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Ikeda, M., Patterson, K., Graham, K. S., Ralph, M. A. L., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). A horse of a different colour: do patients with semantic dementia recognise different versions of the same object as the same? Neuropsychologia, 44(4), 566–575.
Abstract: Ten patients with semantic dementia resulting from bilateral anterior temporal lobe atrophy, and 10 matched controls, were tested on an object recognition task in which they were invited to choose (from a four-item array) the picture representing “the same thing” as an object picture that they had just inspected and attempted to name. The target in the response array was never physically identical to the studied picture but differed from it – in the various conditions – in size, angle of view, colour or exemplar (e.g. a different breed of dog). In one test block for each patient, the response array was presented immediately after the studied picture was removed; in another block, a 2 min filled delay was inserted between study and test. The patients performed relatively well when the studied object and target response differed only in the size of the picture on the page, but were significantly impaired as a group in the other three type-of-change conditions, even with no delay between study and test. The five patients whose structural brain imaging revealed major right-temporal atrophy were more impaired overall, and also more affected by the 2 min delay, than the five patients with an asymmetric pattern characterised by predominant left-sided atrophy. These results are interpreted in terms of a hypothesis that successful classification of an object token as an object type is not a pre-semantic ability but rather results from interaction of perceptual and conceptual processing.
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Lonon, A. M., & Zentall, T. R. (1999). Transfer of value from S+ to S- in simultaneous discriminations in humans. Am J Psychol, 112(1), 21–39.
Abstract: When animals learn a simultaneous discrimination, some of the value of the positive stimulus (S+) appears to transfer to the negative stimulus (S-). The present experiments demonstrate that such value transfer can also be found in humans. In Experiment 1 humans were trained on 2 simple simultaneous discriminations, the first between a highly positive stimulus, A (1,000 points); and a negative stimulus, B (0 points); and the second between a less positive stimulus, C (100 points); and a negative stimulus, D (0 points). On test trials, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiments 2 and 3 the value of the 2 original discriminations was equated in training (A[100]B[0] and C[100]D[0]). In Experiment 2 the values of the positive stimuli were then altered (A[1,000]C[0]); again, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiment 3, however, when the values of B and D were altered (B[1,000]D[0]), participants were indifferent to A and C. Thus, the mechanism that underlies value transfer in humans appears to be related to Pavlovian second-order conditioning. Similar mechanisms may be involved in assimilation processes in social contexts.
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Gallistel, C. R., & Cramer, A. E. (1996). Computations on metric maps in mammals: getting oriented and choosing a multi-destination route. J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 211–217.
Abstract: The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once.
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Clement, T. S., Weaver, J. E., Sherburne, L. M., & Zentall, T. R. (1998). Simultaneous discrimination learning in pigeons: value of S- affects the relative value of its associated S+. Q J Exp Psychol B, 51(4), 363–378.
Abstract: In a simple simultaneous discrimination involving a positive stimulus (S+) and a negative stimulus (S-), it has been hypothesized that positive value can transfer from the S+ to the S- (thus increasing the relative value of the S-) and also that negative value can transfer from the S- to the S+ (thus diminishing the relative value of the S+; Fersen, Wynne, Delius, & Staddon, 1991). Evidence for positive value transfer has been reported in pigeons (e.g. Zentall & Sherburne, 1994). The purpose of the present experiments was to determine, in a simultaneous discrimination, whether the S- diminishes the value of the S+ or the S- is contrasted with the S+ (thus enhancing the value of the S+). In two experiments, we found evidence for contrast, rather than value transfer, attributable to simultaneous discrimination training. Thus, not only does the S+ appear to enhance the value of the S-, but the S- appears to enhance rather than reduce the value of the S+.
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Healy, S., & Braithwaite, V. (2000). Cognitive ecology: a field of substance? Trends. Ecol. Evol, 15(1), 22–26.
Abstract: In 1993, Les Real invented the label 'cognitive ecology'. This label was intended for work that brought cognitive science and behavioural ecology together. Real's article stressed the importance of such an approach to the understanding of behaviour. At the end of a decade in which more interdisciplinary work on behaviour has been seen than for many years, it is time to assess whether cognitive ecology is a label describing an active field.
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Wagner, G. (1975). [Flight leadership in flocks of homing pigeons]. Z. Tierpsychol., (39), 61–74.
Abstract: Groups of 3-5 homing pigeons individually recognizable by different colours of their plumage were followed by helicopter on their way home. In most cases the animals flew together as a group with frequently changing leadership. Flight formations in terms of leadership were noted every minute. It was examined statistically whether the flight order varies at random or whether there are leading and led birds. In 6 out of 7 experiments with groups of 4-5 pigeons flight order was far from random, one or two pigeons proving to be leaders. In only one experiment leadership did not differ from a random distribution. No correlation could be found between the tendency to lead within a group and homing performance of the single pigeon when released individually.
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