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Van Doorn G.S., Hengeveld G.M., & Weissing F.J. (2003). The Evolution of Social Dominance I: Two-player Models. Behavior, 140(10), 1305–1332.
Abstract: A difference in dominance rank is an often-used cue to resolve conflicts between two animals without escalated fights. At the group level, adherence to a dominance convention efficiently reduces the costs associated with conflicts, but from an individual's point of view, it is difficult to explain why a low ranking individual should accept its subordinate status. This is especially true if, as suggested by several authors, dominance not necessarily reflects differences in fighting ability but rather results from arbitrary historical asymmetries. According to this idea, rank differentiation emerges from behavioural strategies, referred to as winner and loser effects, in which winners of previous conflicts are more likely to win the current conflict, whereas the losers of previous conflicts are less likely to do so. In order to investigate whether dominance, based on such winner and loser effects, can be evolutionarily stable, we analyse a game theoretical model. The model focuses on an extreme case in which there are no differences in fighting ability between individuals at all. The only asymmetries that may arise between individuals are generated by the outcome of previous conflicts. By means of numerical analysis, we find alternative evolutionarily stable strategies, which all utilize these asymmetries for conventional conflict resolution. One class of these strategies is based on winner and loser effects, thus generating evolutionarily stable dominance relations even in the absence of differences in resource holding potential.
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Van Doorn G.S., Hengeveld G.M., & Weissing F.J. (2003). The Evolution of Social Dominance II: Multi-Player Models. Behavior, 140(10), 1333–1358.
Abstract: The social hierarchies observed in natural systems often show a high degree of transitivity. Transitive hierarchies do not only require rank differentiation within pairs of individuals but also a higher level ordering of relations within the group. Several authors have suggested that the formation of linear hierarchies at the group level is an emergent property of individual behavioural rules, referred to as winner and loser effects. Winner and loser effects occur if winners of previous conflicts are more likely to escalate the current conflict, whereas the losers of previous conflicts are less likely to do so. According to this idea, an individual's position in a hierarchy may not necessarily reflect its fighting ability, but may rather result from arbitrary historical asymmetries, in particular the history of victories and defeats. However, if this is the case, it is difficult to explain from an evolutionary perspective why a low ranking individual should accept its subordinate status. Here we present a game theoretical model to investigate whether winner and loser effects giving rise to transitive hierarchies can evolve and under which conditions they are evolutionarily stable. The main version of the model focuses on an extreme case in which there are no intrinsic differences in fighting ability between individuals. The only asymmetries that may arise between individuals are generated by the outcome of previous conflicts. We show that, at evolutionary equilibrium, these asymmetries can be utilized for conventional conflict resolution. Several evolutionarily stable strategies are based on winner and loser effects and these strategies give rise to transitive hierarchies.
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Conradt, L., & Roper, T. J. (2003). Group decision-making in animals. Nature, 421(6919), 155–158.
Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.
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Rands, S. A., Cowlishaw, G., Pettifor, R. A., Rowcliffe, J. M., & Johnstone, R. A. (2003). Spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs. Nature, 423(6938), 432–434.
Abstract: Animals that forage socially often stand to gain from coordination of their behaviour. Yet it is not known how group members reach a consensus on the timing of foraging bouts. Here we demonstrate a simple process by which this may occur. We develop a state-dependent, dynamic game model of foraging by a pair of animals, in which each individual chooses between resting or foraging during a series of consecutive periods, so as to maximize its own individual chances of survival. We find that, if there is an advantage to foraging together, the equilibrium behaviour of both individuals becomes highly synchronized. As a result of this synchronization, differences in the energetic reserves of the two players spontaneously develop, leading them to adopt different behavioural roles. The individual with lower reserves emerges as the 'pace-maker' who determines when the pair should forage, providing a straightforward resolution to the problem of group coordination. Moreover, the strategy that gives rise to this behaviour can be implemented by a simple 'rule of thumb' that requires no detailed knowledge of the state of other individuals.
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Waeber P.O., & Hemelrijk C.K. (2003). Female Dominance and Social Structure in Alaotran Gentle Lemurs. Behaviour, 140(10), 1235–1246.
Abstract: Abstract:
Lemur social systems have the striking social feature, that adult females consistently evoke submissive behaviour of adult males. In the Alaotran gentle lemur, Hapalemur griseus alaotrensis, however, female dominance has not been studied yet. Here we confirm female dominance over males on the basis of a 5-month field study of the social behaviour of four groups, in the Lake Alaotra marshland of eastern Madagascar. Further, we found that dominant individuals initiated aggressive interactions significantly more often than lowerranking ones, they initiated group movements more often and higher-ranking individuals were groomed more often. The spatial configuration was remarkable, since individuals were closer in space to those more distant in rank. |
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Silk, J. B., Alberts, S. C., & Altmann, J. (2003). Social Bonds of Female Baboons Enhance Infant Survival. Science, 302(5648), 1231–1234.
Abstract: Among nonhuman primates, females often form strong bonds with kin and other group members. These relationships are thought to have adaptive value for females, but direct effects of sociality on fitness have never been demonstrated. We present 16 years of behavioral data from a well-studied population of wild baboons, which demonstrate that sociality of adult females is positively associated with infant survival, an important component of variation in female lifetime fitness. The effects of sociality on infant survival are independent of the effects of dominance rank, group membership, and environmental conditions. Our results are consistent with the evidence that social support has beneficial effects on human health and well-being across the life span. For humans and other primates, sociality has adaptive value.
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Aberle, K. S. (2003). Untersuchung der Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse, Inzucht und genetischen Distanzen bei den deutschen Kaltblutpferderassen. Ph.D. thesis, , Hannover.
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Kubinyi, E., Topál, J., Miklósi, Á., & Csányi, V. (2003). Dogs (Canis familiaris) learn their owners via observation in a manipulation task. J. Comp. Psychol., 117(2), 156–165.
Abstract: Eighty-seven pet dogs (Canis familiaris) were involved in an experiment in which they had to solve a task to obtain a ball. After witnessing a full demonstration by their owner (10 times pushing the handle of the box, which released a ball), most dogs preferred to touch the handle sooner and more frequently in comparison with other parts of the box, and they used the handle to get the ball. In contrast dogs in 3 control groups developed their own respective methods. The lack of emergence of the ball and playing after the demonstration did not affect the learning performance strongly. This suggests that in dogs the outcome of a demonstration plays only a restricted role in the manifestation of social learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)
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Newman, M. E. J. (2003). Mixing patterns in networks. Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys, 67(2 Pt 2), 026126.
Abstract: We study assortative mixing in networks, the tendency for vertices in networks to be connected to other vertices that are like (or unlike) them in some way. We consider mixing according to discrete characteristics such as language or race in social networks and scalar characteristics such as age. As a special example of the latter we consider mixing according to vertex degree, i.e., according to the number of connections vertices have to other vertices: do gregarious people tend to associate with other gregarious people? We propose a number of measures of assortative mixing appropriate to the various mixing types, and apply them to a variety of real-world networks, showing that assortative mixing is a pervasive phenomenon found in many networks. We also propose several models of assortatively mixed networks, both analytic ones based on generating function methods, and numerical ones based on Monte Carlo graph generation techniques. We use these models to probe the properties of networks as their level of assortativity is varied. In the particular case of mixing by degree, we find strong variation with assortativity in the connectivity of the network and in the resilience of the network to the removal of vertices.
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Lee, R. D. (2003). Rethinking the evolutionary theory of aging: transfers, not births, shape senescence in social species. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 100(16), 9637–9642.
Abstract: The classic evolutionary theory of aging explains why mortality rises with age: as individuals grow older, less lifetime fertility remains, so continued survival contributes less to reproductive fitness. However, successful reproduction often involves intergenerational transfers as well as fertility. In the formal theory offered here, age-specific selective pressure on mortality depends on a weighted average of remaining fertility (the classic effect) and remaining intergenerational transfers to be made to others. For species at the optimal quantity-investment tradeoff for offspring, only the transfer effect shapes mortality, explaining postreproductive survival and why juvenile mortality declines with age. It also explains the evolution of lower fertility, longer life, and increased investments in offspring.
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