Zentall, T. R., Hogan, D. E., Edwards, C. A., & Hearst, E. (1980). Oddity learning in the pigeon as a function of the number of incorrect alternatives. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 6(3), 278–299.
Abstract: Pigeons' rate of learning a two-color oddity task increased as a function of the number of incorrect alternatives from 2 to 24 in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. In general, pigeons that were transferred from many-incorrect-alternative to two-incorrect-alternative oddity performed better than controls, but considerably below baseline (Experiments 2 and 3). In Experiment 4, pigeons showed no unconditioned tendency to peck the odd stimulus among 24 incorect alternatives, when pecks were nondifferentially reinforced, and in Experiment 5, when this procedure was preceded by oddity training, a progressive drop in odd-stimulus pecking was found. In Experiment 6, pigeons exposed to a nine-stimulus array in which the odd stimulus appeared (a) in the center or (b) separate from the array learned faster than when the odd stimulus was at the edge. This outcome suggests ththe figure-ground relation between the odd stimulus and the incorrect alternatives plays a role in the facilitation produced by increasing the number of incorrect alternatives but that poor performance on the standard, three-alternative oddity task appears to be due to center-odd trials which provide a difficult size or number discrimination.
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Zentall, S. S., & Zentall, T. R. (1976). Activity and task performance of hyperactive children as a function of environmental stimulation. J Consult Clin Psychol, 44(5), 693–697.
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Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2003). Imitation and affordance learning by pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 117(4), 414–419.
Abstract: The bidirectional control procedure was used to determine whether pigeons (Columba livia) would imitate a demonstrator that pushed a sliding screen for food. One group of observers saw a trained demonstrator push a sliding screen door with its beak (imitation group), whereas 2 other groups watched the screen move independently (possibly learning how the environment works) with a conspecific either present (affordance learning with social facilitation) or absent (affordance learning alone). A 4th group could not see the screen being pushed (sound and odor control). Imitation was evidenced by the finding that pigeons that saw a demonstrator push the screen made a higher proportion of matching screen pushes than observers in 2 appropriate control conditions. Further, observers that watched a screen move without a demonstrator present made a significantly higher proportion of matching screen pushes than would be expected by chance. Thus, these pigeons were capable of affordance learning.
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Dorrance, B. R., & Zentall, T. R. (2002). Imitation of conditional discriminations in pigeons (Columba livia). J Comp Psychol, 116(3), 277–285.
Abstract: In the present experiments, the 2-action method was used to determine whether pigeons could learn to imitate a conditional discrimination. Demonstrator pigeons (Columba livia) stepped on a treadle in the presence of 1 light and pecked at the treadle in the presence of another light. Demonstration did not seem to affect acquisition of the conditional discrimination (Experiment 1) but did facilitate its reversal of the conditional discrimination (Experiments 2 and 3). The results suggest that pigeons are not only able to learn a specific behavior by observing another pigeon, but they can also learn under which circumstances to perform that behavior. The results have implications for proposed mechanisms of imitation in animals.
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Dorrance, B. R., & Zentall, T. R. (2001). Imitative learning in Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) depends on the motivational state of the observer quail at the time of observation. J Comp Psychol, 115(1), 62–67.
Abstract: The 2-action method was used to examine whether imitative learning in Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) depends on the motivational state of the observer quail at the time of observation of the demonstrated behavior. Two groups of observers were fed before observation (satiated groups), whereas 2 other groups of observers were deprived of food before observation (hungry groups). Quail were tested either immediately following observation or after a 30-min delay. Results indicated that quail in the hungry groups imitated, whereas those in the satiated groups did not, regardless of whether their test was immediate or delayed. The results suggest that observer quail may not learn (through observation) behavior that leads to a reinforcer for which they are unmotivated at the time of test. In addition, the results show that quail are able to delay the performance of a response acquired through observation (i.e., they show deferred imitation).
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Akins, C. K., & Zentall, T. R. (1996). Imitative learning in male Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) using the two-action method. J Comp Psychol, 110(3), 316–320.
Abstract: The study of imitative learning in animals has suffered from the presence of a number of confounding motivational and attentional factors (e.g., social facilitation and stimulus enhancement). The two-action method avoids these problems by exposing observers to demonstrators performing a response (e.g., operating a treadle) using 1 of 2 distinctive topographies (e.g., by pecking or by stepping). Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) observers exposed to conspecific demonstrators showed a high correlation between the topography of the response they observed and the response they performed. These data provide strong evidence for the existence of true imitative learning in an active, precocious bird under conditions that control for alternative accounts.
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Zentall, T. R. (2001). Imitation In Animals: Evidence, Function, And Mechanisms. Cybern Syst, 32, 53–96.
Abstract: The terms sociallearning and social influence have been used descriptively and theoretically to characterize a broad range of animal behavior from physical antipredatory adaptations such as eye spots, which are totally under genetic control, to the human capacity for the exaggeration of individual characteristics, known as caricature, which are largely under cognitive control. In the present review, the various forms of social influence and social learning are identified and distinghished from imitation, a term that generally has been reserved for behavioral matching that cannot be accounted for using simpler specifically predisposed, motivational, or learning mechanisms. It is suggested that much of the ambiguity in the literature concerning the various forms of social learning can be attributed to the distinction between the function of a behavior and the mechanisms responsible for its occurrence. Finally, the various mechanisms that have been proposed to account for imitative learning are presented and an attempt is made to evaluate them.
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Zentall, T. R. (2007). Temporal discrimination learning by pigeons. Behav. Process., 74(2), 286–292.
Abstract: Memory for time by animals appears to undergo a systematic shortening. This so-called choose-short effect can be seen in a conditional temporal discrimination when a delay is inserted between the sample and comparison stimuli. We have proposed that this temporal shortening may result from a procedural artifact in which the delay appears similar to the intertrial interval and thus, produces an inadvertent ambiguity or 'instructional failure'. When this ambiguity is avoided by distinguishing the intertrial interval from the delay, as well as the samples from the delay, the temporal shortening effect and other asymmetries often disappear. By avoiding artifacts that can lead to a misinterpretation of results, we may understand better how animals represent time. An alternative procedure for studying temporal discriminations is with the psychophysical bisection procedure in which following conditional discrimination training, intermediate durations are presented and the point of subjective equality is determined. Research using the bisection procedure has shown that pigeons represent temporal durations not only as their absolute value but also relative to durations from which they must be discriminated. Using this procedure, we have also found that time passes subjectively slower when animals are required to respond to the to-be-timed stimulus.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Timing, memory for intervals, and memory for untimed stimuli: The role of instructional ambiguity. Behav. Process., 71(2-3), 88–97.
Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.
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