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Marshall, T. T., Hoover, T. S., Reiling, B. A., & Downs, K. M. (1998). Experiential learning in the animal sciences: effect of 13 years of a beef cattle management practicum. J. Anim Sci., 76(11), 2947–2952.
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Spinka, M., Duncan, I. J. H., & Widowski, T. M. (1998). Do domestic pigs prefer short-term to medium-term confinement? Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 58(3-4), 221–232.
Abstract: A preference test was used to demonstrate that gilts have the ability to associate two sets of neutral cues with two different periods of confinement and water deprivation and to anticipate the long-term consequences of their choice in the test. Twelve gilts housed in two large, straw-bedded pens were trained to go to two sets of 12 crates, positioned on each side of a choice point, for feeding twice a day. Following initial training, the two sets of crates were marked with contrasting visual patterns and the patterns were associated with either 30 min (`short' confinement) or 240 min (`long' confinement) of confinement in the crates after entry. During 16 days of preference testing, the gilts were sent alternately to one side or the other in the mornings and allowed to choose in the afternoons. Eight gilts chose the short confinement side more often, two, the long confinement side more often and two, each side an equal number of times, indicating that most gilts learned the association and preferred to be released shortly after feeding. However, gilts still chose the long confinement side on occasion, suggesting that they did not find 240 min of confinement very aversive. When the gilts were sent to the crates in the morning, their behaviour indicated that they expected to be released or confined depending on which crate they were in. The cognitive abilities of animals with respect to perception of time and anticipation of future events have important implications for their welfare. This study demonstrates that methods can be developed to ask animals about such things.
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Davis, S. L., & Cheeke, P. R. (1998). Do domestic animals have minds and the ability to think? A provisional sample of opinions on the question. J. Anim Sci., 76(8), 2072–2079.
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Schiffman, S. S. (1998). Livestock odors: implications for human health and well-being. J. Anim Sci., 76(5), 1343–1355.
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Cox, G., & Ashford, T. (1998). Riddle Me This: The Craft and Concept of Animal Mind. Science Technology Human Values, 23(4), 425–438.
Abstract: This article examines the relations between methods used in both animal work and study and concepts of animal mind. By “animal work” the authors mean humans and animals working together, and by “animal study” they mean the discipline of ethology, especially the emerging area of cognitive ethology. Within these areas the wide range of conceptions of animal mind includes varying emphases on intelligence, forms of rationality and language, cognition, consciousness, and intentionality. The authors' central concern is to elucidate the vocabulary and the concepts which seem necessary to establishing successful working relationships with sheepdogs and gundogs. Their argument moves toward an emphasis on the appreciation of particular intentional states and recognizes that they invariably deploy elements of a moral vocabulary in achieving creative teamwork performances with dogs and other animals. The article concludes by consid enng the relevance of accounts of work with animals for associated considerations of intentionality.
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Visalberghi E, & Tomasello M. (1998). Primate causal understanding in the physical and psychological domains. Behav. Process., 42, 189.
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Westergaard, G. C., Liv, C., Chavanne, T. J., & Suomi, S. J. (1998). Token-mediated tool-use by a tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 101–106.
Abstract: This research examined token-mediated tool-use in a tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). We conducted five experiments. In experiment 1 we examined the use of plastic color-coded chips to request food, and in experiments 2-5 we examined the use of color-coded chips to request tools. Our subject learned to use chips to request tools following the same general pattern seen in great apes performing analogous tasks, that is, initial discrimination followed by an understanding of the relationship among tokens, tools, and their functions. Our findings are consistent with the view that parallel representational processes underlie the tool-related behavior of capuchins and great apes.
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Call, J., Hare, B. A., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Chimpanzee gaze following in an object-choice task. Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 89–99.
Abstract: Many primate species reliably track and follow the visual gaze of conspecifics and humans, even to locations above and behind the subject. However, it is not clear whether primates follow a human's gaze to find hidden food under one of two containers in an object-choice task. In a series of experiments six adult female chimpanzees followed a human's gaze (head and eye direction) to a distal location in space above and behind them, and checked back to the human's face when they did not find anything interesting or unusual. This study also assessed whether these same subjects would also use the human's gaze in an object-choice task with three types of occluders: barriers, tubes, and bowls. Barriers and tubes permitted the experimenter to see their contents (i.e., food) whereas bowls did not. Chimpanzees used the human's gaze direction to choose the tube or barrier containing food but they did not use the human's gaze to decide between bowls. Our findings allowed us to discard both simple orientation and understanding seeing-knowing in others as the explanations for gaze following in chimpanzees. However, they did not allow us to conclusively choose between orientation combined with foraging tendencies and understanding seeing in others. One interesting possibility raised by these results is that studies in which the human cannot see the reward at the time of subject choice may potentially be underestimating chimpanzees' social knowledge.
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Rasa, O. A. E. (1998). To stay or to leave? Decision rules for partner species relocation in two symbiotic pairs of desert beetles. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 47–54.
Abstract: Four nocturnal Kalahari desert tenebrionid beetles live in closely associated species pairs. The larger member of each pair, Parastizopus and Gonopus, are the primary burrowers while their smaller associates, Eremostibes and Herpiscius, inhabit the burrows with them and feed on detritus the larger beetles carry in. During summer drought, the two large species have different emergence times, surface activity patterns (vagilities) and different probabilities that burrows will be reoccupied before sunrise or remain empty for longer periods. Because their partners leave the burrows, the smaller species must make a decision either to stay in the expectation of a burrow being reinhabited, or leave and locate a new partner. The vagility and burrow fidelity of the associating species were studied using marked individuals in free-living populations. Field inclusion/exclusion experiments to test what influences the decision process showed that neither continual partner presence nor food induced the smaller beetles to remain. Different percentages, depending on species, left overnight. For both associates, these proportions corresponded exactly to the probability that the burrow would not be inhabited by their partner species the next day. Neither species predicted the probability of burrow reoccupation after a short vacancy and adopted a “waiting” strategy.
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Santi, A., Stanford, L., & Symons, J. (1998). An analysis of confusion errors in many-to-one matching with temporal and nontemporal samples. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 37–46.
Abstract: In experiment 1, pigeons were trained to match temporal (2, 8, and 10 s of houselight) and location (feeder light, left key, center key illumination) samples to color comparison stimuli. Red choices were correct following the 2-s and feeder light, orange choices were correct following the 8-s and center key, and green choices were correct following the 10-s and left key. Samples that were harder to discriminate (8- vs 10-s, and left vs center key) were mapped onto comparisons that were easy to discriminate (orange vs green), while samples that were easier to discriminate (2- vs 8-s, and feeder light vs left key) were mapped onto comparisons that were hard to discriminate(red vs orange). The pattern of errors for temporal and location samples indicated that these samples were not represented by a common code even though they were associated with the same comparison stimuli. In experiment 2, the same pigeons were trained with visual samples in which samples that were hard to discriminate (triangle vs circle) were mapped onto comparisons that were easy to discriminate (orange vs green), while samples that were easy to discriminate(plus vs triangle) were mapped onto comparisons that were hard to discriminate (red vs orange). Following acquisition of the visual discrimination, the temporal samples were re-introduced and many-to-one training was continued. During delay testing, the pattern of errors for temporal and visual samples was equivalent and consistent with the hypothesis that visual samples were being coded in terms of the duration appropriate for the temporal sample with which it shared a common comparison response. Data from no-sample test sessions ruled out a simple response bias explanation of the data. The properties of common codes for temporal and nontemporal events can be somewhat flexible and more complicated than previously envisaged.
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