Abstract: Weaving is a common locomotor stereotypy in horses, which has been shown to be reduced by the presence of a mirror in the stable; however, it remains unclear whether this effect is due to the reflected image of a horse or some other property associated with the introduction of a mirror. To investigate this further, the response of six known weaving horses to each of three different types of poster was recorded. The poster images consisted of a life-size image of a horse's face (true image), a version of the same image cut into 54 squares, which were then randomly rearranged (pixilated image) and a blank (white image) display of the same size as the other posters. Four observation periods were included in each of the two days of observation per treatment condition: 08:00-08:30 h, 10:00-10:30 h, 12:00-12:30 h and 16:00-17:00 h. The first observation period was followed by the provision of concentrate feed and forage, the second observation period by exercise, the third by further forage and the fourth by concentrate feed and forage. The horses' activities and positions in the box were scanned at 1 min intervals and the number of observations registering each activity and position was calculated as a percentage of the total number of observations for each observation period. Weaving was significantly less when the horses were provided with the image of a horse's face (mean percentage of observations +/- S.E.M.; 5.56 +/- 1.57), compared to both the pixilated (14.85 +/- 3.06) and white (20.52 +/- 4.12) images. Nodding was significantly less when provided with the true image of a horse (0.45 +/- 0.15) compared to the pixilated image (2.15 +/- 0.67). The pattern of weaving throughout the day differed from that of nodding, and together these results suggest that the two behaviours are not analogous. The presence of the image of the horse's face was associated with a significant increase in alertness (F112,2 = 11.31, p < 0.001) and recorded time spent looking at the poster(F112,2 = 3.46, p < 0.05). The timing of stereotypic head movements in the horse in this study suggests that they are not associated with boredom, or lack of stimulation but rather acute frustration.

Abstract: For an animal from any species to exhibit intelligent perception it must be capable of being consciously aware of what it perceives and capable of learning from this experience. Although many organisms, and for that matter machines, are capable of rapid adaptive learning in response to perception of environmental changes, such adaptations can occur without them being consciously aware either of external stimuli or their response to them. While behavioural and neurophysiological evidence suggests that, apart from ourselves, other higher primates must also be capable of such awareness, an important central question is whether such awareness is a characteristic of primate evolution or if it also occurs in sub-primate mammals as well. In this review I will examine our behavioural and neurophysiological evidence from visual and olfactory recognition studies in the sheep to support the argument that they are likely to be aware of and learn about both social and non-social objects and that they are therefore capable of intelligent perception. However, the impact of motivational changes on these perceptual processes suggests that they may be limited in terms of both prospection and retrospection and dealing with symbolic associations.

Abstract: In animal communication natural selection favors callers who vocalize to affect the behavior of listeners and listeners who acquire information from vocalizations, using this information to represent their environment. The acquisition of information in the wild is similar to the learning that occurs in laboratory conditioning experiments. It also has some parallels with language. The dichotomous view that animal signals must be either referential or emotional is false, because they can easily be both: The mechanisms that cause a signaler to vocalize do not limit a listener's ability to extract information from the call. The inability of most animals to recognize the mental states of others distinguishes animal communication most clearly from human language. Whereas signalers may vocalize to change a listener's behavior, they do not call to inform others. Listeners acquire information from signalers who do not, in the human sense, intend to provide it.

Abstract: After Charles Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, published in 1872, we had to wait 60 years before the theme of animal expressions was picked up by another astute observer. In 1935, Nadezhda Ladygina-Kohts published a detailed comparison of the expressive behavior of a juvenile chimpanzee and of her own child. After Kohts, we had to wait until the 1960s for modern ethological analyses of primate facial and gestural communication. Again, the focus was on the chimpanzee, but ethograms on other primates appeared as well. Our understanding of the range of expressions in other primates is at present far more advanced than that in Darwin's time. A strong social component has been added: instead of focusing on the expressions per se, they are now often classified according to the social situations in which they typically occur. Initially, quantitative analyses were sequential (i.e., concerned with temporal associations between behavior patterns), and they avoided the language of emotions. I will discuss some of this early work, including my own on the communicative repertoire of the bonobo, a close relative of the chimpanzee (and ourselves). I will provide concrete examples to make the point that there is a much richer matrix of contexts possible than the common behavioral categories of aggression, sex, fear, play, and so on. Primate signaling is a form of negotiation, and previous classifications have ignored the specifics of what animals try to achieve with their exchanges. There is also increasing evidence for signal conventionalization in primates, especially the apes, in both captivity and the field. This process results in group-specific or “cultural” communication patterns.

Abstract: This study investigated capuchin monkeys' understanding of their own visual search behavior as a means to gather information. Five monkeys were presented with three tubes that could be visually searched to determine the location of a bait. The bait's visibility was experimentally manipulated, and the monkeys' spontaneous visual searches before tube selection were analyzed. In Experiment 1, three monkeys selected the baited tube significantly above chance; however, the monkeys also searched transparent tubes. In Experiment 2, a bent tube in which food was never visible was introduced. When the bent tube was baited, the monkeys failed to deduce the bait location and responded randomly. They also continued to look into the bent tube despite not gaining any pertinent information from it. The capuchin monkeys' behavior contrasts with the efficient employment of visual search behavior reported in humans, apes and macaques. This difference is consistent with species-related variations in metacognitive abilities, although other explanations are also possible.