| Home | << 1 2 3 4 5 >> |
|
Shettleworth, S. J., & Sutton, J. E. (2005). Multiple systems for spatial learning: dead reckoning and beacon homing in rats. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 31(2), 125–141.
Abstract: Rats homed with food in a large lighted arena. Without visual cues, they used dead reckoning. When a beacon indicated the home, rats could also use the beacon. Homing did not differ in 2 groups of rats, 1 provided with the beacon and 1 without it; tests without the beacon gave no evidence that beacon learning overshadowed dead reckoning (Experiment 1). When the beacon was at the home for 1 group and in random locations for another, there was again no evidence of cue competition (Experiment 2). Dead reckoning experience did not block acquisition of beacon homing (Experiment 3). Beacon learning and dead reckoning do not compete for predictive value but acquire information in parallel and are used hierarchically.
|
|
Shettleworth, S. J. (1993). Varieties of learning and memory in animals. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 19(1), 5–14.
Abstract: It is often assumed that there is more than one kind of learning--or more than one memory system--each of which is specialized for a different function. Yet, the criteria by which the varieties of learning and memory should be distinguished are seldom clear. Learning and memory phenomena can differ from one another across species or situations (and thus be specialized) in a number of different ways. What is needed is a consistent theoretical approach to the whole range of learning phenomena, and one is explored here. Parallels and contrasts in the study of sensory systems illustrate one way to integrate the study of general mechanisms with an appreciation of species-specific adaptations.
|
|
Katz, J. S., & Wright, A. A. (2006). Same/different abstract-concept learning by pigeons. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(1), 80–86.
Abstract: Eight pigeons were trained and tested in a simultaneous same/different task. After pecking an upper picture, they pecked a lower picture to indicate same or a white rectangle to indicate different. Increases in the training set size from 8 to 1,024 items produced improved transfer from 51.3% to 84.6%. This is the first evidence that pigeons can perform a two-item same/different task as accurately with novel items as training items and both above 80% correct. Fixed-set control groups ruled out training time or transfer testing as producing the high level of abstract-concept learning. Comparisons with similar experiments with rhesus and capuchin monkeys showed that the ability to learn the same/different abstract concept was similar but that pigeons require more training exemplars.
|
|
Vlamings, P. H. J. M., Uher, J., & Call, J. (2006). How the great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) perform on the reversed contingency task: the effects of food quantity and food visibility. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(1), 60–70.
Abstract: S. T. Boysen and G. G. Berntson (1995) found that chimpanzees performed poorly on a reversed contingency task in which they had to point to the smaller of 2 food quantities to acquire the larger quantity. The authors compared the performance of 4 great ape species (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) on the reversed contingency task while manipulating food quantity (0-4 or 1-4) and food visibility (visible pairs or covered pairs). Results showed no systematic species differences but large individual differences. Some individuals of each species were able to solve the reversed contingency task. Both quantity and visibility of the food items had a significant effect on performance. Subjects performed better when the disparity between quantities was smaller and the quantities were not directly visible.
|
|
Church, R. M. (1997). Quantitative models of animal learning and cognition. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 23(4), 379–389.
Abstract: This article reviews the prerequisites for quantitative models of animal learning and cognition, describes the types of models, provides a rationale for the development of such quantitative models, describes criteria for their evaluation, and makes recommendations for the next generation of quantitative models. A modular approach to the development of models is described in which a procedure is considered as a generator of stimuli and a model is considered as a generator of responses. The goal is to develop models that, in combination with many different procedures, produce sequences of times of occurrence of events (stimuli and responses) that are indistinguishable from those produced by the animal under many experimental procedures and data analysis techniques.
|
|
Fetterman, J. G. (1996). Dimensions of stimulus complexity. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 22(1), 3–18.
Abstract: Animal learning research has increasingly used complex stimuli that approximate natural objects, events, and locations, a trend that has accompanied a resurgence of interest in the role of cognitive factors in learning. Accounts of complex stimulus control have focused mainly on cognitive mechanisms and largely ignored the contribution of stimulus information to perception and memory for complex events. It is argued here that research on animal learning stands to benefit from a more detailed consideration of the stimulus and that James Gibson's stimulus-centered theory of perception serves as a useful framework for analyses of complex stimuli. Several issues in the field of animal learning and cognition are considered from the Gibsonian perspective on stimuli, including the fundamental problem of defining the effective stimulus.
Keywords: Animals; *Behavior, Animal; Cognition; *Learning; Memory; Time Factors
|
|
Whiten, A., Horner, V., Litchfield, C. A., & Marshall-Pescini, S. (2004). How do apes ape? Learn. Behav., 32(1), 36–52.
Abstract: In the wake of telling critiques of the foundations on which earlier conclusions were based, the last 15 years have witnessed a renaissance in the study of social learning in apes. As a result, we are able to review 31 experimental studies from this period in which social learning in chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans has been investigated. The principal question framed at the beginning of this era, Do apes ape? has been answered in the affirmative, at least in certain conditions. The more interesting question now is, thus, How do apes ape? Answering this question has engendered richer taxonomies of the range of social-learning processes at work and new methodologies to uncover them. Together, these studies suggest that apes ape by employing a portfolio of alternative social-learning processes in flexibly adaptive ways, in conjunction with nonsocial learning. We conclude by sketching the kind of decision tree that appears to underlie the deployment of these alternatives.
|
|
Nicol, C. J. (2004). Development, direction, and damage limitation: social learning in domestic fowl. Learn Behav, 32(1), 72–81.
Abstract: This review highlights two areas of particular interest in the study of social learning in fowl. First, the role of social learning in the development of feeding and foraging behavior in young chicks and older birds is described. The role of the hen as a demonstrator and possible teacher is considered, and the subsequent social influence of brood mates and other companions on food avoidance and food preference learning is discussed. Second, the way in which work on domestic fowl has contributed to an understanding of the importance of directed social learning is examined. The well-characterized hierarchical social organization of small chicken flocks has been used to design studies which demonstrate that the probability of social transmission is strongly influenced by social relationships between birds. The practical implications of understanding the role of social learning in the spread of injurious behaviors in this economically important species are briefly considered.
|
|
Zentall, T. R. (2004). Action imitation in birds. Learn Behav, 32(1), 15–23.
Abstract: Action imitation, once thought to be a behavior almost exclusively limited to humans and the great apes, surprisingly also has been found in a number of bird species. Because imitation has been viewed by some psychologists as a form of intelligent behavior, there has been interest in how it is distributed among animal species. Although the mechanisms responsible for action imitation are not clear, we are now at least beginning to understand the conditions under which it occurs. In this article, I try to identify and differentiate the various forms of socially influenced behavior (species-typical social reactions, social effects on motivation, social effects on perception, socially influenced learning, and action imitation) and explain why it is important to differentiate imitation from other forms of social influence. I also examine some of the variables that appear to be involved in the occurrence of imitation. Finally, I speculate about why a number of bird species, but few mammal species, appear to imitate.
|
|
Fragaszy, D., & Visalberghi, E. (2004). Socially biased learning in monkeys. Learn Behav, 32(1), 24–35.
Abstract: We review socially biased learning about food and problem solving in monkeys, relying especially on studies with tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and callitrichid monkeys. Capuchin monkeys most effectively learn to solve a new problem when they can act jointly with an experienced partner in a socially tolerant setting and when the problem can be solved by direct action on an object or substrate, but they do not learn by imitation. Capuchin monkeys are motivated to eat foods, whether familiar or novel, when they are with others that are eating, regardless of what the others are eating. Thus, social bias in learning about foods is indirect and mediated by facilitation of feeding. In most respects, social biases in learning are similar in capuchins and callitrichids, except that callitrichids provide more specific behavioral cues to others about the availability and palatability of foods. Callitrichids generally are more tolerant toward group members and coordinate their activity in space and time more closely than capuchins do. These characteristics support stronger social biases in learning in callitrichids than in capuchins in some situations. On the other hand, callitrichids' more limited range of manipulative behaviors, greater neophobia, and greater sensitivity to the risk of predation restricts what these monkeys learn in comparison with capuchins. We suggest that socially biased learning is always the collective outcome of interacting physical, social, and individual factors, and that differences across populations and species in social bias in learning reflect variations in all these dimensions. Progress in understanding socially biased learning in nonhuman species will be aided by the development of appropriately detailed models of the richly interconnected processes affecting learning.
|