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Author | Dugatkin, L.; Alfieri, M. | ||||
Title | Tit-For-Tat in guppies (Poecilia reticulata): the relative nature of cooperation and defection during predator inspection | Type | Journal Article | ||
Year | 1991 | Publication | Evolutionary Ecology | Abbreviated Journal | Evol. Ecol. |
Volume | 5 | Issue | 3 | Pages | 300-309 |
Keywords | Game theory – Tit-For-Tat – predator inspection – guppy | ||||
Abstract | Summary The introduction of game-theoretical thinking into evolutionary biology has laid the groundwork for a heuristic view of animal behaviour in which individuals employ “strategies” – rules that instruct them how to behave in a given circumstance to maximize relative fitness. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) found that a strategy called Tit-For-Tat (TFT) is one robust cooperative solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. There exists, however, little empirical evidence that animals employ TFT. Predator inspection in fish provides one ecological context in which to examine the use of the TFT strategy. | ||||
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Notes | Approved | no | |||
Call Number | Equine Behaviour @ team @ | Serial | 2177 | ||
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