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Carlsson, H. - E., Lyberg, K., Royo, F., & Hau, J. (2007). Quantification of stress sensitive markers in single fecal samples do not accurately predict excretion of these in the pig. Research in Veterinary Science, 82(3), 423–428.
Abstract: All feces produced during 24 h were collected from five pigs and cortisol and immunoreactive cortisol metabolites (CICM), and IgA were quantified. Within pigs, the concentrations of CICM and IgA varied extensively between random samples obtained from a single fecal dropping, and deviated in most cases significantly from the true concentration measured in total fecal output (CV 6.7–130%). The CICM and IgA contents varied considerably (CV 8.1–114%) within and between individual fecal droppings from the same pig compared to the total fecal excretion. In conclusion, single random samples could not be used to reliably quantify the total fecal concentration or excretion of CICM or IgA in pigs. Analyses of all feces collected during shorter periods than 24 h did not provide an accurate estimate of the daily excretion of CICM. Thus, the concentration of stress sensitive molecules in random single fecal samples as an indicator of animal welfare should be interpreted with prudence.
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Rapin, V., Poncet, P. A., Burger, D., Mermod, C., & Richard, M. A. (2007). [Measurement of the attention time in the horse]. Schweiz Arch Tierheilkd, 149(2), 77–83.
Abstract: A study carried out on 49 horses showed that it is possible to measure the attention time by operant conditioning. After teaching horses an instrumental task using a signal, we were then able to test their attention time by asking them to prolong it increasingly while setting success and failure criteria. Two tests were performed 3 weeks apart. The 2nd test was feasible without relearning, a proof of memory, and was repeatable, a proof of consistency in the attention time. A significant difference was observed between the 3 age groups. Young horses often performed very well during the 1st test but their attention dropped in the 2nd test while older horses were more stable with respect to attention and even increased it slightly. The study shows that there are individual differences but it was not possible to prove a significant influence of breed, gender and paternal influence. Consequently, learning appears to be one of the most interesting approaches for evaluating the attention of horses and for observing their behaviour.
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Silk, J. B. (2007). Social Components of Fitness in Primate Groups. Science, 317(5843), 1347–1351.
Abstract: There is much interest in the evolutionary forces that favored the evolution of large brains in the primate order. The social brain hypothesis posits that selection has favored larger brains and more complex cognitive capacities as a means to cope with the challenges of social life. The hypothesis is supported by evidence that shows that group size is linked to various measures of brain size. But it has not been clear how cognitive complexity confers fitness advantages on individuals. Research in the field and laboratory shows that sophisticated social cognition underlies social behavior in primate groups. Moreover, a growing body of evidence suggests that the quality of social relationships has measurable fitness consequences for individuals.
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Pennisi, E. (2007). PSYCHOLOGY: Nonhuman Primates Demonstrate Humanlike Reasoning. Science, 317(5843), 1308–.
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Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in Nonhuman Primates. Science, 317(5843), 1402–1405.
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). online material (Vol. 317).
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Dunbar, R. I. M., & Shultz, S. (2007). Evolution in the Social Brain. Science, 317(5843), 1344–1347.
Abstract: The evolution of unusually large brains in some groups of animals, notably primates, has long been a puzzle. Although early explanations tended to emphasize the brain's role in sensory or technical competence (foraging skills, innovations, and way-finding), the balance of evidence now clearly favors the suggestion that it was the computational demands of living in large, complex societies that selected for large brains. However, recent analyses suggest that it may have been the particular demands of the more intense forms of pairbonding that was the critical factor that triggered this evolutionary development. This may explain why primate sociality seems to be so different from that found in most other birds and mammals: Primate sociality is based on bonded relationships of a kind that are found only in pairbonds in other taxa.
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Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). online material. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
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Ash, C., Chin, G., Pennisi, E., & Sugden, A. (2007). Living in Societies. Science, 317(5843), 1337–.
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Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
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