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Frey, G., & Hildenbrandt, E. (1994). Einführung in die Trainingslehre 1. Grundlagen. Schorndorf: Hofmann.
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Vlajkoviç, S., Nikoliç, V., Nikoliç, A., Milanoviç, S. žA., & Jankoviç, B. D. (1994). Asymmetrical Modulation of Immune Reactivity in Left- and Right-Biased Rats After Ipsilateral Ablation of the Prefrontal, Parietal and Occipital Brain Neocortex. International Journal of Neuroscience, 78(1-2), 123–134.
Abstract: We report here on the lateralized brain immunomodulation in male Wistar rats, a phenomenon related to the rotational bias of animal and the site of cortical lesion. Rats assigned to left- and right-rotators in a cylindrical Plexiglass rotometer were subjected to the ablation of the ipsilateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), parietal cortex (PC) and occipital cortex (OC) and sensitized with bovine serum albumin (BSA) in complete Freund's adjuvant. Intact and sham-lesioned left-biased animals demonstrated increased Arthus and delayed hypersensitivity skin reactions and antibody production to BSA in comparison with corresponding right-biased animals. PFC ablation decreased humoral and cellular immune responses to BSA in left- but increased in right-biased rats. Lesioning of PC decreased humoral immune reactions in left- but increased in right-rotating animals. OC ablation failed to produce immunological abnormalities, These results suggest that immunopotentiation is associated with the left neocortex, and immunosuppression with the right neocortex. The prefrontal cortex appears to be particularly associated with immune reactions.
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Rubenstein, D. I. (1994). The ecology of female social behaviour in horses, zebras and asses. In P. J. Jarman, & A. R. (Eds.), Animal Societies (pp. 13–28). Kyoto University Press.
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Walter, B., & Trillmich, F. (1994). Female aggression and male peace-keeping in a cichlid fish harem: conflict between and within the sexes in Lamprologus ocellatus. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 34(2), 105–112.
Abstract: Conflicts of interest within and between the sexes are important processes leading to variability in mating systems. The behavioral interactions mediating conflict are little documented. We studied pairs and harems of the snail-shell inhabiting cichlid fish Lamprologus ocellatus in the laboratory. Due to their larger size, males controlled the resource that limited breeding: snail shells. Males were able to choose among females ready to spawn. Females were only accepted if they produced a clutch within a few days of settling. When several females attempted to settle simultaneously the larger female settled first. Females were least aggressive when guarding eggs. Secondary females were more likely to settle when the primary female was guarding eggs. In established harems females continued to be aggressive against each other. The male intervened in about 80% of female aggressive interactions. Male intervention activity correlated with the frequency of aggression among the females in his harem. The male usually attacked the aggressor and chased her back to her own snail shell. When a male was removed from his harem, aggression between females increased immediately and usually the secondary female was expelled by the primary female within a few days. Time to harem break-up was shorter the more mobile the primary females' young were and did not correlate with the size difference between harem females. Male L. ocellatus interfere actively in female conflict and keep the harem together against female interests. Female conflict presumably relates to the cost of sharing male parental investment and to the potential of predation by another female's large juveniles on a female's own small juveniles.
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Noë, R., & Hammerstein, P. (1994). Biological markets: supply and demand determine the effect of partner choice in cooperation, mutualism and mating. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 35(1), 1–11.
Abstract: The formation of collaborating pairs by individuals belonging to two different classes occurs in the contexts of reproduction and intea-specific cooperation as well as of inter-specific mutualism. There is potential for partner choice and for competition for access to preferred partners in all three contexts. These selective forces have long been recognised as important in sexual selection, but their impact is not yet appreciated in cooperative and mutualistic systems. The formation of partnerships between members of different classes has much in common with the conclusion of trade agreements in human markets with two classes of traders, like producers and consumers, or employers and employees. Similar game-theoretical models can be used to predict the behaviour of rational traders in human markets and the evolutionarily stable strategies used in biological markets. We present a formal model in which the influence of the market mechanism on selection is made explicit. We restrict ourselves to biological markets in which: (1) Individuals do not compete over access to partners in an agonistic manner, but rather by outcompeting each other in those aspects that are preferred by the choosing party. (2) The commodity the partner has to offer cannot be obtained by the use of force, but requires the consent of the partner. These two restrictions ensure a dominant role for partner choice in the formation of partnerships. In a biological market model the decision to cooperate is based on the comparison between the offers of several potential partners, rather than on the behaviour of a single potential partner, as is implicitly assumed in currently accepted models of cooperation. In our example the members of one class A offer a commodity of fixed value in exchange for a commodity of variable value supplied by the other class, B. We show that when the B-class outnumbers the A-class sufficiently and the cost for the A-class to sample the offers of the B-class are low, the choosiness of the A-class will lead to selection for the supply of high value commodities by the B-class (Fig. 3a). Under the same market conditions, but with a high sampling cost this may still be the evolutionariy stable outcome, but another pair of strategies proves to be stable too: relaxed choosiness of class A coupled with low value commodities supplied by class B (Fig. 3b). We give a number of examples of mating, cooperative and mutualistic markets that resemble the low sampling cost situation depicted in Fig. 3a.
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Houpt, K. A., & Boyd L. (1994). Social Behaviour. In Boyd L., & K. A. Houpt (Eds.), Przewalski's horse. Albany: State university of New York Press.
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Boyd, L., & Houpt, K. A. (1994). Przewalski's Horse. The History and Biology of an Endangered Species. SUNY Press.
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Ballou, J. (1994). Population Biology. In L. Boyd, & C. A. Houpt (Eds.), Przewalski’s horse: The History and Biology of an Endangered Species. Albany: tate University of New York Press.
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Thun, R., & Schwarz-Porsche, D. (1994). Nebennierenrinde (F.H.Döcke, Ed.). Jena, Stuttgart: Verlag Gustav Fischer.
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