantly shorter than fights where only one or neither of the two individuals was informed in advance. Focal animals initiated aggressive behavior more often against larger opponents only after previewing their adversary, indicating that swordtails can extract information about relative body size from watching solitary conspecifics. When a fighting disadvantage is perceived, observers adopt tactics that increase their probability of winning the contest.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (2002). Cooperation in animals: An evolutionary overview. Biology and Philosophy, 17(4), 459–476.
Abstract: Evolutionary biologists have grappled with the question of the emergenceand maintenance of cooperation since Darwin first listed animal cooperation asapotential problem for his theory of natural selection. Here I review four pathsthat have been delineated in the study of intra-specific cooperation amonganimals. These paths – kinship, reciprocity, byproduct mutualism andgroupselection – serve as a starting point for behavioral ecologistsinterestedstudying the initiation and maintenance of cooperation. After reviewing theempirical and theoretical underpinnings of these paths to cooperation, I touchupon some recent work that has attempted to examine (or reexamine) the role ofphylogeny, punishment and morality in the light of cooperative behavior.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (1991). Dynamics of the TIT FOR TAT strategy during predator inspection in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata). Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 29(2), 127–132.
Abstract: One well-known solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is the TIT FOR TAT strategy. This strategy has three “characteristics” associated with it. TIT FOR TAT is nice (cooperates on the first move of a game), retaliatory (plays defect against an individual that defected on the prior move), and forgiving (cooperates with an individual which has defected in the past but cooperates in the present). Predator inspection behavior in guppies (Poecilia reticulata) was examined in order to determine whether guppies displayed these three characteristics. Results indicate that while it can be quite difficult to translate the abstract concepts of niceness, retaliation, and forgiveness into measurable behaviors, the data support the hypothesis that guppies display the three characteristics associated with the TIT FOR TAT strategy.
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