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Santi, A., Stanford, L., & Symons, J. (1998). An analysis of confusion errors in many-to-one matching with temporal and nontemporal samples. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 37–46.
Abstract: In experiment 1, pigeons were trained to match temporal (2, 8, and 10 s of houselight) and location (feeder light, left key, center key illumination) samples to color comparison stimuli. Red choices were correct following the 2-s and feeder light, orange choices were correct following the 8-s and center key, and green choices were correct following the 10-s and left key. Samples that were harder to discriminate (8- vs 10-s, and left vs center key) were mapped onto comparisons that were easy to discriminate (orange vs green), while samples that were easier to discriminate (2- vs 8-s, and feeder light vs left key) were mapped onto comparisons that were hard to discriminate(red vs orange). The pattern of errors for temporal and location samples indicated that these samples were not represented by a common code even though they were associated with the same comparison stimuli. In experiment 2, the same pigeons were trained with visual samples in which samples that were hard to discriminate (triangle vs circle) were mapped onto comparisons that were easy to discriminate (orange vs green), while samples that were easy to discriminate(plus vs triangle) were mapped onto comparisons that were hard to discriminate (red vs orange). Following acquisition of the visual discrimination, the temporal samples were re-introduced and many-to-one training was continued. During delay testing, the pattern of errors for temporal and visual samples was equivalent and consistent with the hypothesis that visual samples were being coded in terms of the duration appropriate for the temporal sample with which it shared a common comparison response. Data from no-sample test sessions ruled out a simple response bias explanation of the data. The properties of common codes for temporal and nontemporal events can be somewhat flexible and more complicated than previously envisaged.
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Fagot, J., Kruschke, J. K., Dépy, D., & Vauclair, J. (1998). Associative learning in baboons (Papio papio) and humans (Homo sapiens): species differences in learned attention to visual features. Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 123–133.
Abstract: We examined attention shifting in baboons and humans during the learning of visual categories. Within a conditional matching-to-sample task, participants of the two species sequentially learned two two-feature categories which shared a common feature. Results showed that humans encoded both features of the initially learned category, but predominantly only the distinctive feature of the subsequently learned category. Although baboons initially encoded both features of the first category, they ultimately retained only the distinctive features of each category. Empirical data from the two species were analyzed with the 1996 ADIT connectionist model of Kruschke. ADIT fits the baboon data when the attentional shift rate is zero, and the human data when the attentional shift rate is not zero. These empirical and modeling results suggest species differences in learned attention to visual features.
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Benhamou, S. (1998). Place navigation in mammals: a configuration-based model. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 55–63.
Abstract: Recent water maze experiments suggest that rats performing place navigation primarily use the geometric information provided by a set of landmarks, and neglect the featural information provided by the identities of the landmarks. Here, I develop a model that explains how an animal may perform place navigation by relying only on geometric information. The core of the model is the representation of places as panoramas defined by circular bar-codes embodying the relative bearings and apparent sizes of the landmarks, irrespective of their identities. There are two stages in the model. During the first stage, the animal freely explores its environment in order to acquire spatial information at the local level. During the second stage, the animal uses the information previously memorized to perform place navigation towards the goal it intends to reach. The possible role of two brain areas in place navigation is discussed within this framework. Beyond their primary role in landmark-based representations of places, hippocampal place cells may be involved in computing the current distances to the landmarks. Beyond their primary role in landmark-based representations of headings, post-subicular head-direction cells may be involved in computing the “compass bearings” of the landmarks.
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Vallortigara, G., Regolin, L., Rigoni, M., & Zanforlin, M. (1998). Delayed search for a concealed imprinted object in the domestic chick. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 17–24.
Abstract: Five-day-old chicks were accustomed to follow an imprinted object (a small red ball with which they had been reared) that was moving slowly in a large arena, until it disappeared behind an opaque screen. In experiments, each chick was initially confined in a transparent cage, from where it could see and track the ball while it moved towards, and then beyond, one of two screens. The screens could be either identical or differ in colour and pattern. Either immediately after the disappearance of the ball, or with a certain delay, the chick was released and allowed to search for its imprinted object behind either screen. The results showed that chicks took into account the directional cue provided by the ball movement and its concealment, up to a delay period of about 180 s, independently of the perceptual characteristics of the two screens. If an opaque partition was positioned in front of the transparent cage immediately after the ball had disappeared, so that, throughout the delay, neither the goal-object nor the two screens were visible, chicks were still capable of remembering and choosing the correct screen, though over a much shorter period of about 60 s. The results suggest that, at least in this precocial bird species, very young chicks can maintain some form of representation of the location where a social partner was last seen, and are also capable of continuously updating this representation so as to take into account successive displacements of the goal-object.
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Shuster, G., & Sherman, P. W. (1998). Tool use by naked mole-rats. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 71–74.
Abstract: Naked mole-rats (Heterocephalus glaber, Rodentia: Bathyergidae) excavate extensive subterranean burrows with their procumbent incisors. Captive individuals often place a wood shaving or tuber husk behind their incisor teeth and in front of their lips and molar teeth while gnawing on substrates that yield fine particulate debris. This oral barrier may prevent choking or aspiration of foreign material. Consistent use of tools has rarely been reported in rodents.
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McNelis, N. L., & Boatright-Horowitz, S. L. (1998). Social monitoring in a primate group: the relationship between visual attention and hierarchical ranks. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 65–69.
Abstract: Social monitoring has been hypothesized to be an important component of primate social behavior. If the gaze direction of one animal can redirect the gaze of another, visual scanning of conspecifics can provide a more efficient means of locating food or predators than directly scanning the entire nonsocial environment. Social monitoring also allows distance regulation between members of a group, reducing the likelihood of agonistic encounters. Although assessment of gaze direction in freely moving primates is problematic, we were successful in assessing amounts of visual scanning among adult females of a captive, socially housed group of patas monkeys (Erythrocebus patas) using a focal sampling technique with on-the-dot recording (5-s sampling intervals). In study 1, relative amounts of scanning were assessed as subjects gazed at any other member of the group. Percentages of agreement between observers ranged from 80% to 92%, with corresponding s values ranging from 0.74 to 0.92. In study 2, relative amounts of visual scanning were assessed so that specific targets of gaze were identified. The resultant data supported a long-standing prediction about the role of social monitoring in primate group dynamics. Lower-ranking animals gazed toward higher-ranking animals more often than vice versa. Although the specific cues eliciting social monitoring remain to be determined, visual attention in this social primate group appeared to be systematically related to hierarchical ranks, assessed by displacements. Minimally, these results suggest that patas monkeys structure their visual attention based on previous encounters with other members of their social group. While simple discrimination learning could account for these results, the demonstration of a systematic relationship between visual attention and primate social dynamics is relevant to current discussions of a primate's understanding of conspecific gaze direction.
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Miklósi, A., Polgárdi, R., Topál, J., & Csányi, V. (1998). Use of experimenter-given cues in dogs. Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 113–121.
Abstract: Since the observations of O. Pfungst the use of human-provided cues by animals has been well-known in the behavioural sciences (“Clever Hans effect”). It has recently been shown that rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) are unable to use the direction of gazing by the experimenter as a cue for finding food, although after some training they learned to respond to pointing by hand. Direction of gaze is used by chimpanzees, however. Dogs (Canis familiaris) are believed to be sensitive to human gestural communication but their ability has never been formally tested. In three experiments we examined whether dogs can respond to cues given by humans. We found that dogs are able to utilize pointing, bowing, nodding, head-turning and glancing gestures of humans as cues for finding hidden food. Dogs were also able to generalize from one person (owner) to another familiar person (experimenter) in using the same gestures as cues. Baseline trials were run to test the possibility that odour cues alone could be responsible for the dogs' performance. During training individual performance showed limited variability, probably because some dogs already “knew” some of the cues from their earlier experiences with humans. We suggest that the phenomenon of dogs responding to cues given by humans is better analysed as a case of interspecific communication than in terms of discrimination learning.
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Dyer, F. C. (1998). Spatial Cognition: Lessons from Central-place Foraging Insects. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 119–154). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary Spatial orientation has played an extremely important role in the development of ideas about the behavioral capacities of animals. Indeed, as the modern scientific study of animal behavior emerged from its roots in zoology and experimental psychology, studies of spatial orientation figured in the work of many of the pioneering researchers, including Tinbergen (), von ), Watson () and .
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Smith, W. J. (1998). Cognitive Implications of an Information-sharing Model of Animal Communication. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 227–243). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In social communication, one animal signals and another responds. Several cognitive steps are involved as the second animal selects its responses; these steps can be described as follows in terms of an informational model. First, the responding individual must evaluate the information made available by the signaling on the basis of other information, available from sources contextual to the signal. Second, the respondent must fit all of the relevant information into patterns generated from recall of past events (conscious recall is not generally required; pattern fitting is a fundamental skill). Third, conditional predictions must be made; and fourth, the individual must test and modify any of these predictions for which significant consequences exist. Many vertebrate animals appear to respond to signaling with considerable flexibility. Communicative events are thus complex but are by no means intractable. Indeed, communication provides us with excellent opportunities to investigate animal cognition.
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Beer, C. G. (1998). Varying Views of Animal and Human Cognition. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 435–456). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In this chapter I want to stand back from the splendid empirical work on animal cognitive capacities that is the focus of this book, and look at the broader context of cognitive concerns within which the work can be viewed. Indeed even the term `cognitive ethology' currently connotes and denotes more than is represented here, as other collections of articles, such as and , exemplify. I include the current descendants of behavioristic learning theory, evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary psychology and the recent comparative turn that has been taken in cognitive science. These several approaches, despite their considerable overlap, often appear independent and even ignorant of one another. Like the proverbial blind men feeling the hide of an elephant, they touch hands from time to time, yet collectively have only a piecemeal and distributed understanding of the shape of the whole. Although each approach may indeed need the space to work out its own conceptual and methodological preoccupations without confounding interference from other views, a utopian spirit envisages an ultimate coming together, a more comprehensive realization of the synthetic approach to animal cognition that is this book's theme.
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