Abstract: We assessed the consequences of respiratory unloading associated with tracheostomy breathing (TBr). Three normal and three carotid body-denervated (CBD) ponies were prepared with chronic tracheostomies that at rest reduced physiological dead space (VD) from 483 +/- 60 to 255 +/- 30 ml and lung resistance from 1.5 +/- 0.14 to 0.5 +/- 0.07 cmH2O . l-1 . s. At rest and during steady-state mild-to-heavy exercise arterial PCO2 (PaCO2) was approximately 1 Torr higher during nares breathing (NBr) than during TBr. Pulmonary ventilation and tidal volume (VT) were greater and alveolar ventilation was less during NBr than TBr. Breathing frequency (f) did not differ between NBr and TBr at rest, but f during exercise was greater during TBr than during NBr. These responses did not differ between normal and CBD ponies. We also assessed the consequences of increasing external VD (300 ml) and resistance (R, 0.3 cmH2O . l-1 . s) by breathing through a tube. At rest and during mild exercise tube breathing caused PaCO2 to transiently increase 2-3 Torr, but 3-5 min later PaCO2 usually was within 1 Torr of control. Tube breathing did not cause f to change. When external R was increased 1 cmH2O . l-1 . s by breathing through a conventional air collection system, f did not change at rest, but during exercise f was lower than during unencumbered breathing. These responses did not differ between normal, CBD, and hilar nerve-denervated ponies, and they did not differ when external VD or R were added at either the nares or tracheostomy.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Abstract: This study investigated the effect of lidocaine i.v. on halothane minimum alveolar concentration (MAC) in ponies. Six ponies were anaesthetised with thiopentone and succinylcholine, intubated and anaesthesia maintained with halothane. Ventilation was controlled and blood pressure maintained within clinically acceptable limits. Following a 2 h equilibration period, baseline halothane MAC was determined. The ponies were then given a loading dose of lidocaine (2.5 or 5 mg/kg bwt) or saline over 5 min, followed by a constant infusion of lidocaine (50 or 100 microg/kg/min, or saline, respectively). The halothane MAC was redetermined after a 60 min infusion of lidocaine or saline. The baseline halothane MAC for the control group was mean +/- s.d. 0.94 +/- 0.03%, and no significant decrease occurred following saline infusion. Lidocaine decreased halothane MAC in a dose-dependent fashion (r = 0.86; P < 0.0003). The results indicate that i.v. lidocaine may have a role in equine anaesthesia.

Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.

Abstract: Animals with relatively highly developed brains are likely to experience some degree of self-awareness and the ability to think. As well as being interesting in its own right, self-consciousness matters from an ethical point of view, since it can give rise to forms of suffering above and beyond the immediate physical sensations of pain or distress. This article surveys the evidence for animal self-consciousness and its implications for animal welfare.