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Flack, J. C., Jeannotte, L. A., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2004). Play signaling and the perception of social rules by juvenile chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J Comp Psychol, 118(2), 149–159.
Abstract: Prescriptive social rules are enforced statistical regularities. The authors investigated whether juvenile chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) recognize and use enforced statistical regularities to guide dyadic play behavior. They hypothesized (a) that proximity of adults, especially mothers of younger play partners, to play bouts will increase the play signaling of older partners and (b) that when juvenile-juvenile play bouts occur in proximity to adults, older partners will play at a lower intensity than when no adults are present. They found that older and younger partners increase their play signaling in the presence of the mothers of younger partners, particularly as the intensity of play bouts increases. In contrast to their hypothesis, older partners played more roughly when the mothers of younger partners were in proximity. These results suggest that juvenile chimpanzees increase play signaling to prevent termination of the play bouts by mothers of younger partners.
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Soproni, K., Miklósi, Á., Topál, J., & Csányi, V. (2002). Dogs' (Canis familiaris) responsiveness to human pointing gestures. J Comp Psychol, 116(1), 27–34.
Abstract: In a series of 3 experiments, dogs (Canis familiaris) were presented with variations of the human pointing gesture: gestures with reversed direction of movement, cross-pointing, and different arm extensions. Dogs performed at above chance level if they could see the hand (and index finger) protruding from the human body contour. If these minimum requirements were not accessible, dogs still could rely on the body position of the signaler. The direction of movement of the pointing arm did not influence the performance. In summary, these observations suggest that dogs are able to rely on relatively novel gestural forms of the human communicative pointing gesture and that they are able to comprehend to some extent the referential nature of human pointing.
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Soproni, K., Miklósi, A., Topál, J., & Csányi, V. (2001). Comprehension of human communicative signs in pet dogs (Canis familiaris). J Comp Psychol, 115(2), 122–126.
Abstract: On the basis of a study by D. J. Povinelli, D. T. Bierschwale, and C. G. Cech (1999), the performance of family dogs (Canis familiaris) was examined in a 2-way food choice task in which 4 types of directional cues were given by the experimenter: pointing and gazing, head-nodding (“at target”), head turning above the correct container (“above target”), and glancing only (“eyes only”). The results showed that the performance of the dogs resembled more closely that of the children in D. J. Povinelli et al.'s study, in contrast to the chimpanzees' performance in the same study. It seems that dogs, like children, interpret the test situation as being a form of communication. The hypothesis is that this similarity is attributable to the social experience and acquired social routines in dogs because they spend more time in close contact with humans than apes do, and as a result dogs are probably more experienced in the recognition of human gestures.
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Shapiro, A. D., Janik, V. M., & Slater, P. J. B. (2003). A gray seal's (Halichoerus grypus) responses to experimenter-given pointing and directional cues. J Comp Psychol, 117(4), 355–362.
Abstract: A gray seal (Halichoerus grypus) was trained to touch a target on its left or right by responding to pointing signals. The authors then tested whether the seal would be able to generalize spontaneously to altered signals. It responded correctly to center pointing and head turning, center upper body turning, and off-center pointing but not to head turning and eye movements alone. The seal also responded correctly to brief ipsilateral and contralateral points from center and lateral positions. Pointing gestures did not cause the seal to select an object placed centrally behind it. Like many animals in similar studies, this gray seal probably did not understand the referential character of these gestures but rather used signal generalization and experience from initial operant conditioning to solve these tasks.
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Thor, D. H., & Holloway, W. R. (1982). Social memory of the male laboratory rat. J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol., 96(6), 1000–1006.
Abstract: Used duration of social-investigatory behavior by 36 mature male Long-Evans rats as a measure of individual recognition in 5 experiments to assess social memory. In Exp I, the duration of social investigation during a 2nd exposure to the same juvenile (n[en space]=[en space]12) was directly related to the length of the interexposure interval. In Exp II, Ss were exposed to the same or different juvenile 10 min after an initial 5-min exposure to a novel juvenile; reexposure to the same juvenile elicited significantly less social investigation than an exposure to a different juvenile. Exps III and IV demonstrated that following a 5-min introductory exposure, social memory of the juvenile was relatively brief in comparison with that of mature Ss. Exp V revealed a retroactive interference effect on recently acquired memory for an individual: 12 mature Ss exposed to interpolated social experience engaged in significantly longer investigation of a juvenile than those with no interpolated social experience. The combined results suggest that (1) the rat normally engages in spontaneous learning of individual identity and (2) social memory may be a significant aspect of complex social interactions. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved)
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Allen, C. (1998). Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives. J. Anim Sci., 76(1), 42–47.
Abstract: Developments in the scientific and philosophical study of animal cognition and mentality are of great importance to animal scientists who face continued public scrutiny of the treatment of animals in research and agriculture. Because beliefs about animal minds, animal cognition, and animal consciousness underlie many people's views about the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals, it has become increasingly difficult for animal scientists to avoid these issues. Animal scientists may learn from ethologists who study animal cognition and mentality from an evolutionary and comparative perspective and who are at the forefront of the development of naturalistic and laboratory techniques of observation and experimentation that are capable of revealing the cognitive and mental properties of nonhuman animals. Despite growing acceptance of the ethological study of animal cognition, there are critics who dispute the scientific validity of the field, especially when the topic is animal consciousness. Here, a proper understanding of developments in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science can help to place cognitive studies on a firm methodological and philosophical foundation. Ultimately, this is an interdisciplinary task, involving scientists and philosophers. Animal scientists are well-positioned to contribute to the study of animal cognition because they typically have access to a large pool of potential research subjects whose habitats are more controlled than in most field studies while being more natural than most laboratory psychology experiments. Despite some formidable questions remaining for analysis, the prospects for progress in assessing animal cognition are bright.
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Duncan, I. J., & Petherick, J. C. (1991). The implications of cognitive processes for animal welfare. J. Anim Sci., 69(12), 5017–5022.
Abstract: In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.
Keywords: *Animal Welfare; Animals; Animals, Domestic/*psychology; *Cognition
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Curtis, S. E., & Stricklin, W. R. (1991). The importance of animal cognition in agricultural animal production systems: an overview. J. Anim Sci., 69(12), 5001–5007.
Abstract: To describe and then fulfill agricultural animals' needs, we must learn more about their fundamental psychological and behavioral processes. How does this animal feel? Is that animal suffering? Will we ever be able to know these things? Scientists specializing in animal cognition say that there are numerous problems but that they can be overcome. Recognition by scientists of the notion of animal awareness has been increasing in recent years, because of the work of Griffin and others. Feeling, thinking, remembering, and imagining are cognitive processes that are factors in the economic and humane production of agricultural animals. It has been observed that the animal welfare debate depends on two controversial questions: Do animals have subjective feelings? If they do, can we find indicators that reveal them? Here, indirect behavioral analysis approaches must be taken. Moreover, the linear additivity of several stressor effects on a variety of animal traits suggests that some single phenomenon is acting as a “clearinghouse” for many or all of the stresses acting on an animal at any given time, and this phenomenon might be psychological stress. Specific situations animals may encounter in agricultural production settings are discussed with respect to the animals' subjective feelings.
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Proops, L., McComb, K., & Reby, D. (2008). Cross-modal individual vocal recognition in the domestic horse. In IESM 2008.
Abstract: Horses fulfill many of the criteria for a species in which it would be adaptive to be capable of individual recognition: they are highly social, form strong and long lasting bonds, their affiliations are rarely kin based, they have a fission-fusion social structure and they possess inter and intra-group dominance hierarchies.
We used a novel cross-modal, expectancy violation paradigm to provide the first systematic evidence that a non-human animal – the domestic horse- is capable of cross modal recognition. We believe this paradigm could provide an ideal way to study individual recognition across a wide range of species. For full published details see: Proops L, McComb K, Reby D (2009) Cross-modal individual recognition in domestic horses (Equus caballus). Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 106: 947-951. |
Proops, L., McComb, K., & Reby, D. (2008). Horse-human interactions: Attention attribution and the use of human cues by domestic horses (Equus caballus). In IESM 2008.
Abstract: Recent research has shown that domestic dogs are particularly good at reading human attentional cues, often outperforming chimpanzees and hand reared wolves [1, 2]. It has been suggested that the close evolutionary relationship between humans and dogs has led to the development of this ability, however very few other species have been studied [3]. We tested the ability of 24 domestic horses to discriminate between an attentive and inattentive person when choosing whom to approach for food. While the attentive person faced forwards, the inattentive person either stood with their body turned 180° away from the subject (body orientation condition), stood with their body facing forwards but their head facing away (head orientation condition) or stood facing forwards but with their eyes closed (eyes closed condition). A fourth, mixed condition was included where the attentive person stood with their body facing away from the subjects but their head turned towards the subject while the inattentive person stood with their body facing the subject but their head turned away. Horses chose the attentive person significantly more often using the body cue (n = 24, k = 19, p = 0.003), the head cue (n = 24, k = 18, p = 0.011), and the eye cue (n = 24, k = 19, p = 0.003) but not the mixed cue (n = 24, k = 13, p = 0.42). In an additional pilot study, horses were tested in an object choice task. A human experimenter cued one of two buckets by either tapping the bucket (tap condition), orienting their body towards the bucket and pointing (body and point condition), pointing while facing forwards (point condition) or orienting their body towards the bucket (body condition). If the subjects chose the correct bucket they were rewarded. Subjects were able to use the tap cue (n = 31, k = 21, p = 0.035), body + point cue (n= 31, k = 21, p = 0.035) and the point cue (n = 30, k = 21, p = 0.021) but not the body cue (n = 31, k = 11, p = 0.076). These results taken together suggest that domestic horses are also very sensitive to human attentional cues, including gaze.
Keywords: social cognition, animal-human interaction, horses, attention attribution, domestication 1. Hare, B., Brown, M., Williamson, C., and Tomasello, M. (2002). The domestication of social cognition in dogs. Science 298, 1634-1636. 2. Gacsi, M., Miklosi, A., Varga, O., Topal, J., and Csanyi, V. (2004). Are readers of our face readers of our minds` Dogs (Canis familiaris) show situation-dependent recognition of human’s attention. Animal Cognition 7, 144-153. 3. Hare, B., and Tomasello, M. (2005). Human-like social skills in dogs? Trends Cogn. Sci. 9, 439-444. Keywords: social cognition; animal-human interaction; horses; attention
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