Abstract: Although many variants of the hawk-dove game predict the frequency at which group foraging animals should compete aggressively, none of them can explain why a large number of group foraging animals share food clumps without any overt aggression. One reason for this shortcoming is that hawk-dove games typically consider only a single contest, while most group foraging situations involve opponents that interact repeatedly over discovered food clumps. The present iterated hawk-dove game predicts that in situations that are analogous to a prisoner's dilemma, animals should share the resources without aggression, provided that the number of simultaneously available food clumps is sufficiently large and the number of competitors is relatively small. However, given that the expected gain of an aggressive animal is more variable than the gain expected by nonaggressive individuals, the predicted effect of the number of food items in a clump-clump richness-depends on whether only the mean or both the mean and variability associated with payoffs are considered. More precisely, the deterministic game predicts that aggression should increase with clump richness, whereas the stochastic risk-sensitive game predicts that the frequency of encounters resulting in aggression should peak at intermediate clump richnesses or decrease with increasing clump richness if animals show sensitivity to the variance or coefficient of variation, respectively.

Abstract: Self‐organizing‐system approaches have shed significant light on the mechanisms underlying synchronized movements by large groups of animals, such as shoals of fish, flocks of birds, or herds of ungulates. However, these approaches rarely consider conflicts of interest between group members, although there is reason to suppose that such conflicts are commonplace. Here, we demonstrate that, where conflicts exist, individual members of self‐organizing groups can, in principle, increase their influence on group movement destination by strategically changing simple behavioral parameters (namely, movement speed, assertiveness, and social attraction range). However, they do so at the expense of an increased risk of group fragmentation and a decrease in movement efficiency. We argue that the resulting trade‐offs faced by each group member render it likely that group movements are led by those members for which reaching a particular destination is most crucial or group cohesion is least important. We term this phenomenon leading according to “need” or “social indifference,” respectively. Both kinds of leading can occur in the absence of knowledge of or communication about the needs of other group members and without the assumption of altruistic cooperation. We discuss our findings in the light of observations on fish and other vertebrates.

Abstract: The effects of ACTH 4-10 on rats' imitation learning was examined during the acquisition and extinction of a bar-press response for water reinforcement. Rats were exposed to either a bar-pressing conspecific (OB), an experimentally naive conspecific (ON), or an empty box (OE) during bar-press acquisition. In a factorial design, each rat was then exposed to one of the same three conditions during extinction. An 80 mcg dose of ACTH 4-10 was administered to half of the rats in each group prior to observation. Performance differences during acquisition were generally small, but significant performance differences during extinction were found. Social facilitation was indicated by the finding that rats extinguished in the presence of a conspecific exhibited significantly greater resistance to extinction than rats extinguished in the presence of an empty box. An imitation effect was also found. Rats that observed a bar-pressing conspecific during both acquisition and extinction (group OB-OB) showed significantly greater resistance top extinction than did groups OB-ON, CB-OE, or OE-OE. There were no significant effects of the hormone, however, relative to saline controls.