Dugatkin, L. A. (1998). A comment on Lafleur et al.'s re-evaluation of mate-choice copying in guppies. Anim. Behav., 56(2), 513–514.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (2002). Animal cooperation among unrelated individuals. Naturwissenschaften, 89(12), 533–541.
Abstract: The evolution of cooperation has long been a topic near and dear to the hearts of behavioral and evolutionary ecologists. Cooperative behaviors run the gamut from fairly simple to very complicated and there are a myriad of ways to study cooperation. Here I shall focus on three paths that have been delineated in the study of intraspecific cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocity, byproduct mutualism, and group selection. In each case, I attempt to delineate the theory underlying each of these paths and then provide examples from the empirical literature. In addition, I shall briefly touch upon some recent work that has attempted to examine (or re-examine) the role of cognition and phylogeny in the study of cooperative behavior. While empirical and theoretical work has made significant strides in the name of better understanding the evolution and maintenance of cooperative behavior in animals, much work remains for the future. “From the point of view of the moralist, the animal world is on about the same level as the gladiator's show. The creatures are fairly well treated, and set to fight; whereby the strongest, the swiftest and the cunningest live to fight another day. The spectator has no need to turn his thumb down, as no quarter is given em leader the weakest and the stupidest went to the wall, while the toughest and the shrewdest, those who were best fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in any other way, survived. Life was a continuous free fight, and em leader a war of each against all was the normal state of existence.” (Huxley 1888)
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Alfieri, M. (1991). Guppies and the TIT FOR TAT strategy: preference based on past interaction. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 28(4), 243–246.
Abstract: The evolution of cooperation requires either (a) nonrandom interactions, such that cooperators preferentially interact with other cooperators, or (b) conditional behaviors, such that individuals act cooperatively primarily towards other cooperators. Although these conditions can be met without assuming sophisticated animal cognition, they are more likely to be met if animals can remember individuals with whom they have interacted, associate past interactions with these individuals, and base future behavior on this information. Here we show that guppies (Poecilia reticulata), in the context of predator inspection behavior, can identify and remember (for at least 4 h) the “more cooperative” among two conspecifics and subsequently choose to be near these individuals in future encounters.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (2001). Bystander effects and the structure of dominance hierarchies. Behav. Ecol., 12(3), 348–352.
Abstract: Prior modeling work has found that pure winner and loser effects (i.e., changing the estimation of your own fighting ability as a function of direct prior experience) can have important consequences for hierarchy formation. Here these models are extended to incorporate “bystander effects.” When bystander effects are in operation, observers (i.e., bystanders) of aggressive interactions change their assessment of the protagonists' fighting abilities (depending on who wins and who loses). Computer simulations demonstrate that when bystander winner effects alone are at play, groups have a clear omega (bottom-ranking individual), while the relative position of other group members remains difficult to determine. When only bystander loser effects are in operation, wins and losses are randomly distributed throughout a group (i.e., no discernible hierarchy). When pure and bystander winner effects are jointly in place, a linear hierarchy, in which all positions (i.e., {alpha} to {delta} when N = 4) are clearly defined, emerges. Joint pure and bystander loser effects produce the same result. In principle one could test the predictions from the models developed here in a straightforward comparative study. Hopefully, the results of this model will spur on such studies in the future.
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Mesterton-Gibbons, M., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1995). Toward a theory of dominance hierarchies: effects of assessment, group size, and variation in fighting ability. Behav. Ecol., 6(4), 416–423.
Abstract: We introduce assessment to the analysis of dominance hierarchies by exploring the effect of an evolutionarily stable fighting rule when there is variation in resource holding potential (RHP) and RHP is not a perfectly reliable predictor of the outcome of a fight. With assessment, the probability of a linear hierarchy decreases with group size but can remain appreciable for groups of up to seven or eight individuals, whereas it decreases virtually to zero if there is no assessment. The probability of a hierarchy that correlates perfectly with RHP is low unless group size is small.
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Wilson, D. S., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1996). A reply to Lombardi & Hurlbert. Anim. Behav., 52(2), 423–425.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Wilson, D. S. (1994). Choice experiments and cognition: a reply to Lamprecht & Hofer. Anim. Behav., 47(6), 1459–1461.
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Mesterton-Gibbons, M., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1997). Cooperation and the Prisoner's Dilemma: towards testable models of mutualism versus reciprocity. Anim. Behav., 54(3), 551–557.
Abstract: For the purpose of distinguishing between mutualism and reciprocity in nature, recent work on the evolution of cooperation has both oversimplifed and undersimplified the distinction between these two categories of cooperation. This article addresses the resulting issues of model testability, clarifies the role of time and argues that the category of `pseudo-reciprocity' is an unnecessary complication.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Mesterton-Gibbons, M. (1996). Cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocal altruism, by-product mutualism and group selection in fishes. Biosystems, 37(1-2), 19–30.
Abstract: Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve not only via reciprocal altruism but also via trait-group selection or by-product mutualism (or some combination of all three categories). Therefore the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is an insufficient paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation. We replace this game by the cooperator's dilemma, which is more versatile because it enables all three categories of cooperative behavior to be examined within the framework of a single theory. Controlled studies of cooperation among fish provide examples of each category of cooperation. Specifically, we describe reciprocal altruism among simultaneous hermaphrodites that swap egg parcels, group-selected cooperation among fish that inspect dangerous predators and by-product mutualism in the cooperative foraging of coral-reef fish.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Hoglund, J. (1995). Delayed breeding and the evolution of mate copying in lekking species. J. Theor. Biol., 174(3), 261–267.
Abstract: Recent experimental evidence indicates that females may copy the mate choice of others. Here, we present a model for the evolution of mate copying strategies in lekking species. In the model, all females (copiers and non-copiers) assess male quality, but a copier's assessment of a male's quality increases after males have mated with other females. The model demonstrates that mate copying is favored when breeding late in the season has a relatively high cost. We hope that our results will spur empirical work quantifying the time constraints associated with breeding, thus allowing more direct tests of the model's predictions.
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