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Paukner, A., Anderson, J. R., & Fujita, K. (2006). Redundant food searches by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): a failure of metacognition? Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 110–117.
Abstract: This study investigated capuchin monkeys' understanding of their own visual search behavior as a means to gather information. Five monkeys were presented with three tubes that could be visually searched to determine the location of a bait. The bait's visibility was experimentally manipulated, and the monkeys' spontaneous visual searches before tube selection were analyzed. In Experiment 1, three monkeys selected the baited tube significantly above chance; however, the monkeys also searched transparent tubes. In Experiment 2, a bent tube in which food was never visible was introduced. When the bent tube was baited, the monkeys failed to deduce the bait location and responded randomly. They also continued to look into the bent tube despite not gaining any pertinent information from it. The capuchin monkeys' behavior contrasts with the efficient employment of visual search behavior reported in humans, apes and macaques. This difference is consistent with species-related variations in metacognitive abilities, although other explanations are also possible.
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Moses, S. N., Villate, C., & Ryan, J. D. (2006). An investigation of learning strategy supporting transitive inference performance in humans compared to other species. Neuropsychologia, 44(8), 1370–1387.
Abstract: Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.
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de Waal, F. B. M., Dindo, M., Freeman, C. A., & Hall, M. J. (2005). The monkey in the mirror: hardly a stranger. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 102(32), 11140–11147.
Abstract: It is widely assumed that monkeys see a stranger in the mirror, whereas apes and humans recognize themselves. In this study, we question the former assumption by using a detailed comparison of how monkeys respond to mirrors versus live individuals. Eight adult female and six adult male brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were exposed twice to three conditions: (i) a familiar same-sex partner, (ii) an unfamiliar same-sex partner, and (iii) a mirror. Females showed more eye contact and friendly behavior and fewer signs of anxiety in front of a mirror than they did when exposed to an unfamiliar partner. Males showed greater ambiguity, but they too reacted differently to mirrors and strangers. Discrimination between conditions was immediate, and blind coders were able to tell the difference between monkeys under the three conditions. Capuchins thus seem to recognize their reflection in the mirror as special, and they may not confuse it with an actual conspecific. Possibly, they reach a level of self-other distinction intermediate between seeing their mirror image as other and recognizing it as self.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
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Friedrich, A. M., Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2004). Functional equivalence in pigeons involving a four-member class. Behav. Process., 67(3), 395–403.
Abstract: Research suggests that animals are capable of forming functional equivalence relations or stimulus classes of the kind usually demonstrated by humans (e.g., the class defined by an object and the word for that object). In pigeons, such functional equivalences are typically established using many-to-one matching-to-sample in which two samples are associated with one comparison stimulus and two different samples are associated with the other. Evidence for the establishment of functional equivalences between samples associated with the same comparison comes from transfer tests. In Experiment 1, we found that pigeons can form a single class consisting of four members (many-to-one matching) when the alternative class has only one member (one-to-one matching). In Experiment 2, we ruled out the possibility that the pigeons acquired the hybrid one-to-one/many-to-one task by developing a single-code/default coding strategy as earlier research suggested that it might. Thus, pigeons can develop a functional class consisting of as many as four members, with the alternative class consisting of a single member.
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Zentall, T. R., Galizio, M., & Critchfied, T. S. (2002). Categorization, concept learning, and behavior analysis: an introduction. J Exp Anal Behav, 78(3), 237–248.
Abstract: Categorization and concept learning encompass some of the most important aspects of behavior, but historically they have not been central topics in the experimental analysis of behavior. To introduce this special issue of the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (JEAB), we define key terms; distinguish between the study of concepts and the study of concept learning; describe three types of concept learning characterized by the stimulus classes they yield; and briefly identify several other themes (e.g., quantitative modeling and ties to language) that appear in the literature. As the special issue demonstrates, a surprising amount and diversity of work is being conducted that either represents a behavior-analytic perspective or can inform or constructively challenge this perspective.
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Cheney, D. L., Seyfarth, R. M., & Silk, J. B. (1995). The responses of female baboons (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) to anomalous social interactions: evidence for causal reasoning? J Comp Psychol, 109(2), 134–141.
Abstract: Baboons' (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) understanding of cause-effect relations in the context of social interactions was examined through use of a playback experiment. Under natural conditions, dominant female baboons often grunt to more subordinate mothers when interacting with their infants. Mothers occasionally respond to these grunts by uttering submissive fear barks. Subjects were played causally inconsistent call sequences in which a lower ranking female apparently grunted to a higher ranking female, and the higher ranking female apparently responded with fear barks. As a control, subjects heard a sequence made causally consistent by the inclusion of grunts from a 3rd female that was dominant to both of the others. Subjects responded significantly more strongly to the causally inconsistent sequences, suggesting that they recognized the factors that cause 1 individual to give submissive vocalizations to another.
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Hanggi, E. B. (2003). Discrimination learning based on relative size concepts in horses (Equus caballus). Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 83(3), 201–213.
Abstract: This study explored whether or not horses (Equus caballus) could respond to stimuli using a concept based on relative size. In Experiment 1, after learning to respond to the larger of the two stimuli for six sets of two-dimensional (2D) training exemplars, one horse was tested for size transposition that used novel larger and smaller stimuli as well as three-dimensional (3D) objects (5 two-dimensional sets and 5 three-dimensional sets with large, medium, small, and tiny sizes). The horse correctly chose (significantly above chance) the larger of two stimuli regardless of novelty or dimension or combination. In Experiment 2, two additional horses were tested using a subset of the stimuli from Experiment 1. One horse was required to select the larger stimulus--as in Experiment 1--and the other the smaller stimulus. After learning the task, both horses responded correctly to new stimuli and showed size transposition. These results suggest that at least some horses are capable of solving problems based on relative size concepts. Moreover, they are able to generalize across situations that vary from flat, black shapes to objects of different materials and colors including balls, flower pots, and PVC connectors. These findings support earlier research that showed that horses could categorize certain stimuli, and provide new evidence that they are capable of using some form of concept for problem solving. Understanding that horses have more advanced learning abilities than was previously believed should help improve training methods and management.
Keywords: Horse; Concept; Size transposition; Generalization; Learning; Training
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Morton, D. B. (2000). Self-consciousness and animal suffering. Biologist (London), 47(2), 77–80.
Abstract: Animals with relatively highly developed brains are likely to experience some degree of self-awareness and the ability to think. As well as being interesting in its own right, self-consciousness matters from an ethical point of view, since it can give rise to forms of suffering above and beyond the immediate physical sensations of pain or distress. This article surveys the evidence for animal self-consciousness and its implications for animal welfare.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). The representation of social relations by monkeys. Cognition, 37(1-2), 167–196.
Abstract: Monkeys recognize the social relations that exist among others in their group. They know who associates with whom, for example, and other animals' relative dominance ranks. In addition, monkeys appear to compare types of social relations and make same/different judgments about them. In captivity, longtailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) trained to recognize the relation between one adult female and her offspring can identify the same relation among other mother-offspring pairs, and distinguish this relation from bonds between individuals who are related in a different way. In the wild, if a vervet monkey (Cercopithecus aethiops) has seen a fight between a member of its own family and a member of Family X, this increases the likelihood that it will act aggressively toward another member of Family X. Vervets act as if they recognize some similarity between their own close associates and the close associates of others. To make such comparisons the monkeys must have some way of representing the properties of social relationships. We discuss the adaptive value of such representations, the information they contain, their structure, and their limitations.
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