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de Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Darwin's legacy and the study of primate visual communication. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1000, 7–31.
Abstract: After Charles Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, published in 1872, we had to wait 60 years before the theme of animal expressions was picked up by another astute observer. In 1935, Nadezhda Ladygina-Kohts published a detailed comparison of the expressive behavior of a juvenile chimpanzee and of her own child. After Kohts, we had to wait until the 1960s for modern ethological analyses of primate facial and gestural communication. Again, the focus was on the chimpanzee, but ethograms on other primates appeared as well. Our understanding of the range of expressions in other primates is at present far more advanced than that in Darwin's time. A strong social component has been added: instead of focusing on the expressions per se, they are now often classified according to the social situations in which they typically occur. Initially, quantitative analyses were sequential (i.e., concerned with temporal associations between behavior patterns), and they avoided the language of emotions. I will discuss some of this early work, including my own on the communicative repertoire of the bonobo, a close relative of the chimpanzee (and ourselves). I will provide concrete examples to make the point that there is a much richer matrix of contexts possible than the common behavioral categories of aggression, sex, fear, play, and so on. Primate signaling is a form of negotiation, and previous classifications have ignored the specifics of what animals try to achieve with their exchanges. There is also increasing evidence for signal conventionalization in primates, especially the apes, in both captivity and the field. This process results in group-specific or “cultural” communication patterns.
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Mrosovsky, N., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1974). Further studies of the sea-finding mechanism in green turtle hatchlings. Behaviour, 51(3-4), 195–208.
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Rogers, L. J. (2000). Evolution of hemispheric specialization: advantages and disadvantages. Brain Lang, 73(2), 236–253.
Abstract: Lateralization of the brain appeared early in evolution and many of its features appear to have been retained, possibly even in humans. We now have a considerable amount of information on the different forms of lateralization in a number of species, and the commonalities of these are discussed, but there has been relatively little investigation of the advantages of being lateralized. This article reports new findings on the differences between lateralized and nonlateralized chicks. The lateralized chicks were exposed to light for 24 h on day 19 of incubation, a treatment known to lead to lateralization of a number of visually guided responses, and the nonlateralized chicks were incubated in the dark. When they were feeding, the lateralized chicks were found to detect a stimulus resembling a raptor with shorter latency than nonlateralized chicks. This difference was not a nonspecific effect caused by the light-exposed chicks being more distressed by the stimulus. Instead, it appears to be a genuine advantage conferred by having a lateralized brain. It is suggested that having a lateralized brain allows dual attention to the tasks of feeding (right eye and left hemisphere) and vigilance for predators (left eye and right hemisphere). Nonlateralized chicks appear to perform these dual tasks less efficiently than lateralized ones. Reference is made to other species in discussing these results.
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Loveland, K. A. (1995). Self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: ecological considerations. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 254–257.
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Hart, D., & Whitlow, J. W. J. (1995). The experience of self in the bottlenose dolphin. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 244–247.
Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.
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Anderson, J. R. (1995). Self-recognition in dolphins: credible cetaceans; compromised criteria, controls, and conclusions. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 239–243.
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Marten, K., & Psarakos, S. (1995). Using self-view television to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior in the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus). Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 205–224.
Abstract: In mirror mark tests dolphins twist, posture, and engage in open-mouth and head movements, often repetitive. Because postures and an open mouth are also dolphin social behaviors, we used self-view television as a manipulatable mirror to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior. Two dolphins were exposed to alternating real-time self-view (“mirror mode”) and playback of the same to determine if they distinguished between them. The adult male engaged in elaborate open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode, but usually just watched when played back the same material. Mirror mode behavior was also compared to interacting with real dolphins (controls). Mark tests were conducted, as well as switches from front to side self-views to see if the dolphins turned. They presented marked areas to the self-view television and turned. The results suggest self-examination over social behavior.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (1972). Stimulus relevance in the control of drinking and conditioned fear responses in domestic chicks (Gallus gallus). J Comp Physiol Psychol, 80(2), 175–198.
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Brauer, J., Kaminski, J., Riedel, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Making inferences about the location of hidden food: social dog, causal ape. J Comp Psychol, 120(1), 38–47.
Abstract: Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and great apes from the genus Pan were tested on a series of object choice tasks. In each task, the location of hidden food was indicated for subjects by some kind of communicative, behavioral, or physical cue. On the basis of differences in the ecologies of these 2 genera, as well as on previous research, the authors hypothesized that dogs should be especially skillful in using human communicative cues such as the pointing gesture, whereas apes should be especially skillful in using physical, causal cues such as food in a cup making noise when it is shaken. The overall pattern of performance by the 2 genera strongly supported this social-dog, causal-ape hypothesis. This result is discussed in terms of apes' adaptations for complex, extractive foraging and dogs' adaptations, during the domestication process, for cooperative communication with humans.
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Vokey, J. R., Rendall, D., Tangen, J. M., Parr, L. A., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2004). Visual kin recognition and family resemblance in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J Comp Psychol, 118(2), 194–199.
Abstract: The male-offspring biased visual kin recognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) reported by L. A. Parr and F. B. M. de Waal (1999) was replicated with human (Homo sapiens) participants and a principal components analysis (PCA) of pixel maps of the chimpanzee face photos. With the same original materials and methods, both humans and the PCA produced the same asymmetry in kin recognition as found with the chimpanzees. The PCA suggested that the asymmetry was a function of differences in the distribution of global characteristics associated with the framing of the faces in the son and daughter test sets. Eliminating potential framing biases, either by cropping the photos tightly to the faces or by rebalancing the recognition foils, eliminated the asymmetry but not human participants' ability to recognize chimpanzee kin.
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