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Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. Nat Rev Neurosci, 4(3), 165–178.
Abstract: We are an intensely social species--it has been argued that our social nature defines what makes us human, what makes us conscious or what gave us our large brains. As a new field, the social brain sciences are probing the neural underpinnings of social behaviour and have produced a banquet of data that are both tantalizing and deeply puzzling. We are finding new links between emotion and reason, between action and perception, and between representations of other people and ourselves. No less important are the links that are also being established across disciplines to understand social behaviour, as neuroscientists, social psychologists, anthropologists, ethologists and philosophers forge new collaborations.
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Paz-y-Miño C. G., Bond, A. B., Kamil, A. C., & Balda, R. P. (2004). Pinyon jays use transitive inference to predict social dominance. Nature, 430(7001), 778–781.
Abstract: Living in large, stable social groups is often considered to favour the evolution of enhanced cognitive abilities, such as recognizing group members, tracking their social status and inferring relationships among them. An individual's place in the social order can be learned through direct interactions with others, but conflicts can be time-consuming and even injurious. Because the number of possible pairwise interactions increases rapidly with group size, members of large social groups will benefit if they can make judgments about relationships on the basis of indirect evidence. Transitive reasoning should therefore be particularly important for social individuals, allowing assessment of relationships from observations of interactions among others. Although a variety of studies have suggested that transitive inference may be used in social settings, the phenomenon has not been demonstrated under controlled conditions in animals. Here we show that highly social pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) draw sophisticated inferences about their own dominance status relative to that of strangers that they have observed interacting with known individuals. These results directly demonstrate that animals use transitive inference in social settings and imply that such cognitive capabilities are widespread among social species.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (2004). Cognitive science: rank inferred by reason. Nature, 430(7001), 732–733.
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Grosenick, L., Clement, T. S., & Fernald, R. D. (2007). Fish can infer social rank by observation alone. Nature, 445(7126), 429–432.
Abstract: Transitive inference (TI) involves using known relationships to deduce unknown ones (for example, using A > B and B > C to infer A > C), and is thus essential to logical reasoning. First described as a developmental milestone in children, TI has since been reported in nonhuman primates, rats and birds. Still, how animals acquire and represent transitive relationships and why such abilities might have evolved remain open problems. Here we show that male fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) can successfully make inferences on a hierarchy implied by pairwise fights between rival males. These fish learned the implied hierarchy vicariously (as 'bystanders'), by watching fights between rivals arranged around them in separate tank units. Our findings show that fish use TI when trained on socially relevant stimuli, and that they can make such inferences by using indirect information alone. Further, these bystanders seem to have both spatial and featural representations related to rival abilities, which they can use to make correct inferences depending on what kind of information is available to them. Beyond extending TI to fish and experimentally demonstrating indirect TI learning in animals, these results indicate that a universal mechanism underlying TI is unlikely. Rather, animals probably use multiple domain-specific representations adapted to different social and ecological pressures that they encounter during the course of their natural lives.
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Whiten, A., Goodall, J., McGrew, W. C., Nishida, T., Reynolds, V., Sugiyama, Y., et al. (1999). Cultures in chimpanzees. Nature, 399(6737), 682–685.
Abstract: As an increasing number of field studies of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have achieved long-term status across Africa, differences in the behavioural repertoires described have become apparent that suggest there is significant cultural variation. Here we present a systematic synthesis of this information from the seven most long-term studies, which together have accumulated 151 years of chimpanzee observation. This comprehensive analysis reveals patterns of variation that are far more extensive than have previously been documented for any animal species except humans. We find that 39 different behaviour patterns, including tool usage, grooming and courtship behaviours, are customary or habitual in some communities but are absent in others where ecological explanations have been discounted. Among mammalian and avian species, cultural variation has previously been identified only for single behaviour patterns, such as the local dialects of song-birds. The extensive, multiple variations now documented for chimpanzees are thus without parallel. Moreover, the combined repertoire of these behaviour patterns in each chimpanzee community is itself highly distinctive, a phenomenon characteristic of human cultures but previously unrecognised in non-human species.
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Terrace, H. S. (1987). Chunking by a pigeon in a serial learning task. Nature, 325(7000), 149–151.
Abstract: A basic principle of human memory is that lists that can be organized into memorable 'chunks' are easier to remember. Memory span is limited to a roughly constant number of chunks and is to a large extent independent of the amount of informaton contained in each chunk. Depending on the ingenuity of the code used to integrate discrete items into chunks, one can substantially increase the number of items that can be recalled correctly. Newly developed paradigms for studying memory in non-verbal organisms allow comparison of the abilities of human and non-human subjects to memorize lists. Here I present two types of evidence that pigeons 'chunk' 5-element lists whose components (colours and achromatic geometric forms) are clustered into distinct groups. Those lists were learned twice as rapidly as a homogeneous list of colours or heterogeneous lists in which the elements are not clustered. The pigeons were also tested for knowledge of the order of two elements drawn from the 5-element lists. They responded in the correct order only to those subsets that contained a chunk boundary. Thus chunking can be studied profitably in animal subjects; the cognitive processes that allow an organism to form chunks do no presuppose linguistic competence.
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Matsuzawa, T. (1985). Use of numbers by a chimpanzee. Nature, 315(6014), 57–59.
Abstract: Recent studies have examined linguistic abilities in apes. However, although human mathematical abilities seem to be derived from the same foundation as those in language, we have little evidence for mathematical abilities in apes (but for exceptions see refs 7-10). In the present study, a 5-yr-old female chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), 'Ai', was trained to use Arabic numerals to name the number of items in a display. Ai mastered numerical naming from one to six and was able to name the number, colour and object of 300 types of samples. Although no particular sequence of describing samples was required, the chimpanzee favoured two sequences (colour/object/number and object/colour/number). The present study demonstrates that the chimpanzee was able to describe the three attributes of the sample items and spontaneously organized the 'word order'.
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McGonigle, B. (1985). Can apes learn to count? (Vol. 315).
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Crook, J. H. (1983). On attributing consciousness to animals. Nature, 303(5912), 11–14.
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Kiltie, R. A., Fan, J., & Laine, A. F. (1995). A wavelet-based metric for visual texture discrimination with applications in evolutionary ecology. Math Biosci, 126(1), 21–39.
Abstract: Much work on natural and sexual selection is concerned with the conspicuousness of visual patterns (textures) on animal and plant surfaces. Previous attempts by evolutionary biologists to quantify apparency of such textures have involved subjective estimates of conspicuousness or statistical analyses based on transect samples. We present a method based on wavelet analysis that avoids subjectivity and that uses more of the information in image textures than transects do. Like the human visual system for texture discrimination, and probably like that of other vertebrates, this method is based on localized analysis of orientation and frequency components of the patterns composing visual textures. As examples of the metric's utility, we present analyses of crypsis for tigers, zebras, and peppered moth morphs.
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