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Plotnik, J. M., de Waal, F. B. M., & Reiss, D. (2006). Self-recognition in an Asian elephant. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 103(45), 17053–17057.
Abstract: Considered an indicator of self-awareness, mirror self-recognition (MSR) has long seemed limited to humans and apes. In both phylogeny and human ontogeny, MSR is thought to correlate with higher forms of empathy and altruistic behavior. Apart from humans and apes, dolphins and elephants are also known for such capacities. After the recent discovery of MSR in dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), elephants thus were the next logical candidate species. We exposed three Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) to a large mirror to investigate their responses. Animals that possess MSR typically progress through four stages of behavior when facing a mirror: (i) social responses, (ii) physical inspection (e.g., looking behind the mirror), (iii) repetitive mirror-testing behavior, and (iv) realization of seeing themselves. Visible marks and invisible sham-marks were applied to the elephants' heads to test whether they would pass the litmus “mark test” for MSR in which an individual spontaneously uses a mirror to touch an otherwise imperceptible mark on its own body. Here, we report a successful MSR elephant study and report striking parallels in the progression of responses to mirrors among apes, dolphins, and elephants. These parallels suggest convergent cognitive evolution most likely related to complex sociality and cooperation.
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Bonnie, K. E., Horner, V., Whiten, A., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2007). Spread of arbitrary conventions among chimpanzees: a controlled experiment. Proc Biol Sci, 274(1608), 367–372.
Abstract: Wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have a rich cultural repertoire--traditions common in some communities are not present in others. The majority of reports describe functional, material traditions, such as tool use. Arbitrary conventions have received far less attention. In the same way that observations of material culture in wild apes led to experiments to confirm social transmission and identify underlying learning mechanisms, experiments investigating how arbitrary habits or conventions arise and spread within a group are also required. The few relevant experimental studies reported thus far have relied on cross-species (i.e. human-ape) interaction offering limited ecological validity, and no study has successfully generated a tradition not involving tool use in an established group. We seeded one of two rewarded alternative endpoints to a complex sequence of behaviour in each of two chimpanzee groups. Each sequence spread in the group in which it was seeded, with many individuals unambiguously adopting the sequence demonstrated by a group member. In one group, the alternative sequence was discovered by a low ranking female, but was not learned by others. Since the action-sequences lacked meaning before the experiment and had no logical connection with reward, chimpanzees must have extracted both the form and benefits of these sequences through observation of others.
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Flack, J. C., Krakauer, D. C., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). Robustness mechanisms in primate societies: a perturbation study. Proc Biol Sci, 272(1568), 1091–1099.
Abstract: Conflict management mechanisms have a direct, critical effect on system robustness because they mitigate conflict intensity and help repair damaged relationships. However, robustness mechanisms can also have indirect effects on system integrity by facilitating interactions among components. We explore the indirect role that conflict management mechanisms play in the maintenance of social system robustness, using a perturbation technique to 'knockout' components responsible for effective conflict management. We explore the effects of knockout on pigtailed macaque (Macaca nemestrina) social organization, using a captive group of 84 individuals. This system is ideal in addressing this question because there is heterogeneity in performance of conflict management. Consequently, conflict managers can be easily removed without disrupting other control structures. We find that powerful conflict managers are essential in maintaining social order for the benefit of all members of society. We show that knockout of components responsible for conflict management results in system destabilization by significantly increasing mean levels of conflict and aggression, decreasing socio-positive interaction and decreasing the operation of repair mechanisms.
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Brosnan, S. F., Schiff, H. C., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). Tolerance for inequity may increase with social closeness in chimpanzees. Proc Biol Sci, 272(1560), 253–258.
Abstract: Economic decision-making depends on our social environment. Humans tend to respond differently to inequity in close relationships, yet we know little about the potential for such variation in other species. We examine responses to inequity in several groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in a paradigm similar to that used previously in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). We demonstrate that, like capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees show a response to inequity of rewards that is based upon the partner receiving the reward rather than the presence of the reward alone. However, we also found a great amount of variation between groups tested, indicating that chimpanzees, like people, respond to inequity in a variable manner, which we speculate could be caused by such variables as group size, the social closeness of the group (as reflected in length of time that the group has been together) and group-specific traditions.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Aureli, F. (1996). Consolation, reconciliation, and a possible cognitive difference between macaque and chimpanzee. In A. E. Russon, K. A. Bard, & S. T. Parker (Eds.), Reaching into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes (pp. 80–110.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract: Russon,A.E.; Bard, K.A.; Parker, S.T.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). How animals do business. Sci Am, 292(4), 54–61.
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Flack, J. C., de Waal, F. B. M., & Krakauer, D. C. (2005). Social structure, robustness, and policing cost in a cognitively sophisticated species. Am Nat, 165(5), E126–139.
Abstract: Conflict management is one of the primary requirements for social complexity. Of the many forms of conflict management, one of the rarest and most interesting is third-party policing, or intervening impartially to control conflict. Third-party policing should be hard to evolve because policers personally pay a cost for intervening, while the benefits are diffused over the whole group. In this study we investigate the incidence and costs of policing in a primate society. We report quantitative evidence of non-kin policing in the nonhuman primate, the pigtailed macaque. We find that policing is effective at reducing the intensity of or terminating conflict when performed by the most powerful individuals. We define a measure, social power consensus, that predicts effective low-cost interventions by powerful individuals and ineffective, relatively costly interventions by low-power individuals. Finally, we develop a simple probabilistic model to explore whether the degree to which policing can effectively reduce the societal cost of conflict is dependent on variance in the distribution of power. Our data and simple model suggest that third-party policing effectiveness and cost are dependent on power structure and might emerge only in societies with high variance in power.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Ferrari, P. F. (2010). Towards a bottom-up perspective on animal and human cognition. Trends Cognit. Sci., 14(5), 201–207.
Abstract: Over the last few decades, comparative cognitive research has focused on the pinnacles of mental evolution, asking all-or-nothing questions such as which animals (if any) possess a theory of mind, culture, linguistic abilities, future planning, and so on. Research programs adopting this top-down perspective have often pitted one taxon against another, resulting in sharp dividing lines. Insight into the underlying mechanisms has lagged behind. A dramatic change in focus now seems to be under way, however, with increased appreciation that the basic building blocks of cognition might be shared across a wide range of species. We argue that this bottom-up perspective, which focuses on the constituent capacities underlying larger cognitive phenomena, is more in line with both neuroscience and evolutionary biology.
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